169 Ill. App. 3d 520 - Phillips v. Joyce’s Empirical Analysis
1988
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 3 district · 21 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently June 2017 · most notably 246 Ill. App. 3d 719 - Holstein v. Grossman (1993), Kaplan v. Pavalon & Gifford (1993)
4 federal appellate · 3 district · 21 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 60 Ill. 2d 141 - Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc. · 78 Ill. 2d 217 - Rhoades v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · 93 Ill. App. 3d 517 - Corti v. Fleisher · 10 Ill. 2d 357 - In Re Heirich · 107 Ill. App. 3d 442 - Marvin N. Benn & Associates, Ltd. v. Nelsen Steel & Wire, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"To determine which agreements violate the canons of ethics, then, we must consider the underlying policy considerations and the harm to be avoided by the particular disciplinary rule. Disciplinary Rule 2—107 aims to preserve the fiduciary relationship between a client and his attorney through disclosure of fee-sharing arrangements, thereby leading to greater accountability. In addition, the rule contains a proportionality concept, which can be viewed as protecting the client from unearned or excessive fees. Requiring a relationship between the fee claimed and services or responsibility assumed also ensures that the attorney will have the incentive to use his best efforts to resolve the case. [Citation.] It is readily apparent that DR 2—107 mandates disclosure to the client whenever his attorney enters into an agreement with another attorney to share fees and responsibility for the legal matters entrusted to the first attorney. Hence, the client’s right to be represented by the attorney of his choosing is preserved. No attorney whom the client has not retained will be entitled to payment from the client via a secret deal with the client’s attorney. Instead, the client must consent in writing to the shared fee and shared responsibility. * * * We believe, however, that a standard of substantial compliance is preferable because it comports with practical realities. In fact, such a standard is consonant with the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in Kravis v. Smith Marine, Inc. and”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(a) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm, unless (1) the client consents in a writing signed by him to employment of the other lawyer, which writing shall fully disclose (a) that a division of fees will be made, (b) the basis upon which the division will be made, including the economic benefit to be received by the other lawyer as a result of the division, and (c) the responsibility to be assumed by the other lawyer for the performance of the legal services in question.... In an effort to comply with the Illinois rule, two attorneys who assumed joint responsibility for a class action case sent a letter to all class clients indicating that the attorneys “were jointly representing their interests and that the clients must sign a new contingent fee agreement.” The letter generally mentioned the “combined efforts" of the attorneys. Respondent’s situation is different from that discussed in Phillips . Both attorneys clearly were identified in a written communication to the clients. Moreover, the proceeding here is before the Board and is a disciplinary action, not a civil lawsuit before a court of law.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“disciplinary rule 2-107 should not be too readily construed as a license for attorneys to break a promise, go back on their word, or decline to fulfill an obligation in the name of legal ethics.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.