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169 Mass. 485

Green v. E. D. Smith

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided November 23, 1897

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1897-11-23

<p>Loss of Life — Employers’ Liability Act — Negligence of Superintendent — Death without Conscious Suffering — Law and Fact.</p> <p>In an action under the employers' liability act, St. 1887, c. 270, for causing the death of A., who was killed by an explosion of dynamite in a tunnel where he was at work, it appeared that, after a blast had been exploded in the tunnel, the defendant’s workmen, including A. and the person who was in superintendence of the work, returned down the shaft to the tunnel, carrying dynamite with them. The only survivor of the explosion which killed A. testified that, as soon as they reached the tunnel, the superintendent told the witness to go and get the loading stick, which he did, and gave it to another workman, near whom the superintendent was standing; that A. was making connection with wires on the other side of the tunnel and in front of the superintendent; that the witness saw the dynamite placed in the holes, after which the superintend- , ent gave them orders to go after the main wire; that the witness had gone fifteen or twenty feet when the explosion occurred; and that this was from ten to fifteen minutes after they started down the shaft. An expert witness testified that an explosion of dynamite in a hole drilled in a rock heated the rock; that it was dangerous to place dynamite in a rock which was so heated; and that, in his opinion, the second explosion was caused by the heated holes. Held, that it was for the jury to determine whether the superintendent was exercising superintendence.</p> <p>In an action under the employers’ liability act, St. 1887, c. 270, for causing the death of A., who was killed by an explosion of dynamite in a tunnel where he was at work, two witnesses who saw A. just after the explosion testified that his leg was broken and his body was badly cut and bruised, but they did not notice whether or not he was breathing. Of three physicians, to whom hypothetical questions were put, one answered that he should say that A. died without conscious suffering, basing his opinion upon the force of the explosion ; and the other two answered that they could not say whether or not A. died without conscious suffering, but on cross-examination stated that it was possible that he died instantly. One witness for the defendant, who saw A. soon after the explosion, testified that A. was laid on a pile of lumber and groaned very plainly, but did not speak, and seemed to be suffering, and he should say that he lived about twenty minutes; and another, who drove an ambulance in which A. was placed, testified that lie knew A. “ was alive and groaning,” and, on cross-examination, that he could hear him breathing, but did not hear him say anything. Held, that there was.evidence from which tiie jury might infer that A. died without conscious suffering.</p>

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently March 1908

3 state decisions

Relies on Whittaker v. Bent

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1897-11-23

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Allen, J.

¶1There was some evidence for the jury, that the defendants’ superintendent, while exercising superintendence, directed dynamite to be put into a hole while the rock was heated from the effect of a recent explosion; that under such circumstances an explosion was likely or liable to occur; and that the explosion which followed and caused the death of the plaintiff’s husband was the result of negligence on the part of *492the superintendent in thus directing the dynamite to be put in before the rock had become cool. Under the circumstances of the present case, it was for the jury to determine whether the superintendent was exercising superintendence; and in this respect the case is to be distinguished from Whittaker v. Bent, 167 Mass. 588.

¶2There was also evidence from which the jury might infer that the plaintiff’s husband died without conscious suffering. The small size of that portion of the tunnel where the accident occurred, the force of the explosion as shown by its effect, the proximity of the deceased, the distance to which he and the other men were thrown, and the injuries found upon his body, supplemented by the evidence of the doctors, might'lead the jury to be reasonably satisfied that the deceased was at once deprived of consciousness, and that he did not regain it, even though he may have breathed and groaned afterwards. The testimony as to these last matters may not have been accepted by the jury as absolutely accurate. The way in which the deceased was cared for by those who were rendering assistance at the time might be thought to indicate that they saw in him no signs of consciousness.

¶3We cannot say that there was no evidence for the jury on the above points; and the other objections taken by the defendants were not insisted on at the argument.

¶4 Exceptions overruled.

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