The Henry W. Breyer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 8 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““On another ground, the shippers were justified in alleging that they were damaged by acts of the vessel which amounted to torts. The complete financial inability of the owner of the vessel to comply with the obligations of a common carrier is so-clearly shown by the testimony that, it must have been known to the managers of the vessel when the cargo-was taken on board. The action,, therefore, in accepting the goods,, and particularly in receiving the freight money in advance, from the-intervening libelants, was in effect fraudulent. The navigation corporation was doubtless insolvent, and the situation was analogous to that which has been frequently before-the courts in reclamation proceedings in bankruptcy. It is a general principle that, when a person who is-insolvent purchases goods with no-intention of paying for them, and conceals his insolvency and his intention not to pay, he is guilty of fraud which entitles the vendor to-recover the goods. Knowledge of inability to pay when the purchase is made is equivalent to purchase-with intent not to pay. Such purpose is constructively fraudulent. In re Henry Siegel Co., (D.C.) 223 F. 369 ; Gillespie v. Piles & Co., (C.C.A.) 178 F. 886 [44 L.R.A.,N.S., 1]; Hornor v. Henning, 93 U.S. 228 , 23 L.Ed. 879 ; In re K. Marks & Co., (C.C.A.) 218 F. 453 ; Jones v. H. M. Hobbie Grocery Co. (C.C.A.) 246 F. 431 ; In re Liebig (C.C.A.) 255 F. 458 ; In re Stewart (D.C.) 178 F. 463 ; In re Kenyon (D.C.) 156 F. 863 . It was equally fraudulent f”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Atlantic Steamer Supply Company v. the SS Tradewind

2. ““ ‘That neither the mortgagor nor the master of the vessel, nor any one acting in its or his behalf, has or shall have any right, power, or authority to create, incur, or permit to be placed or imposed upon the vessel, or any party thereof, subject to this mortgage, any liens whatsoever other than for crew’s wages, supplies, or salvage.’ “Obviously this section clothed the mortgagor or master of the vessel with power to create an indebtedness for supplies, and to subject the vessel to a lien therefor. The master was thereby enabled, wherever the vessel might be, to pledge her credit, not only to raise money to pay the crew, but also to buy the necessary supplies. Moreover, in order to make this authority practically effective, the lien was intended to have priority over that of the mortgage. The authority to purchase supplies is grouped in the same clause with the authority to impose liens upon the vessel of wages or salvage, which, under the Ship Mortgage Act, give rise to preferred maritime liens. It is therefore a fair conclusion that the parties to the mortgage intended to put all three liens in the same category. Subsection S of section 30 of the act (Comp. St. § 81461/4 ppp) provides that nothing in section 30 of the act shall be construed to prevent the mortgagee from waiving his right to a lien or, in the case of a preferred mortgage lien, to the preferred status of such a lien at any time by agreement or otherwise. (Emphasis added) “The tacit permission given by the ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 462 F. Supp. 899 - International Paint Co. v. M/V MISSION VIKING

3. ““Undoubtedly the claimant is entitled to a lien on the ship for the coal furnished under subsection P of section 30 of the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, providing that any person furnishing supplies or other necessaries to a vessel shall have a maritime lien thereon. The sole question is whether this lien has priority over the lien of the preferred mortgage. It is clear that it is not one of the preferred liens under the terms of subsection M, since it did not arise prior to the recording and indorsement of the mortgage, nor did it arise out of tort, wages of stevedores or crew, or general average or salvage.” (Emphasis supplied.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Atlantic Steamer Supply Company v. the SS Tradewind