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← 169 Conn. App. 708 - In re Lilyana P.

169 Conn. App. 708 - In re Lilyana P.’s Empirical Analysis

2016

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
February 2019
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (§ 2 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990)

Relies on In re Antony B. · Com. v. 2002 Subaru Impreza and Nokia Tracphone seized from A. Glushko ~ Appeal of: A. Glushko · 166 Conn. App. 48 - In re Leilah W. · 147 Conn. App. 435 - In re Sena W.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Personal rehabilitation as used in [ § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) ] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent.... The statute does not require [a parent] to prove precisely when [she] will be able to assume a responsible position in [her] child's life. Nor does it require [her] to prove that [she] will be able to assume full responsibility for [her] child, unaided by available support systems.... Rather, [ § 17a-112 ] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time.... [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [the parent] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he or she] can assume a responsible position in [his or her] child's life.... [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his or her] ability to manage [his or her] own life, but rather whether [he or she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Our Supreme Court has clarified that [a] conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court's factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in assessing whether those findings satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B). Accordingly ... the appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate conclusion].... When applying this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial court.... We will not disturb the court's subordinate factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “A hearing on a termination of parental rights petition consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition.... In the adjudicatory phase, the court must determine whether the [commissioner] has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, a proper ground for termination of parental rights.... In the dispositional phase, once a ground for termination has been proven, the court must determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.