17 Kan. App. 2d 246 - State v. Finley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Reasonable suspicion is not the same as probable cause. In United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 , 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 , 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989), the Court conducted a thorough examination into the meaning of reasonable suspicion. The Court stated: ‘The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” [Citation omitted.] The Fourth Amendment requires “some minimal level of objective justification” for making the stop. [Citation omitted.] That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means “a fair prob ability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” [citation omitted] and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.’ 490 U.S. at 7 . “In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 , 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), the United States Supreme Court expounded on the differences between reasonable suspicion and probable cause: ‘Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. . . . Reasonable suspicion, like probab”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 19 Kan. App. 2d 920 - State v. Tucker · State v. Field

2. ““Such a stop always constitutes a seizure. Therefore, to stop a moving vehicle an officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under K.S.A. 22-2402 and Terry. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 , 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 , 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). To stop a vehicle to investigate circumstances which provoke suspicion, an officer must be aware of ‘specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion’ that the vehicle contains individuals involved in criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 , 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 , 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).” 249 Kan. at 510 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 30 Kan. App. 2d 1097 - City of Hutchinson v. Davenport · State v. Field

3. ““Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand . . . the name [and] address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect’s actions.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Anderson · State v. Field