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17 Ind. 470

Scoville v. Chapman

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided December 12, 1861

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1861-12-12

<p>In a proceeding to enforce a mechanic’s lien, after the jury had been sworn, and the evidence heard, the Court permitted the plaintiff to enter a dismissal as to some of the defendants, so far as a personal judgment was sought against them, but to continue them as parties to the proceedings to enforce the lien.</p> <p>Held, that there was no error in this.</p> <p>Errors of law occurring on the trial, as in the refusal to grant a continuance, or in the admission of improper evidence, must be assigned in the motion for a new trial, or they can not be noticed on appeal.</p> <p>Motion for a new trial upon the following grounds, viz., 1. “For irregularities in the proceedings of the Court, and abuse of discretion, by which the defendants were prevented from having a fair trial. 2. On account of accident and surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 3. Errors of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to.”</p> <p>Held, that the reasons assigned were too vague and indefinite to bring any question to the attention of the Court.</p>

Relies on Kent v. Lawson · Barnard v. Graham

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1861-12-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently March 1955

7 state decisions

501861187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Worden, J.

¶1This was an action by the appellee against Seoville, Jones and Shirts, to recover for work and labor done, and materials furnished; and to enforce a mechanic’s lien on a saw-mill and premises, on which the labor had been done, and for which the materials were furnished. Issues were formed, and the cause tried by a jury.

¶2After the jury had been sworn, and the evidence offered, the plaintiff filed a dismissal of the cause as against Jones and Shirts, so far as it was sought to obtain a personal judgment against them, but retained them as defendants, so far as it was sought to enforce the lien on the premises. The defendants objected and excepted to such dismissal, the Court permitting the same to be entered. There was no error in this. Code, § 99; Taylor et al. v. Jones, 1 Ind. 1.

¶3The effect of the proceeding was simply an abandonment of any pretended right to recover against Jonesand Shirts a personal judgment for the labor and materials; claiming the right to enforce the lien as against them, however, and leaving them before the Court to protect their interests in the premises, if they had any. This, it seems to us, can not be error.

¶4Verdict and judgment against Seoville, with the usual order enforcing the lien.

¶5After the action above noted was had in relation to Jonesand Shirts, an affidavit was filed, on which a continuance *472was applied for; but the application was overruled, and exception taken. There was no motion for a new trial on the ground of error in refusing a continuance; hence, this point ne0<^ no ^tiier noticed. Kent v. Lawson, 12 Ind. 675.

J. E. McDonald, A. L. Eoache and E. Parrett, for the appellants.A. Ellison, for the appellee.

¶6It is objected that incompetent evidence was permitted to go to the jury. A new trial was not asked on this ground.

¶7The reasons filed for a new trial are as MIoavs: 1. “For irregularities in the proceedings of the Court, and abuse of the discretion of the Court, by which the defendants were prevented from having a fair trial. 2. On account of accident and surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 3. Because the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, and is contrary to law. 4. Errors of law occurring at the trial, and excepted to by the defendants.”

¶8The evidence is not in the record; hence, nothing further need be said in reference to the third reason. The other reasons were all too vague and indefinite to have brought any question to the attention of the Court below. Barnard v. Graham, 14 Ind. 322; Medler v. Hiatt, id. 405.

¶9What AAre have said disposes of all the questions arising in the case.

¶10Per Guriam. — The judgment is affirmed, Avith 5 per eent. damages and costs.

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