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← 17 Md. App. 16 - Kable v. State

17 Md. App. 16 - Kable v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1973

Citation profile

43
cited by 43 later decisions
3
states following
March 2018
most recently cited

2 district · 41 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently March 2018 · most notably Bowers v. State (1983), 84 Wis. 2d 68 - State v. Tronca (1978)

2 district · 41 state decisions

23019731980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Benton v. Maryland · Sheppard v. Maxwell · Hurtado v. People of the State of California · Beck v. Washington · Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In concluding that the appellant was acting within his “official duties” in recommending that the State’s Attorney nol. pros, traffic violations, we “have given the statutory definition of bribery a construction broad enough to cover cases,” such as this one, “where a public official has accepted a bribe to act corruptly in a matter to which he bears some official relation, though the act itself may be technically beyond his official powers or duties.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The appellant, however, would have us anticipate the Supreme Court of the United States. He argues that authority of Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 [4 S.Ct. Ill, 28 L.Ed. 232 ] (1884) has been eroded by more recent Supreme Court decisions. In Hurtado , the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require that State criminal prosecutions be initiated by grand jury indictment. The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to Hurtado . The last clear expression of its continuing agreement with the rule of that case came in Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 [, 82 S.Ct. 955, 957-958 , 8 L.Ed.2d 98 ] (1962). “The appellant, nevertheless, claims that the Supreme Court by its recent decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 [ 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ] (1969) has given a signal suggesting that the Court ultimately will overturn Hurtado and extend the Fifth Amendment grand jury right to the States through application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Benton , the Court held that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represented a notion that was ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ and that the prohibition was enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 796 [ 89 S.Ct. at 2063 ]. “We eschew speculation on our part as to whether a majority of the present members of the Supreme Court of the United States might hold, despite the precedent of Hurtado , that the Fifth Amendment grand jur”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Sugarman , however, represents only one end of the spectrum of a policeman’s duties, i.e., actions which a police officer is prohibited from undertaking and thus clearly beyond the scope of his official duties. As the Court of Appeals said in Sugarman , in such a case the officer “not only is not acting in the performance of official duties, but contrary to them____” Id. The case now before us, however, does not fall within the coverage of Sugarman . Here, the appellant had lawfully charged the driver of the automobile with traffic violations and his authority to recommend the nol. pros, of those violations, if not expressly a part of his officially prescribed duties, clearly was not “contrary to them.” Id. At the other end of the spectrum from the Sugarman situation are official actions and duties which are expressly authorized by statute, rule or regulation. However, lying between the two opposite poles of (1) duties or actions obviously prohibited and (2) official duties expressly prescribed or authorized, is a large area in which the determination of whether or not the action of a policeman is part of his official duties must depend on the particular facts. This is such a case. When the appellant requested the nol. pros, he was not carrying out any official duty expressly specified in writing, nor was he doing something that he was prohibited from doing as a policeman.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.