17 Ohio App. 3d 159 - State v. Tu’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “" '*** rp^g pUrp0Se 0f this [physician-patient] privilege is to encourage patients to make a full disclosure of their symptoms and condition to their physicians without fear that such matters will later become public. Against the interest of the patient in having his condition remain confidential, must he balanced the interest to the public in detecting crimes in order to protect society.’ * * * [State v. Antill (1964), 174 Ohio St. 61 , 64-65, 26 O.O. 2d 366, 368, 197 N.E. 2d 548 , 551.] <<* * * “We concede that the law, to a reasonable degree, should encourage a frank and uninhibited flow of information between doctor and patient by protecting their private, confidential communications. However, the privilege is not absolute and must yield when the public interest outweighs the policy considerations supporting the privilege. This is especially so in the context of a prosecution for the offense of driving while intoxicated. To allow the privilege to be invoked so as to exclude evidence tending to prove that appellant was driving while intoxicated would be against the public interest and would not serve the purpose of R.C. 2317.02(B). The privilege was not designed to operate in this matter, nor will we sanction such use. See State v. District Court of Iowa, supra, at 644. U* * * “As we noted above, R.C. 2317.02(B), being in derogation of the common law, is to be given a strict construction. Weis v. Weis, supra. In balancing the public interest in prosecuting those char”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 40 Ohio App. 3d 173 - State v. Boysaw · 33 Ohio App. 3d 240 - State v. Kavlich

2. ““In the context of a criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated (and related crimes, see, e.g., newly enacted R.C. 4511.19[A][3], driving with a specified concentration of alcohol), there is a further point to be made. By tendering a plea of ‘not guil ty’ to the offense charged, appellant thereby placed in issue each essential element, including (obviously) the element requiring proof of his intoxication. In other words, his plea of ‘not guilty’ put his 'physical condition in issue. Yet, in asserting his physical condition as an element of the crime, an element to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, appellant is simultaneously seeking to invoke an evidentiary privilege to preclude the prosecution from establishing precisely that element. This is patently unfair to a party already bearing extremely heavy burdens of proof and persuasion. In so-called ‘drunk driving’ cases, evidence of the defendant’s blood-alcohol test, if otherwise competent, is exceedingly relevant — indeed, vitally necessary — to proof of guilt. To allow the privilege to suppress that evidence would be to thwart the state’s ability to offer the best evidence of guilt; it would, moreover, permit a defendant to evade the penalties therefor with impunity.” Id.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 40 Ohio App. 3d 173 - State v. Boysaw

3. ““Unlike the Dress case, appellant’s intoxicated driving in this case proximately caused another person's death. Consciously inebriating oneself to the point where driving a car becomes as dangerous (and as deadly) as recklessly discharging a firearm on a public sidewalk is inexcusable conduct that cannot be tolerated. We can hardly give our tacit imprimatur to it by approving the use of an artificial evidentiary privilege that excludes probative evidence of illegality. State v. Dress, supra, at 261-262 . Simply put, the privilege must yield to competent evidence of conduct the law defines as criminal. The overriding public policy favoring the sensible and effective enforcement of R.C. 4511.19 far outweighs the limited purpose of and narrow policy considerations supporting Ohio’s physician-patient privilege.” Tu, supra, at 163 , 17 OBR at 295, 478 N.E. 2d at 834 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 33 Ohio App. 3d 240 - State v. Kavlich