State v. . Lipkin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “. . . [N]o sooner is [the prohibited activity] defined, and the definition applied to a given state of facts, than ingenuity is at work to evolve some scheme of evasion which is within the mischief, but not quite within the letter, of the definition. But, in this way, it is not possible to escape the law’s condemnation, for it will strip the transaction of all its thin and false apparel and consider it in its very nakedness. It will look to the substance and not to the form of it, in order to disclose its real elements and the pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent. The court will inquire, not into the name, but into the game, however skillfully disguised, in order to ascertain if it is prohibited. . . .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 95 N.C. App. 258 - Animal Protection Society of Durham, Inc. v. State · 67 Wash. 2d 630 - Sherwood & Roberts—Yakima, Inc. v. Leach

2. ““So far as we can see from the evidence, the managers of the Mutual Supply Company exercised no more than an arbitrary choice of its customers as recipients of its gifts; but, however that may be in fact, the vice of the whole scheme lies farther back than that, and is found in the ‘chance’ which the customer takes when he pays his money under the terms of the contract, and the temptation held out to arouse the gambling spirit, which is just as evil and debasing as if there were any other kind of chance taken, and, besides, if he fails once or twice, or more times, to win the prize, and discontinues paying, he loses all that he has paid. So that if tempted by this cunning device, which so insidiously appeals to this gambling instinct, his money is risked in the hope of drawing a piece of furniture of much larger value, the person so investing it may lose or win, and in either event may retire, forfeiting what he had paid in the one case, and retaining what he has drawn in the other as the profit of his venture.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. Hecht

3. ““The same contention was made there (State v. Clarke, 33 N. H. 329) as in this case, that the choice of persons to receive the furniture was not by lot or chance, but by the judgment of the company which proposed to sell; but the court rejected it, and thus showed its fallacy: ‘With the purchaser, what prize he might obtain was a mere matter of lot and chance. The scheme involved substantially the same sort of gambling upon chances as in any other kind of lottery. It appealed to the same disposition for engaging in hazards and chances with the hope that luck and good fortune may give a great return for a small outlay, and is, we think, within the general meaning of the word “lottery,” and clearly within the mischief against which the statute is aimed.' Randle v. State, 42 Tex. 580 .” State v. Lipkin, 169 N. C. 265 ( 84 S. E. 340 , L. R. A. 1915F, 1018, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 137).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. People v. Wassmus