Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “• Whether the statement was spontaneous (fi.g., a “plea for assistance”) or elicited by others. A number of Texas courts have relied on similar considerations when addressing Crawford . 14 Implicit in this consideration is a recognition that, while excited utterances might not categorically be non-testimonial, the characteristic of spontaneity or lack of deliberation that establishes a particular statement is an excited utterance might nonetheless be a factor in whether it is testimonial. 15 • To whom the statement was made (e.g., “to a uniformed police officer” versus a friend or acquaintance). 16 • The age or sophistication of the de-clarant {e.g., “a reasonable 51-year-old declarant like Ford would have known that her accusations made to a uniformed police officer would be passed on to prosecutorial authorities to be used against appellant”). 17 • The nature of any involvement by law enforcement (e.g., was the statement made during police interrogation or investigation, or were the police attempting to respond to and gain control of a situation.). 18 • Related to the previous consideration, the temporal proximity of the statement to any emergency or exigent situation. 19”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Davis v. State · Lagunas v. State

2. “We understand the State's position to be that, by definition, an excited utterance is not made under circumstances conducive to subjective contemplation of future legal proceedings. We cannot agree. Moreover, even if we were to assume the State is correct in such premise, we nevertheless conclude, based on Crawford itself, that subjective contemplation is irrelevant to an analysis of whether such out-of-court statements would be testimonial or non-testimonial. First, the test set out in Crawford is objective, not subjective. Second, even if the test were subjective, the declarant's perception could be determined only through cross-examination. Crawford identifies as testimonial "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” And, in criticizing the application of the Roberts reliability test, the Court stated, the Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by "neutral” government officers. But even if the court’s assessment of the officer’s motives was accurate, it says nothing about Sylvia's perception of her situation. Only cross-examination could reveal that. Thus, even if the test were subjective, under Crawford , only cross-examination could reveal the complainant’s subjective perception of her situation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wall v. State

3. “ipso facto nontestimonial hearsay outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause and admissible into evidence” and instead held that”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wall v. State