Volume 17 — Connecticut Reports

<p>Where a committee in chancery, on a bill charging a combination between the defendant and others, to defraud the plaintiff in the sale of a mercantile concern, without finding any fraudulent intent, stated in their report, a train of circumstances brought about by the management of the defendant, by which the plaintiff was deceived and injured; and the court adjudged thereon, that the contract of sale was fraudulent and void ; on a motion in error by the defendant, it was held, 1. that it was questionable whether this court could review the evidence; 2. that it was competent to the court below to adjudge that the facts found by the committee were sufficient evidence of fraud; 3. that as it appeared from the finding of the committee, that the plaintiff entered into the contract from a mistake as to the real nature of the concern, in consequence of which the substantial object of the contract was defeated, this was a sufficient ground for setting it aside.</p> <p>Where the delay of the plaintiff to seek relief, was occasioned, in part at least, by the promise of the defendant to rectify the errors complained of; the existence of such errors came to the knowledge of the plaintiff gradually; and the circumstances of the case were such that the defendant could suffer nothing by the delay ; it was held, that the plaintiff was not precluded from relief, on the ground of his not having sought it within a reasonable time.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff, some time after the sale, under the terrors of threatened attachments then impending, by the adyice of the officer, and on a promise of the defendant to make all right, exeeuted mortgages to the defendant to secure the purchase money, and it did not appear that the plaintiff then had full knowledge of the errors; it was held, 1. that whether there was a waiver of the plaintiff’s right to relief, was a question of fact, which ought to appear distinctly on the record; 2, that if the question were open here, the fact relied on, did not, under the circumstances, amount to a waiver.</p> <p>Where contracts are entered into as auxiliary to a former contract between the same parties, and merely to secure its performance, if the principal contract be set aside, the others must fall with it.</p> <p>Where an instrument bipartite, purporting to be an assignment of all the plaintiff's right in certain goods and debts, to the defendant, with general releases and stipulations on both sides, was signed by the plaintiff and defendant, and was, by mutual consent, left in the hands of a third person;— for what purpose did not distinctly appear; — there was, at this time, no giving up of notes or adjustment of accounts; and the next day, the plaintiff went to the depositary, and forbade his giving up the instrument to the defendant, claiming that it was no settlement; it was held, that these facts did not shew a delivery of the instrument.</p> <p>The answer of the defendant to a bill in chancery, not found to be true, by the committee or the court, is no evidence, in the court above, of the facts* stated in such answer.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff had purchased, but had not paid for, certain goods for a store occupied by him, which goods, the defendant had the benefitof; and the court decreed, that the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff against the claims of the creditors for such goods; it was held, that this decree was correct, doing entire justice to all parties.</p> <p>Where it appeared to the committee, in taking the account between the parties, that the plaintiff had, without consideration and at the defendant’s request, given certain negotiable notes, not specified in the bill, which were outstanding in the defendant’s hands ; and the committee did not include them in the account, as the plaintiff might not pay them, but reported the facts; and the court thereupon decreed, that the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff against such notes ; it was held, 1. that if the giving of these notes constituted a distinct, transaction, the decree was not correct; but 2. as they were exhibited before the committee in taking the account, and no objection was then made on the ground of their belonging to ⅛ distinct transaction, they may^ well be considered as part of the plaintiff’s claim in the account; and as this course makes an end of the controversy between the parties, and does better justice than would be done, by leaving the matter open for further litigation, the decree ought not, on this account, to be reversed.</p> <p>In the taking of an account before a committee in chancery, the testimony of the parties and their account books, are admissible in evidence.</p> <p>Where the report of a committee in chancery is found to be incorrect in part, the court may recommit it as to that part, and establish it as to tile residue,</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, brought by Silas P. Bab-cock, as the indorsee and holder of a promissory note, made by the defendants, R. L. Callender, dated the 21st of January 1841, for 262 dollars, 30 cents, payable to Enos Bab-cock, or order.

<p>A grant, by the legislature, in consideration of expenses to be incurred by the grantees, and m contemplation of a public bem-fb, of tlw , xt im-uv' right of erecting a bridge, and taking tolls, to reimburse such exp- nv - vubin certain limits, for a limited time, is not a monopolj, in the o 1 nut - ns, oí that term.</p> <p>Such a grant is in the nature of a contract, which may not t,e mip.m. d.</p> <p>The court will give to its stipulations such construction as \. ill < ,.;iy them into full effect.</p> <p>In 1793, the General Assembly of this state created a corporation, fbr the purpose of erecting and maintaining a bridge across Council), id nver between Enfield and Svfiield, and granted to such corporation the right oí taking certain tolls from persons going over or using the bridge, for the term of one hundred years, or until the cost of erecting the bridge should be reimbursed; and then provided, that during said term of one hundred years, no person or persons, should have liberty to erect another bridge any where between the North line of said Enfield and the South line of Windsor. In 1⅛35, General Assembly created another corporation, with power to construct a rad-road from the city of Hartford, by the most direct and feasible route, to the Northern line of this state, and thence to Springfield, In the charter of this corporation, it was provided, that if it should become necessary to erect abridge across Connecticut river, it should be used exclusively for the railroad travel, and it should not be lawful for the corporation to permit any othei passing thf t'jnn Ji v\,n also pinwdn! in.ins imoni, dm nothing fIk is ,u (oiiian < d siK lf 1 , , ( m¡i ut d ,n j i* jndue ¡ ¡ imp > j mu < i fie i ughis th< ¡i o m ! ,n h* } <■ «o li> / (tu,/ no '$ h« 1 t i ■ i. ) u i aw < onpd (0 u ih t u u qiim lot nrs oi tin ir f ijitei , on V an lot < < ' ■ i <d‘ i Ik ii_l fs 'Ik ub) granted, v S n h < , p i i ni. i \ 1 1 < . . t o i >f uoUh. tb 1 i ,u t 1 , i-n! ¡ i n o n 1 i ! in rí 1 ," 1 i i 1 i «' ui m -•>> C> n-(» 1 "l OI Slln [ i1 1 tu OM\ 1| 111 1 at) u , nt o iUll 50 li - , i i i g Tin* ¡.ad-ioad eompatu hud oiu Ka uM m 0 - ,t n ^ 1 v >i ii hi <ip, u>Ui-Uon of the commissioners thereon, across the tonne client river, in the most direct and feasible route from Hartford to the North line of the state and thence to Spring field, between the North line o f Enjidd arid the South line of Windsor; and were proceeding to erect a structure over Connecticut- river, at that place, for the purposes of their rad-road, and for such purposes only, claiming the right so to do, under the provisions of their charier, without making compensation to the bridge company. At this juncture, the bridge company brought a bill in chancery against the rail-road company, praying for an injunction, or other relief. During the pendency of this bill, the defendants completed said structure, and used it for the transportation of locomotives and cars, with passengers and freight. The plaintiffs then hied a supplemental bill,shewing these facts, and praying the same relief as in their original bill. The structure in question is built much in the manner common to rail-road bridges, and is adapted to and convenient for the passing of locomotives and cars, but not of common vehicles; though foot passengers, when upon the rail-road, can walk over it, in the day-time; but there is no public road or highway thereto, except said rail-road. The plaintiffs have purchased and now own the land on each side of the river, where this structure is. Tliis is above tide water; but the river is these navigable for small flat-bottomed steam-boats, and other boats of small draft. The erection and use of said structure, by the defendants, will have a tendency, in some degree, to divert the travel from the plaintiffs’ bridge; but very little, however, if any, more, than it would, if it were placed a little above or below the protected pan of the river. Held, 1. that the structure of the defendants, is “a bridge,” and “another bridge,” within the meaning of the plaintiffs5 charter: 2. that the erection and use of such bridge, by the defendants, without compensation to the plaintiffs, was a violation of their grant; and if the charter of the defendants purported to authorize such acts, it was, so far, unconstitutional and void, as impairing the obligation of a contract: 3. that a rail-road, though granted to a private company, is “ for public use,” within the meaning of the constitution; and the taking of pm ate propwly fur that usig ought to be accompanied with compensa!ion ; 4. th.it ti»* tiaurhue of a lull bridge company, is “private property,” within the meaning of tne eomsthution; anda legislative provision, authorizing an injury to such franchise, for public use, upon compensation made, is not unconstitutional: 5. that the acts of the defendants, in this case, were not authorized, by the facts, that the site of their bridge was above tide water, and that they owned the land on both sides of ibe river; G. that these acts could not be vindicated, on the ground that the bridge of the defendants was exclusively adapted to, and used for, the passage of their engines arid cars; 7. nor on the ground, that there was no appreciable damage resulting therefrom to the plainnfis: 8. that though the court cannot now restrain the defendants from building the bridge, according to the specific prayer of the original bill, yet it will, under the gen-eva! pvayei, pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff's, affording relict adapted to the whole case. *</p>

<p>A, bemg n ppomn d sh'frnf, gave bund, with sureties, tor die faithful dH'Large of his mThwd duties; and U ex< cited u bund to che sureties to indemnify then, A aht r\\ unK brought nn action o:\iuiU Con urecMpi inven by him for property attach.d by us Cu nib, m a &.m between IJ and K, On the ? rial oí such anion. A off red IJ, o s a witness, to prove a denund uf the propt rty. The boui’t grwm by B wo-, thm outstanding; bm ir did not appear, timi any suit liad ever been brought against A for any default in his oiiiee. Held, that B was a competent witness.</p> <p>A, havm_r, as -dr i iff, miLwh¡ d pw-snual property, in a suit brought by D against /I, judgment wo •, n n b ml in Mien suit m ia\ our of L\ by the supf rlor court; after \vhi-*h J d-mann-d of f\ the r» ceiprer, the property attached, to be applied on she ext euliun, end C failed to deliver it. E then brought a \\ i it of error on such judgment, which was reversed, by the supreme court of errors, on a ground nut imvu'-.isU'nt with an uh míate recovery by ]). At the next succeeding 0 mi of tip- superior court, the cause, at the insiance uf D, was entered in tie dock'd of that <*ouit, where it remained open and undisposed of; when A brought his action against C on the receipt. Held, 1. that after the reversal of said judgment, the cause was properly entered m the superior court for trial; 2, that for this purpose, no order of the supreme court of errors, remanding the caum, was new ssary ; 3. that in tins suit, it was not necessary to show any action of the superior court directing nr sanctioning the entry, as it would here be. deemed to have been properly and regularly made; 4. that »a;d judgment was nut a “ filial judgment,” within the meaning of that expression in the statute relative to the attachment of personal property; (¿u. 2. s. 1.) 5. that consequently, the lien created by the attachment, was not discharged, by the lapse of sixty days after such judgment, without any levy of execution on the property,</p>

IN EURO it. Pursuant to the advice of this court, in the caso of The Hartford Bridge Company v. The Town of East-1 lar ford, 1⅝⅜16 Conn. Held: that said franchise continued to be vested equally in both of those towns. 8.

IN ERROR. This was a bill in chancery, brought originally by Roger S. Newell against William Orvis and Ebenezer Orvis, for a decree of foreclosure.

IN ERROR. The original action was one brought by Joseph Wright, as judge of probate for the district of Berlin, against Ira E. Smith and Benjamin Wilcox, on a bond by them executed, dated the 30th of November, 1839, in the penal sum of 10,000 dollars, to be paid to the plaintiff', as said judge, or his successor in office.

IN ERROR. This was a bill in chancer}', brought by Samuel Benjamin against Elmir Benjamin, in September 1843, praying for a set-off. At the term of the superior court, holden at Hartford, on the fourth Tuesday of September 1842, Elhur Benjamin, the defendant, recovered judgment, in an action of trespass, against Samuel Benjamin,the plaintiff, for tire sum of 97 dollars, 50 cents, damages, and costs of suit; execution on which was stayed, by order of the court.

This was an action of assumpsit, containing two counts ; the first on a guaranty, the second for goods sold and delivered.

This was a bill in chancery. The bill stated, that on the - 16th of July 1833, Asaph L. Bissell and Philip f (dentine, the plaintiffs, entered into partnership with James Wells, for the manufacture and sale of paper, at the Eagle mill in Suf-jield, which partnership was to commence on that day, and be continued until its dissolution ; that Wells was to be interested one half, and the plaintiffs one quarter each, in the business, which proportion was to be the measure oí'…

This was a bill in chancery to redeem mortgaged premises, and for a conveyance of title. On the 7th of October, 1831, Lewis Bradford mortgaged a piece of land in the city of Hartford, whereof he was then seised in fee, to Horace Olcott, to secure a note of that date for 850 dollars, payable in ten years, with annual interest.

Tiiis was an action of assumpsit against the defendant, as a common carrier, for a breach of his undertaking, in that capacity, to convey a package of money belonging to the plaintiff, from Sherman in this state to Poughkeepsie in the. state of New-York, and to deliver it to the Farmers and Manufacturers' Bank in that village.

<p>Where an officer, having an execution, dated originally the 25th of August 1840, and returnable in sixty days, in proceeding to levy it upon the land of the debtor, made a demand of the debtor therewith, on the 16th of October, after which, it was altered, by the clerk of the court, by erasing the original date, and substituting the 17th of November, and then the officer, under such altered execution, completed his proceedings, and set off the land to the credit, or, stating, in his return, that the demand was made on the IGth of October ; it was held, 1. that the demand was legally made; 2, that it was not necessary to repeat the demand, after the date of the execution was altered, the subsequent proceedings being all under the same writ.</p>

<p>Payment of the mortgage debt, by the mortgagor, after the law day has expired, without getting in the legal title, will not enable him, or any one claiming title under him, to sustain an action at law* against the mortgagee for the possession.</p> <p>[Points discussed, but not diredhj decided. Levy of execution on mortgaged premises. . . . Extinguishment of mortgage debt. . . . Merger of, equitable and legal estates,]</p>

A new trial having been granted, pursuant to the opinion of this court, (16 Conn. R. 276-291.) the cause was tried again, at Litchfield, February term, 1845, before Hinman, J. On the 27th of November, 1840, Barnabas Payne leased to Nathaniel E. Bradley about six acres of land in Bln,ron Valley, with a furnace for the manufacture of iron, and a dweliing-house and store thereon, from the 1st of April, 1841, to the 1st of April, 1844.

This was an action of trespass vi ei arniis, in which the defendant was charged with having unlawfully imprisoned the plaintiff.

This was an appeal from a decree of the court of pro-., bate, accepting the distribution of the estate of Lois Ackley, deceased, brought by The American Board of Commission-, ers for Foreign Missions, The American Bible Society and The American Tract Society ; the executor of Lois Ackley, and her heirs at law, being cited in to defend.

<p>A decree of divorce, on the ground of intolerable cruelty, will not be granted, unless the acts complained of are in fact intolerable, and as cruel at least as those for which, under the head of extreme cruelly. the courts in Great-Britain and elsewhere divorce a nu tua et thoro,</p> <p>Vulgar, obscene and harsh language, with epithets suited deeply to wound the feelings and excite the passions, but not accompanied with any act or menace indicating violence to the person, does not constitute such cruelty.</p> <p>The unreasonable exercise of the husband’s authority in regard to his wife's social intercourse with her relatives and friends, excluding; them from his house and forbidding her to visit them, does not constitute such cruelty.</p> <p>Where it was found, that the husband repeatedly compelled his wife, against her wishes and remonstrances, to occupy the same bed with himself, when, in consequence of her ill health, it was indelicate, improper, unreasonable . and injurious to her health so to do, and was calculated to endanger, and did in fact endanger, her health; though this e'ffett was not in fact intended or foreseen by him ; it was held, that such conduct of the husband did not constitute intolerable cruelty, within the statute.</p> <p>And where it was further found, that though she had no reason to fear from him personal violence of any other character; yet she had just reason to fear, that he would again compel her to occupy the same bed with him, regardless of the consequences to her health ; it was held, that this fact, neither by itself, nor in connexion with the other facts in the case, entitled her toa decree of divorce. [One judge dissenting.]</p>

<p>In a petition to the county court for a highway from one point to another within the same town, an averment that the select-men of that town neglected and refused to lay out such highway, is indispensable to give jurisdiction to the court.</p> <p>This requirement is not satisfied, by an averment that the town neglected and refused, &c.; the select-men being the agents of the law, and not of the town, for this purpose.</p>

<p>Though parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or controul the import of a bond ; yet it is admissible to show the situation of the parties, at the lime it was given, the object in view and the consideration,</p> <p>"Where A, in contemplation of marriage with B, and in consideration thereof, executed a bond to her, the condition of which was, that her personal property should not he taken by him, and converted from her use to his, without her consent; it was held, that this was, in effect, an agreement that such . property should remain hers, for her sole and separate use.</p> <p>Though such bond, as a legal instrument, is extinguished, by the marriage, a court of equity will uphold the agreement and carry it into effect according to the intent of the parties; and where there is no trustee, the husband himself will be considered as trustee.</p> <p>In this state, the husband does not, on the death of the wife, become entitled, as heir or survivor, to personal property secured to her sole and separate use ; but it goes into the hands of her administrator, for distribution.</p>

IN ERROR. This was a proceeding in forcible entry and detainer, before the judge of the county court and a justice of the peace, instituted by Chauncey Baldwin against Edward A. Phelps, Josiah Phelps and Hastings Brown. The complaint was dated March 3rd, 1845, and contained two counts.

This was an action of book debt. In the superior court, the cause was referred to auditors, who reported, that the defendant was, indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of 23 dollars, 11 cents, to balance book accounts. Against the acceptance of this report the defendant filed a remonstrance, stating the following facts. On the hearing before the auditors, the plaintiff exhibited his account against the defendant, containing this charge, among others: “ 1837, March 2.

This was an action of assumpsit for the use and occupation of a certain piece of land in Brookfield in tins state, and a store standing thereon. The defendants pleaded, 1st, the general issue ; and 2ndiy, a set-off, with claim to a balance of 100 dollars, the plaintiff being insolvent and residing in the republic of Texas. The issues, by agreement, were joined to the court.

This was an action of replevin, to regain the possession of sundry goods and chattels, which had been taken by the defendant, as a deputy sheriff, by virtue of three or four writs of attachment against Daniel W. Bouton; which goods and chattels the plaintiff claimed as his property. In connexion with the writ of replevin there was a count in trespass.

IN ERROR. This was an action of replevin, for certain goods and chattels, which had been attached, as the property of Patrick Laurie, by the defendant, a deputy sheriff, returnable to the county court of Fairfield county, at its term in December, 1840.

This was an action brought to recover from the defendants the amount claimed by the plaintiff to be due to him on three couPons> 0He °f which was of the following tenor: i£ The Mayor, Aldermen, Common Council and Freemen of the City of Bridgeport, hereby acknowledge, that there will be due to bearer thirty dollars, being half a year’s interest, payable on the 15th day of December, 1842, on bond No. 53. of the six percent, loan of said city, issued on the 15th day of June,…

This was an action on the case, ⅛ two counts. In the first count, the plaintiffs alleged, that they were the proprietors *n fee-siropJe of a parcel of land in Bridgeport, contain-about forty square rods, through which a natural stream of water, or water-course, called the Pequonnoc river, flowed; that on this land there were two mills and a dam, owned by plaintiffs ; that said dam was erected in a firm and substantial manner across said stream and of a suitable height; that…

IN ERROR. This was an action of assumpsit, to recover certain dividends on twenty shares of the stock of The Stamford Bank, brought by Joshua B. Ferris Esq. against that institution, before a justice of the peace, and appealed to the county court. There were three counts in the declaration ; the two first being special, and the third a general count for money had and received by the defendants to the plaintiff’s use.

This was a bill in chancery. The material facts in the case were these. The plaintiff and William Lacón, one of the defendants, were partners in the business of manufacturing rolled iron wire, in Stamford; and for the purposes of their business, several-tracts of land, with the buildings thereon, were purchased.

This was a petition for a divorce, upon the ground of habitual intemperance and intolerable cruelty, on the part of the husband. The cause was heard at Fairfield, February term, 1845, before Waite, J. On the hearing, the allegations contained in the petition were fully proved. It further appeared, that, the parties formerly lived in the city of New-York, where a separation took place between them, inconsequence of the intemperance and . cruelty of the husband.

This was an action on the case for the diversion of a watercourse.

This was a bill in chancery, to set aside an award and to restrain the defendant from proceedings thereon at law.

This was an action of trespass de bonis asporlatis. The defendants pleaded the general issue, with notice of special matter to be given in evidence..

IN ERROR. This was an action of indebitatus assumpsit, brought by Thomas IT.

This was an action of debt on a probate bond. The declaration alleged, that Esther Brown, the defendant, as principal with one Roswell Broim, then m full life, but since deceased, by a certain writing obligatory, under her hand and seal, by her well .executed, dated the 4th day of April 1815, acknowledged herself to be holden, and firmly bound and obliged, to Ralph Hurlbut, as judge of probate, &c. The defendant having prayed oyer of the writing obligatory and condition…

This was an action of trespass guare clausum fregit, brought in March 1844, alleging the wrongful acts complained of, to have been committed by the defendant, between the 1st of June 1843, and that time.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, the locus in quo being a strip of land, used as a passage-way, running from Main street in the city of Norwich up to Church street, between the Merchants'’ Hotel on the East, and the defendant’s dwelling-house on the West.

This was a bill in chancery, stating the following case. On the 20th of June 1843, the plaintiffs entered into a written contract with Miner C. Storey, one of the defendants, for the construction of the masonry in the bank walls and bridge abutments on section No. 1. of the plaintiffs’ extension railroad, according to a specification annexed to the contract; the work to be completed before the 1st day of October 1843.

This was a bill in chancery for an injunction. Held: that a private action at law would not lie for a public nuisance, proceed manifestly on the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, which might ruin the offending party, when a public prosecution would settle the right at once.

After the opinion given by the court, in the case of Gould v. Stanton & al. 16 Conn. R. 12. — the defendants moved the superior court to stay execution, that they might have an opportunity to file a cross-bill for a set-off of accounts in a subsequent voyage of the same ship and brig.

IN ERROR. This was a bill in chancery, brought by Samuel Gates against James S, Treat, seeking the correction of a mistake, made by the freeholders appointed by the court of probate to distribute the estate of Miner Robins among his heirs, in making their return of such distribution.

This was a bill in chancery for a decree against the defendants, foreclosing all their right in equity to redeem certain mortgaged premises. The facts in the case, so far as they bear materially upon the points discussed and decided, are substantially these. George Spafford being indebted to Joel W. White and two others, by three notes, amounting to 5,000 dollars, mortgaged to them certain real estate, to secure the payment of those notes.

This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit; tried at Brooklyn, January term, 1845, before Waite, J. On the trial, the plaintiff claimed title to the land described in her declaration as heir at law of Joshua Smith, deceased, under a deed from Solomon Smith jun., dated May 4th, 1801.

This was an action on the case for the obstruction of a water-course.

IN ERROR, (a) This was a writ of scire-facias, brought by William Barnes, Esq., as judge of probate, against Ebenezer Pinney and his… Held: and still holds, said funds. To the third plea, the plaintiff, after stating the facts alleged in the preceding replication, averred, That after the sale of said real estate for the payment of said legacies, said Pinney collected of one Davis a debt due the estate of the deceased, amounting to 111 dollars; and that those entitled to…

<p>Notice of want or failure of consideration.</p> <p>be on the</p> <p>0r judgment of non-suit,</p> <p>deílndamlo entered.</p> <p>S"¿u1fment f°r</p> <p>Proviso.</p> <p>Costs, where more counte°for distinct causes of action.</p> <p>Set-ofl oí costs.</p> <p>Costs on continuance of action.</p>

This was an action against the defendant, as the indorser - of a promissory note, made by William II, Lord and Joseph H. Poiwine, for 771 dollars, 96 cents, dated October 25th, 1838, and payable to the order of C. & H. Chapin, at the Hartford Bank, thirteen months after the date thereof, and indorsed successively by C. & H. Chapin and the defendant.

After the decision of this court, ante 40-67. the cause was continued in the superior court until the term thereof in January 1846, when… Held: that a mere contract stood on different ground. 4. That the resolve of 1839, passed before any thing had been done or attempted under the charter of the Springfield Rail-Road Company, vests in the plaintiffs,(if need be,) the right to erect another bridge, within the exclusive limits of the plaintiffs, for the use of the defendants.

IN EEROR. This was an information, filed by the state’s attorney, at the term of the county court of Hartford county, in August 1845, against Woodruff Cadwellff$larging, That on the 15th day of June 1845, and on divers other days and times between that day and the filing of this information, said Cadwell un-^awfu^y kept a house, situated on the West side of Commerce street in the city of Hartford, which house, during all said time, was and is a house of ill fame, resorted to…

This was an action on the case, in two counts. In the first, the plaintiff alleged, that on the 8th of July 1842, a certain bridge in the town of Canton, over a part of the Farm-ington river, which bridge it was the duty of said town to make and keep in good and sufficient repair, was out of repair, defective and insufficient; that although it was the duty of said town to have erected and maintained a good and sufficient railing on the sides of said bridge, which was so…

This was an action of trespass de bfinis asportatis, against Humphrey Horton and George Andross.

This was an action of debt on bond. The declaration alleged, that said bond was executed by the defendant, under his hand and seal, by his lawful attorney, William H. Whiting, thereunto duly authorized, bearing date the 18th of October 1837; whereby the defendant acknowledged himself bound and obliged unto the plaintiff in the sum of 4132 dollars, 33 cents; to the payment of which sum to the plaintiff, on demand, with the interest thereon, the defendant did, in and by said…

Tins was an action of trover, for two wagons, a horse anil a harness ; tried at Hartford, September term 1845, before - Ilinman, J. Oh the trial of the cause, on the general issue, the plaintiff, .claimed title to the property mentioned in the declaration, as executor of the last will and testament of William Wilkins, deceased. The property had been owned by Lyman Johnson, who had conveyed and delivered it to Wilkins, in his lifetime.

This was an action of debt on judgment, in the usual form, brought by Wood, Johnson ⅜ Burritt against Henry Wells, Peter Vandervoort and Edward B. Watkinson, partners, under the firm of Wells, Vandervoort ⅝ Co. The plea, by agreement, was Nil debet. The cause was tried, at Hartford, January term, 1846, before Storrs, J., when the following facts were proved and admitted.

This was an action, by the indorsee, against one of the makers, of a joint promissory note, for 300 dollars, dated the 23d of March 1836, payable to John Caldwell, or order, on or before the 1st of April 1837.

IN ERROR. This was an application to the superior court, by Edward Carrington against William S. Holabird Esq., for a new trial in certain causes, in which judgments had been rendered against Carrington, and for an injunction against further proceedings in the collection or enforcement of the executions issued on such judgments. The plaintiff’s bill stated the following case.

This was an appeal from a decree of the court of probate for the district of Norfolk, making distribution of the estate of Titus Nettleton, deceased. On the 2d day of April 1844, Titus Nettleton made his last will and testament; and died, on the 6th day of January 1845. By this will, the testatorgave to his son, Joseph Nettle-ton, a large part of his estate, being of the value of nearly 2000 dollars.

This was a bill in chancery for an injunction against the prosecution of an action of ejectment brought by the defendant to obtain possession of certain real estate, and for the conveyance of the legal title to such estate. The parties were Joseph Goddard, Maraña E. Goddard, his wife, and Henry D. Sewail, plaintiffs, against Laura Prentice, defendant. The court referred the cause to a committee, who reported the following facts.

m ERROR, This was a bill in chancery, brought by Milo Burr, Harry Coe, as executor of Seth Coe, and Roswell Marsh, against Chester Soper, Zebina Smith and William S. Holabird, praying for the correction of a mistake in a mortgage deed executed by Soper, for an account of rents and profits, and a decree of foreclosure.

This was an action of trover for 40 yards of broad-cloth. The cause was tried, on the general issue, closed to the court, at Litchfield, October adjourned term, 1845, before Church, J. The plaintiff having proved the taking of the cloth, mentioned in the declaration, by the defendant, Witherell, a legal constable, by direction of Hunt, the other defendant, the defendants claimed, that such taking was by virtue of a warrant, issued by Hunt, as the captain of the 6th company…

This was a bill in chancery, seeking special relief. The committee to whom the cause was referred, reported the following facts. On the 9th of January 1833, Buel Atwood, the plaintiff, being owner of certain lands in New- Hartford, in this state, particularly described in the bill, conveyed them, by mortgage deed, to the state of Connecticut, to secure the payment of his bond for the benefit of the school fund, conditioned for the payment of 2100 dollars, and interest.

IN ERROR. This was an action of debt, brought by Allen Painter against the town of Plymouth, to recover of the defendants the sum of 1 dollar, 20 cents, which the plaintiff claimed as due to him as his fees, as a witness, in a public prosecution, before a justice of the jieace in that town, against John C. Calhoun and Lucius P, Porter, for a matter of delinquency. On the trial of the cause before the justice, on the general issue, the following facts were proved.

This was a bill in chancery, for an account, for the reservation of a right of way in certain estate held in common, and a sale of such estate and a division of the proceeds, subject to such reservation. The case, as found by the committee, was as follows. Justus L. Bush and Ephraim Golden, from the 15th of March 1830, until the death of the former, owned in fee-simple a certain mill, dam and pond of water, particularly described in the bill.