17 Kan. App. 2d 623 - State v. Cramer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[T]he determination of whether a sentence has resulted in manifest injustice must be decided on a case-by-case basis under a ‘shocking to the conscience’ consideration; that is, whether the trial court has abused its discretion by imposing a sentence which is obviously unfair and shocks the conscience of the court.” 17 Kan. App. 2d at 636.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 19 Kan. App. 2d 412 - State v. Coleman · State v. Medina

2. ““The evidence of past conduct by defendant was certainly not complimentary to her. However, defendant opened the door to such testimony by her reliance on the battered woman’s syndrome as a defense. The State had every right to rebut that defense, and it did so, in part, by using specific instances of past conduct between defendant and third parties. Indeed, these specific instances were relied upon by the State’s expert to support her opinion that defendant did not suffer from the battered woman’s syndrome. While the evidence may have been prejudicial, it was certainly probative to the issue at hand. The evidence complained of was proper rebuttal. “ ‘Rebuttal evidence is that which contradicts evidence introduced by an opposing party .... [I]t may refute or deny some affirmative fact which an opposing party has attempted to prove. It may be used to explain, repel, counteract or disprove testimony or facts introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party .... Tire use and extent of rebuttal rests in the sound discretion of die trial court and its ruling will not be reversed unless it appears die discretion has been abused to a party’s prejudice.’ State v. Richard, 235 Kan. 355 , Syl. ¶ 1, 681 P.2d 612 (1984). “In the final analysis, the trial court determined that the probative value of die evidence outweighed die prejudicial effect of that evidence. This was a proper decision for die trial court, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this issu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lessley

3. ““After participating in the drafting of the answer to the jury’s question, defendant now argues that the trial court erred in giving that answer and asks that we reverse the conviction as a result. “The record shows that the answer given by the trial court which defendant now claims is error was given at the joint request of the State and defendant. After die prosecuting attorney suggested die language used, defense counsel responded by saying: T really don’t have a problem with setting out the standard that’s in the syllabus that Mr. Pierce suggested.’ We could not have a more clear-cut case of acquiescence in the giving of die answer. Indeed, defense counsel joined the State in requesting that the answer be given as suggested by the prosecuting attorney. Defendant should not be permitted to join in a request for specific language to be used in answering the jury’s question and then on appeal claim that the court erred in using that language. “If the language used to answer the jury’s question was erroneous, then it was error invited by defendant. ‘A litigant may not invite and lead a trial court into error and then complain of the trial court’s action on appeal.’ State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292, 298-99 , 767 P.2d 1308 (1989).” 17 Kan. App. 2d at 632 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Bruce