Seider v. Roth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

74 federal appellate · 24 district · 76 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 303 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is said that by affirmance we would be setting up a “direct action” against the insurer. That is true to the extent only that affirmance will put jurisdiction in New York State and require that insurer to defend here, not because a debt owing by it to the defendant has been attached but because by its policy it has agreed to defend in any place where jurisdiction is obtained against its insured. Jurisdiction is properly acquired by this attachment since the policy obligation is a debt owed to the defendant by the insurer, the latter being regarded as a resident of this state .”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. O'CONNOR v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp. · 457 F. Supp. 460 - Torres v. Towmotor Division of Caterpillar, Inc.

2. ““The whole question, therefore, is whether [the insurer’s] contractual obligation to defendant is a debt or cause of action such as may be attached. The * * * policy is in customary form. It requires [the insurer] among other things, to defend [the insured] in any automobile negligence action and, if judgment be rendered against [the insured], to indemnify him therefor. Thus as soon as the accident occurred there was imposed on [the insurer] a contractual obligation which should be considered a ‘debt’ within the meaning of CPLR 5201 and 6202.” Seider v. Roth, supra, 17 N.Y.2d at 113 , 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101 , 216 N.E.2d at 314 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sisalcords Do Brazil, Ltd. v. Fiacao Brasileira De Sisal, S. A. · 281 F. Supp. 488 - Podolsky v. Devinney

3. ““ * * * The late Robert Riggle, who had been a resident of Illinois, was the driver of an automobile which, in an accident in Wyoming, had injured a New York resident named Mabel Wells. Mrs. Wells, in order to sue Riggle in New York State, moved to have appointed in this State an administrator with the will annexed of Riggle’s property. The only property claimed to belong to Riggle’s estate in New York State was ‘the personal obligation of an indemnity insurance carrier to defend him.’ Section 47 of the Surrogate’s Court Act provided that, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon a Surrogate’s Court, ‘a debt owing to a decedent by a resident of the state’ is regarded as personal property. The careful and convincing majority opinion in this court concluded, with ample citation of precedent, that within the broad meaning of section 47 this liability insurance policy, even though no judgment had been obtained against the insured, made decedent’s estate a ‘creditor’ and the insurer a ‘debtor’ sufficient for the purposes of the statute. It is interesting to note that the dissenting Judge in Matter of Riggle’s Estate conceded that the insurance company’s obligation ‘to defend and contingently indemnify’ was a debt, but he was of the opinion, contrary to that of the majority, that the insurer was not a resident of the State within the meaning of section 47. The reasoning of the Riggle case is sound and calls for an affirmance here. * * ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State Ex Rel. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Lasky