169 Ind. App. 58 - Cordial v. Grimm’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In ruling on appellees' motion for summary judgment, however, the trial court was required to determine what statute of limitations was applicable to the cause of action stated by appellant by determining the legal basis of the action. "It is proper for a trial court to make such a determination in order to determine what law is applicable to a particular case. Sickels v. Aetna Securities Co., supra [ 220 Ind. 347 , 41 N.E.2d 947 ]. As stated by Judge Dillin in the case of Koehring Company v. National Automatic Tool Co. (1966), 257 F.Supp. 282 : 'The general rule is that, especially where forms of action have been abolished, as in Indiana, it is the nature or substance of the cause of action, rather than the form of the action, which determines the applicability of the statute of limitations. 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 33 P. 982 ." "Similarly, see, 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 105, pp. 677-78." 346 N.E.2d at 269 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shideler v. Dwyer · French v. Hickman Moving & Storage

2. ““ ‘Under the doctrine of Ejusdem Gen-eris, when words of specific or limited signification in a statute are followed by general words of more comprehensive import, the general words are construed to embrace only such things as are of like kind or class with those designated by the specific words, unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed. Short v. State (1954), 234 Ind. 17 , 122 N.E.2d 82 and cases cited therein. ‘But Ejusdem Generis is not a doctrine of mandatory application. It is merely one method available for determining the legislative intent in connection with a statute. Woods v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 423 , 140 N.E.2d 752 . The only purpose of Ejusdem Generis is to aid the courts in determining the true meaning of a statute. It should not become a device for unduly narrowing the scope and operation of statutes to an extent never envisioned by the General Assembly. Sherfey v. City of Brazil (1938), 213 In,d. 493, 13 N.E.2d 568 . ‘Too often it seems the doctrine is employed judicially to exclude cases from the scope of a statute when the language of the statute is clearly applicable to them. In other words the doctrine is often used to obviate legislative intent under the guise of judicial interpretation.’ Similarly, see, Woods v. State (1957), 236 Ind. 423, 427-28 , 140 N.E.2d 752, 753-54 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 179 Ind. App. 622 - Shideler v. Dwyer

3. ““In the case at bar, the substance of the factual allegations which the appellant made in his complaint is that the appellees’ actions or inactions rendered his valid workman’s compensation claim worthless. Such claim was a chose in action, and as such must be considered to have been the personal property of appellant. (Citations omitted). It is the alleged tortious damage to such personal property which gave rise to appellant’s cause of action, and it is for such damage that he sought compensation. In light of the foregoing, the trial court could have properly concluded that the provision of [Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2 (1976)] limiting the commencement of actions for damage to personal property was applicable to appellant’s cause of action, because such aspect of this case was the gravamen of the case. See, Rush v. Leiter, (1971) 149 Ind.App. 274 , 271 N.E.2d 505 .” (Emphasis added). Id. at 63-64, 346 N.E.2d at 270 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Shideler v. Dwyer