Volume 17 — Oklahoma Criminal Reports

Hughes, Judge. T. R. Braught was convicted of murder, and sentenced to be electrocuted. Motion for a new trial denied, and he appeals.

J. E. Burns and Lula Bond were jointly tried and convicted of the crime of living in open and notorious adultery, and sentenced to pay fines of $350 and $250, respectively, and each appeals.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. JURY — Challenge to Panel — Specification of Objection. A challenge to a panel of jurors, summoned upon an open venire, on the ground “of a material department from the forms prescribed by law in respect to the selection, drawing, and returtn of said panel, from which the defendant has suffered material prejudice, and that said panel of jurors is not a fair and impartial panel,” was properly denied, because it did not specify the facts, if any, showing how or in what manner the panel was not summoned as prescribed by law.</p> <p>2. SAME — Statutory Form. Under section 5843, Rev. Laws 1910, a challenge to the panel must be taken before the jury is sworn, and must be in writing, specifying plainly and distinctly the facts constituting the grounds of challenge.</p> <p>3. SAME — Bias of Officer. Under section 5848, Rev. Laws 1910, a challenge to a panel of jurors summoned upon an open venire, on account of any bias of the officer who summoned them, must be made in tbe same form) and determined in tbe same manner as if made to a juror.</p> <p>4. EVIDENCE — “Confession.” In criminal law a confession is a voluntary statement mad'e by a person charged with the commission of a crime, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged, and discloses the circumstances of the act, or the share and participation which he had in it.</p> <p>5. SAME — “Confession”—Scope. A “confession,” in a legal sense-is restricted1 to an acknowledgment of guilt made by a person after an offense has been committed, and does not apply to a mere statement or declaration of an independant fact from which such guilt may be inferred.</p> <p>6. SAME — Voluntary Confession — Admissibility. A statement, declaration, or admission made by one accused of crime, explaining suspicious circumstances for his own defense, from which the jury may or may not infer guilt, is not a confession, and does not come within the rule that confessions must be voluntary to to be admissible.</p> <p>7. EVIDENCE — Explanation of Incriminating Circumstances — Contradiction. Statements of a person accused of murder, in giving an account of himself, or of the homicide, which tend to explain incriminating circumstances brought against hin^, are admissible’, and may be proved false by the prosecution after it has proved that accused mad’e them.</p> <p>8. APPEAL AND ERROR — Reversible Error — Statute. Under Code of Criminal procedure (sec.-6005, Rev. Laws! 1910), providing that no judgment shall be set asidje or new (trial granted Ion the ground of misdirection of the jury or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or as to errors in any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire record, it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right, this court is necessarily vested with a large discretion in determining the effect of errors, and' each case must depend upon its own circumstances, since it is the opinion of the court, upon a full consideration of the particular record, including the evidence, that is to control upon the question whether the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.</p> <p>9. APPEAL AND ERROR — Improper Remark by Court — Reversible Error. An improper remark by the court while ruling on an objection to the testimony of a witness for defendant, which was in effect a comment on the weight of the evidence, is not ground for reversal where the court subsequently instructs the jury to disregard the same, and where this court, from an examination of the whole case, finds that the proof of defendant’s guilt is practically undisputed.</p> <p>Conceding that some of the rulings of*the trial court were erroneous, they affect no substantial right of the defendant, and</p> <p>10. APPEAL, AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Rulings of Trial Court. under section 6005, Code of Criminal Procedure (Rev. Laws 1910), they must be regarded as technical, and insufficient to warrant a reversal of the judgment of conviction.</p> <p>11. HOMICIDE — Sufficiency of Evidence — Sentence. The evidence in a homicide case examined, and held sufficient to warrant a verdict convicting the defendant of murder, but insufficient to warrant the extremle penalty of the law, and the judgment and sentence is modified to imprisonment for life at hard labor.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Marshall County; George C. Crump, Assigned Judge. </p> <p>G. G. Harris was convicted of the crime of embezzlement, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. HOMICIDE; — Evidence of Threats by Deceased'. When the undisputed facts clearly show that a defendant committed an un-Í warranted and unprovoked assault and took the life of deceased without any overt or unlawful demonstration of hostility upon the part of deceased, it is not error for the trial court to exclude evidence of previous threats made by deceased against 'defendant.</p> <p>2. HOMICIDE — Conviction—Sufficiency of Evidence. The entire evidence in this case carefully considered, and found that, if all the evidence as the facts surrounding the commission of the homicide charged be eliminated' other than the testimony of the defendant, there remains evidence sufficient to fully warrant the verdict found and the judgment thereon rendered.</p>

C. Crow, Judge. Robert S. Evans was indicted for larceny of live stock, his motion to discharge the jury and dismiss the case was sustained, and the State appeals.

Appeal .from District Court, McIntosh County; R. W. Higgins, Judge. Walker Cox and Bill Lindsay were convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree, and they appeal.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Woods County; W. C. Crow, Judge. </p> <p>Martin M. Fulkerson was convicted of embezzlement, and .he appeals.</p>

B. Forrest, Judge. T. Kollar was charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquors, and from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the information, the State appeals.

B. Swank, Assigned Judge. ' D. A. Collier was convicted of murder, and lie appeals. The information charged that in Pontotoc, county, on the 21st day of May, 1916, D. A. Collier did then and there kill one C. H. McFerron, by shooting him with a pistol. It appears that C. OH. McFerron, the deceased, was a pharmacist, employed in Busby’s Drug Store in the town of Allen.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>LARCENY — Evidence—Sufficiency. In a prosecution for cattle theft, the evidence carefully considered, and found to fully support the verdict rendered, and an examination of the record discloses that the trial was free from error.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. RAPE — Evidence—Sufficiency. In a prosecution for statutory rape, the evidence considered, and conviction affirmed.</p> <p>2. EVIDENCE — Predicate For AdmBssion of Letter. In a trial for statutory rape, a note or letter was properly admitted, where the prosecutrix testified that she received the same from the defendant, and there was proof that the same was in his handwriting.</p> <p>3. RAPE — Improper Acts of Prosecutrix as Defense. Proof that the female was guilty of improper relations with other men is no defense to the charge of statutory rape.</p>

M. Bowles, Judge. •George Riussell was convicted- of statutory rape, and he appeals. On the 11th day of January, 1916, Blanche De Roin, a female under the age of 16 years, gave birth to a male child at the home of the niece of this defendant near War-rensburg, in the state of Missouri, to which place the defendant had taken the said Blanche De Roin in the month of September, 1915.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Cleveland County; F. B. Swank, Judge. </p> <p>■Clarence Earnest Berry was convicted of issuing fraudulent checks, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from Superior Court, Okmulgee County; R. E. Simpson, Judge. </p> <p>Mike Broshears was convicted of the crime of unlawful destruction of public property, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Conviction—Sufficiency of Evidence. If there is a clear conflict in the evidence, or if the evidence is such that different inferences may reasonably be drawn therefrom, the jury’s determination will not he interfered with, on appeal, unless the verd'ict is clearly against the weight of the evidence, or was influenced by passion and prejudice. It is not for this court to substitute its judgment on the question of the weight of the evidence for that either of the jury or the trial court, provided there is competent evidence from which the jury were authorized to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged.</p> <p>2. LARCENY — Evidence—Sufficiency. Record examined, and held evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. RAPE — Information—Sex of Victim — Sufficiency of Allegation. In a prosecution for tbe crime of rape or assault with intent to commit rape, where the description of the name of the person assaulted is one usually applied to females, an additional allegation that such person is a female is unnecessary.</p> <p>2. SAME. In such prosecution, an indictment or information charging the offense will be held to be sufficient without the use of the term “female,"’ if by other words contained therein the sex of the person alleged to have been assaulted clearly appears.</p> <p>3. ' SAME. One of the essential elements of an indictment or information charging- the crime of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape is an allegation that the person alleged tb have been raped or assaulted is a female, or else other allegations which reasonably show that such person is a female. An indictment or information which attempts to charge either of said crimes must allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged crime was committed against a female person..</p> <p>4. SAME. For information held insufficient to charge the crime of assault with intent to rape, and the reasons for such holding, see body of opinion.</p>

<p> Appeal from, District Court, Okmulgee County; Ernest B. Hughes, Judge. </p> <p>Sarah Palmer was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and she appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>L HOMICIDE — Parties—“Principal”—Aiding or Abetting. One who aids or abets in perpetrating a homicide is guilty as a “principal.”</p> <p>2. SAME. Where three persons willingly and jointly engage' in an attack upon another, ox two. of them abet the other in making such attack, in which a blow is struck by one of the attacking parties which results in the death of the party attacked, all of the attacking and abetting parties are liable for the homicide resulting, regardless of which of them struck the fatal blow.</p> <p>3. TRIAL — Directed Verdict — Right to. Where there are facts from which the jury can legitimately deduce either of two conclusions, a motion for a directed verdict should always be denied.</p>

Mason, Judge. James Hobbs was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Pawhuska, prohibiting the keeping of a tippling sho-p, as defined by said ordinance, and he appeals.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>APPEAL AND ERROR — Time—Misdemeanor .Case. An appeal in a misdemeanor case must be taken within 60 days from the rendition of the judgment appealed from by filing with the clerk of this court a petition in error, with case-mjade or transcript pf the record attached, with proof of notices of appeal, unless the time in which such appeal may be perfected is extended as authorized by section 5991, Rev. Laws 1910; and, when an appeal is not so perfected, this court does not acquire jurisdiction of the appeal, and such attempted appeal will be dismissed.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Cleveland County; F. B. Swank, Judge. </p> <p>John McGarrah was convicted of the larceny of an automobile, and he appeals.</p>

District Court, Pottawatomie County; Charles B. Wilson, Jr., Judge. Roy Wilks was tried for robbery and was acquitted in the district court of Pottawatomie county, .and the State appeals on questions of law reserved for review on appeal.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Delaware County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>John Steeley was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>■INTOXICATING' LIQUORS — Unlawful Possession — Sufficiency of Evidence. The evidence considered, and found sufficient to sustain the conviction of G. W. Davis, and insufficient to sustain the conviction of Mrs. G. W. Davis.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Jackson County; Frank Mathews, Judge. </p> <p>G. M. Clemens was convicted of arson in the second degree, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>APPEAL AND ERROR, — Dismissal—(Acceptance of Pardon. When the pardoning power extends clemency, and the same is accepted pending the determination of an appeal, the appeal will be dismissed.</p>

Appeal from County Court, Noble County; A. Duff Tillery, Judge. John L. Miller was convicted of the unlawful abandonment of his wife and child, and he appeals.

Pitchford, Judge. Harry Newberry was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, and he appeals. This an appeal from the district court of Delaware county in an action commenced in said court on the 19th day of March, 1917, by information duly filed by the county attorney of said county, charging the defendant with the murder of one Ben Price by shooting him with a 45 Colt's • revolving pistol on the 18th of December, 1916.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Cherokee County; E. B. Arnold, Judge. </p> <p>Zack Noel was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, and he appeals.</p>

• J. D. Leach was convicted of the crime of maintaining a public nuisance, and his punishment fixed at a fine of $500. Motion in arrest of judgment overruled, and he appeals.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Pittsburg County; R. W. Higgins, Judge. </p> <p>Jim Barrow was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Time for Objections — Information. An objection to the sufficiency of an information cannot be raised for the first time upon appeal, unless the information fails to charge a public offense.</p> <p>2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Sufficiency—Waiver of Objections. -Where the defendant fails to challenge the sufficiency of an information in the manner provided by law, he in effect waives any and all defects., except such as are fundamental.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. HOMICIDE — Murder—Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for murder, the evidence reviewed, and held sufficient to sustain the conviction, with imprisonmVsnt for life as the punishment.</p> <p>2. APPEAL AND ERROR — Absence of Briefs — Review of Murder Case. In a homicide case, where the defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, and no briefs are filed or argument presented, this court will carefully examine the record and all questions involved therein,' and- if no error is apparent, the judgment will be affirmed.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Muskogee County; R. P. de Graff enr&id, Judge. </p> <p>J. E. Hill was convicted of the crime of assault with intent to kill by shooting, and sentenced to serve a term of ten years in the state penitentiary, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(•Syllabus.)</p> <p>APPEAL AND ERROR — Conviction—Sufficiency of Evidence. Where the uncontradicted testimony sustains a conviction, the judgment will not be reversed on appeal.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>GAMING — Conducting- Game — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for conducting a gambling game, the evidence considered, and held sufficient to sustain conviction.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Case-made — Settlement — Judges. A case-made must be settled and signed by tbe judge wbo tried the case; and, where a ease was tried by one judge, and the case-made is signed and settled by another, and no showing is made as to inability of the trial judge to do so, such ease-made is a nullity.</p> <p>2. SAME — Case-Made a Nullity — Dismissal. Where the appeal is attempted to be taken by ease-made alone, and such case-made is a nullity, because no; settled and signed according to law, upon proper motion by the state, such case-made will be stricken, and the appeal dismissed.</p>

<p>(■Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. COURTS — Death Sentence — Opinion to Governor Before Expira tion of Time for Appeal. An opinion to the Governor in a case where a defendant has been sentenced to death ought not to be given when the time for taking an appeal has not expired, and when defendant has not waived the right to apner.l.</p> <p>2. PARDON — Death Sentence — Time for Appeal — Power to Reprieve. Where one convicted of murder and sentenced to death has obtained permission to take an appeal, and the time allowed by the court for perfecting an appeal has not expired, the Governor by virtue of Rev. Daws 1910, § 5970, alone can reprieve or suspend the execution of the judgment beyond the time allowed by the trial court to perfect the appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Choctaw County; C. E. Dudley, Judge. </p> <p>Israel Williams was convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals.</p> <p>Israel Williams was convicted in the district court of Choctaw county, at the October term, 1917, for the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, alleged to have been committed by him on the 11th day of July, 1917, by shooting and killing one Joe Childers with a pistol. Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of 10 years’ imprisonment-in the penitentiary. The shooting occurred on the premises of the defendant in Choctaw county about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 11th day of July, 1917, the deceased dying about 9 o’clock the next morning.</p> <p>The deceased was a tenant on the farm of the defendant, and lived about a quarter of a mile distant from the house of the defendant. Deceased was a married man, with some children, and had been working for the defendant off and on for over 2 years.</p> <p>On the day of the killing, the defendant was over at the home of the deceased, and took about a pint of whisky with him, and the defendant, deceased, and one other drank from this bottle of whisky early in the morning of that day. The defendant was somewhat intoxicated, and later came to the home of the deceased to borrow a horse to go and get some more whisky. After borrowing the horse, the defendant again returned to the home of the deceased, and had dinner, and after dinner the. defendant and deceased went over to defendant’s house, and it was while they were over there by themselves that the tragedy occurred.</p> <p>The deceased stated after he was shot that Israel Williams had shot him, and he (deceased) believed defendant had killed him; that he had no idea that Israel would ever have done it, or he never would have gone home with him; also that it looked hard for an honest man to have to die that way; that he hated to leave the children for his wife to do the best she could with them. He stated further that after they had got over to Israel’s house, Israel told him to pick the banjo for him so he could dance, and deceased said he was picking the banjo and Israel was dancing, when deceased stopped, and Israel went in the house and came back with a gun and said he was going to kill deceased and Lee Novels both; that they had run over him enough. Deceased said that he asked defendant not to shoot him, but that Israel commenced to fire, and fired three .shots, and the fourth shot hit him, and deceased said that he started home, and Israel then said he was going to follow him and kill him; that when he started home, he left Israel reloading his gun.</p> <p>The wife of the deceased testified that she heard the shots and heard her husband hollowing, and that she went immediately in the direction of Williams’ house, and found her husband by the side of the road, badly shot, and Israel Williams about 18 steps away with a pistol in his hand, and that she heard the defendant say at that time to her husband: “Good-bye, you -; I’ll kill you yet;” that thereupon she assisted her husband home; that her husband was suffering intense pain and died about 9 o’clock the next morning.</p> <p>The defendant testified concerning the homicide as follows :</p> <p>“Q. Did you come back to Joe’s house then after you rode the horse awhile? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Did you have dinner over there? A. I don’t recollect eating dinner there, but they say I eat dinner there.</p> <p>“Q. Then where did you go? A. I went home.</p> <p>“Q. Who went with you? A. Joe.</p> <p>“Q. Now what took place after you got over there? A. Well, I went and got a banjo. T come out on the gallery, and he went to picking the banjo, and he wanted me to dance, and I told him I couldn’t dance, and he kept on after me, and I made on like I was dancing. After I got tired I just sat down on the gallery, and after awhile he quit picking. I had a string on the banjo, and he wanted to borrow some money from me, and I told him I didn’t have any, and he says, ‘I know damn well you have got it,’ and I says, ‘No; I ain’t got no money.’ ‘Well,’ he says, ‘I am goiag to have it anyway,’ and he commenced cussing me, and I just got up—</p> <p>“Q. What did he call you when he was cussing you? what did he call you? A. He called me a son of a bitch.</p> <p>“Q. And what did you do then? A. I just got up, and started out towards the fence, and he come up behind me and gave me a push and struck me in the boot here (indicating) — that’s the foot — and I fell down, and I got up. Then he struck at me with the banjo, and I just got up and went around the house, and he followed me. I comé to the back door and went in the house; I just went on in and got my gun and walked out, and he come through the house following me.</p> <p>“Q. Where was the gun? A. It was on the bed under a pillow.</p> <p>“Q. What took place out at the gallery? A. I just shot towards him. I didn’t aim to hit him.</p> <p>“Q. Before the shooting took place, what did you tell him about trouble, if anything? A. I just told him that I didn’t want to have any trouble with him, and I didn’t want him to hurt me, and I didn’t want to hurt him.</p> <p>“Q. Then did he hit you firpt, or did you shoot first? A. He hit me first.</p> <p>“Q. What did he hit you with? A. A banjo.</p> <p>“Q. Where did he hit-you? A. Right up here (indicating), and right down there (indicating).</p> <p>“Q. Do you know how many shots you fired? A. No,, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Do you remember what took place after you was hit? A. No sir; I don’t know anything about—</p> <p>“Q. Tell that jury whether or not you thought you was in any danger when you went to shooting? A. Well, I thought I was in danger. The banjo is brass, and weighs about five or six pounds.</p> <p>“Q. And did you shoot because he hit you? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. What was Joe 'Childers doing at the time you shot, if you know? A. No, sir; I don’t.</p> <p>“Q. You don’t remember anything after he hit you? A. No sir. * * *</p> <p>“Q. Did you have any ill feelings towards Joe that morning when you went over to Joe’s house; was you mad at him? A. No, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Did you tell Joe that you was going to kill him and Lee Novels? A. I don’t know, sir.</p> <p>“Q. You don’t remember telling him anything of the kind? A. No, sir; if I did, I was just saying that, I gue,ss. We had been talking about one another there all the time.</p> <p>“Q. About getting one another, but if you did tell him that, you didn’t mean it, did you ? A. No, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Was you mad at Joe when you and him went back over to your house and Joe went to picking the banjo? A. No, sir; I wasn’t.</p> <p>“Q. And if you shot Joe and killed him that evening, you did it because you thought he was trying to kill you with that banjo? A. Yes, sir.”</p> <p>On cross-examination the defendant testified in part as follows:</p> <p>“Q. Israel, you say you was drinking some that day you shot Joe? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. How much had you drank? A. I don’t know. I don’t know how much I did drink.</p> <p>“Q. How much did you drink the day before? A. I was already full that morning. I don’t know how much I did drink.</p> <p>“Q. What time of the day was it when you went over to Joe’s the first time? A. First time about 8 or 9 o’clock.</p> <p>“Q. You say you took a drink or two that time over there? A. Yes.</p> <p>“Q. How .many drinks did Joe take? A. Why, he taken about four.</p> <p>“Q. And you taken about how many? A. I take one —two.</p> <p>"Q. Two? A. Yes. * * *</p> <p>“Q. Didn’t you eat dinner at Joe’s that day, that evening some time? A. I might eat dinner there, but I don’t know it.</p> <p>“Q. Don’t remember it, do you? A. No, sir.</p> <p>“Q. In fact, you don’t remember many things down there, that day, do you? A. Not many.</p> <p>“Q. Where was Joe sitting when he was picking that banjo; whereabouts was he sitting? A. On'the gallery. ,</p> <p>“Q. Whereabouts on the gallery? A. On the right-hand side of the door.</p> <p>“Q. Leaning back against a post, was he? A. No, sir; leaning against the wall.</p> <p>“Q. Leaning against the wall facing out in the yard? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. How long did Joe play that banjo before you went out in the yard ? A. He didn’t play it long. I guess it was about a quarter of an hour.</p> <p>“Q. When was it he asked you for some money that day? A. That day?</p> <p>“Q. Yes. A. He asked me — he wanted to borrow it right after he got through picking the banjo and dancing.</p> <p>“Q. Where was you when he asked you for the money ? A. I was sitting on a chair in the yard.</p> <p>“Q. What did you do then? A. I didn’t do anything. I just told him I didn’t have the money.</p> <p>“Q. When did you go'out to the gate? A. Well, when he wanted to borrow the money I told him I didn’t have it, and he says he knows damn well I did have it; he says, T am going to have it anyway,’ and when he ,said that I just got up and started towards the fence, and he come up behind me and give me a push, and he struck me on the foot there — this foot (indicating).</p> <p>“Q. Then what did you do? A. Fell down.</p> <p>“Q. You was pretty drunk, wasn’t you? A. I guess I was.</p> <p>“Q. How long did you lay on the ground before you got up? A. I just got right up and went around the house and he followed me.</p> <p>“Q. What did you say Joe called you? A. He called me a son of a bitch.</p> <p>“Q. I believe you stated a while ago that you didn’t think much about that; that was a common byword between you, wasn’t it? Y'ou just called each other sons of bitches any time you thought about it, didn’t you? A. When we got to drinking.</p> <p>“Q. And when you wasn’t drinking you still kept it up, didn’t you? ‘ A. I guess so.</p> <p>“Q. You went around to the back of the house? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Went around the back way? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Went into your bed and got the gun and went out the front door, and at that time Joe had come up and was .standing on the front gallery? A. No, sir; he followed me.</p> <p>“Q. Where was you when you done the shooting? A. Out on the ground.</p> <p>“Q. Then you went out in the front yard? A. I got off of the gallery and then he got off, and I come back to the gallery, and he still followed me, and I shot. I wasn’t aiming to hit him.</p> <p>“Q. And Joe hadn’t touched you since the time you fell down, had he? A. He touched me with the banjo.</p> <p>“Q. Where? A. (Indicating).</p> <p>“Q. I know, but whereabouts was he touching you with the banjo? A. Out in the yard.</p> <p>“Q. Was that just before he shoved you down? A. That was after.</p> <p>“Q. Did he hit you one or two licks? A. One; come down this way (indicating).</p> <p>“Q. And then you went around behind the house, went in and got your gun, came on back and went out in the yard, didn’t you? A. Yes, ¡sir.</p> <p>“Q. Then you came back on the gallery, and then was when you done the shooting, wasn’t it? A. Yes, sir.</p> <p>“Q. Where did you go then? A. I just set down on the gallery.</p> <p>“Q. Where did Joe go? A. He went home.</p> <p>“Q. Didn’t you follow him? A. I don’t recollect following him.”</p> <p>The foregoing statement of the case is sufficiently comprehensive for the purposes of this opinion.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION — Proof of Venue As Charged. The venue of an offense must be proved as charged.</p> <p>2. LIBEL AND SLANDER — Evidence—Sufficiency. For reasons holding the evidence in this case insufficient to support the judgment, see body of opinion.</p>

Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; Conn Linn, Judge. Anna Brown was convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, and she appeals.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>APPEAL AND ERROR — Conviction—Sufficiency of Evidence. A judgment of a trial court will not be reversed upon appeal when the sole question raised is based upon the contention that “the conviction is contrary to the evidence,” when the record discloses competent evidence tending clearly to support the verdict of the jury and judgment rendered thereon.</p>

<p>RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS — Conviction—Sufficiency of Evidence. Possession of stolen property, supported by other incriminating evidence and circumstances, is sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Review—Necessity of Prejudice — Time of Trial. The action of a trial court in causing a criminal case to be tried at any particular time is riot subject to review on appeal, unless it appears that some substantial right of the defendant in the cause is prejudicially affected thereby.</p> <p>2. APPEAL AND ERROR — Discretion of Trial Court — Change of Venue. A petition for change of venue under our law is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and, unless it affirmatively appears that the court abused this discretion in such manner as to affect the rights of the party to the litigation complaining of the ruling, a new trial will not be awarded on appeal.</p> <p>3. APPEAL AND ERROR — Necessity for Prejudicial Error — Exclusion of Evidence. It is not reversible error for the trial court to refuse to permit proof of- the reputation of the place where a homicide occurred as being a bootlegging or gambling joint, when such proof does not shed any light whatever upon the issues joined.</p> <p>4. SAME — Conviction—Sufficiency of Evidence. When the proof contained in the record is such that the guilt of the accused can fairly be deduced therefrom, and no prejudicial error of law is disclosed, the verdict of the jury and judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed upon appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Okmulgee County; Dudley C. Monk, Judge. </p> <p>L. C. Cooper was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and she appeals.</p>

C. Brewster, Judge. Monroe Betterton was convicted of murder, and the. death penalty assessed, and he appeals. Monroe Betterton, charged with the murder of his-wife, Elzadah Betterton, in Craig county, on the 9th day* of July, 1919, was tried and convicted of murder, and the death penalty assessed. H. E. Ridenhóur was the first witness for the state.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>L MONOPOLIES — Construction of Statute — Intent. Section 1, e. 114, Sess. Laws 1913, construed, and held: The evident intention of the Legislature was twofold: (1) To prevent discrimination m selling of commfodities for the purpose of strangling or thwarting competition; (2) in the absence of competition or otherwise, to prevent discrimination in selling as between two similarly situated communities.</p> <p>2. SAME — Information—Sufficiently. For information held insufficient to charge an offense under section 1, e. 114, Sess. Laws 1913, see body of opinion.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. TRIAL — Verdict—Shooting With Intent to Kill or Do Bodily •Harm. On an information under Penal Code, first clause (section 2836, Rev. Laws), for shooting another with a pistol with intent to kill, where the instruction of the court submitted the included offense of shooting another with intent to do bodily harm, but without intent to kill, as defined by second clause of section 2844, Rev. Laws, the verdict, was, “Guilty of an assault with intent to do bodily harm, as charged in the information herein.” Held, that the verdict was responsive and sufficiently definite and certain as to the offense of which defendant was convicted, and was in effect a verdict of guilty of assault with intent to do bodily harm by shooting with a pistol.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Informal Verdict — Time to Object. An informal verdict should have been objected to when returned, which would have called the attention of the court to its defective form and given an opportunity for its correction.</p> <p>3. HOMICIDE — Evidence—Finding of Weapons Near Scene. Evidence of the finding of weapons at or near the scene of ah assault with intent to kill, subsequent thereto, which are apparently connected with and tend to explain the crime, is admis- ' sitole.</p> <p>4. SAME — Identification of Weapon. On a trial for assault with intent to kill by shooting with a pistol, a knife, not identified as the one claimed to have been in the hands of the person assaulted when the shooting occurred, is not admissible.</p>

Appeal form District Court, Bryan County; Jesse M. Hatchett, Judge. D. F. Underwood was convicted of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses and his punishment fixed by verdict at imprisonment for two years, and, from an order arresting the judgment, the State appeals.

Odie Williams was convicted of the crime of rape in the second degree, and sentenced to serve a term of four years in the state reformatory, and he appeals.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. HOMICIDE — “Unwritten Law” as Defense. The so-called unwritten law, the right to avenge wrongs done female members ‘ of one’s family by killing the wrongdoer, is not a recognized rule of action in Oklahoma.</p> <p>2. EVIDENCE — Nonexpert Opinions — Sanity of Defendant. Persons who, are not experts on insanity, but who have had opportunity to converse with and observe the actions of one whose sanity is at issue, may legally testify as to whether such conversations and actions indicated sanity or insanity; the weight of such evidence being for the jury.</p> <p>8. EVIDENCE — Flight and Concealment of Defendant. Flight irom the scene of a crime and acts 'done by a fugitive to hide his identity are circumstances tending to show guilt, and proof of them is admissible in evidence.</p> <p>4. HOMICIDE — Defensive Evidence — Illicit Relations Between Deceased and Defendant’s Wife. Proof of illicit relations between a deceased and the wife of a defendant, whom he is charged with killing on account of the relationship, is entitled to go to the jury in mitigation of the punishment, and when insanity is the defense 'based upon these wrongful acts, such proof is also entitled to go to the jury in support thereof when the facts were known to the defendant and it is made reasonably to appear that his acts and -conduct were influenced thereby.</p> <p>5. HOMICIDE — Evidence—Uncommunicated Threats by Deceased. Unless there is evidence tending to show self-defense, uncom-munieated threats made by the deceased against tie defendant are not admissible in evidence.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. RAPE — Assault with Intent — Age of Prosecutrix — Previous Chaste Character. Where an information charges an assault to •rape a female under the age of 18 years of previous chaste and' virtuous chraeter, and avers that the said assault was made with force and violence, the defendant, upon legal, proof, may be properly convicted, regardless of the age of the female assaulted, and whether or not she was of previous • chaste and virtuous character.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Instructions—Refusal of Requests. Instructions requested and refused that direct an acquittal upon a finding of facts which do not constitute a legal defense to the offense cnarged are properly refused.</p> <p>3. APPEAL AND ERROR — Review—Error Favorable to Appellant. Instructions given which instruct the jury to acquit the defendant, should they find from the evidence certain. facts, which said facts do not constitute a legal defense to the offense charged, are more favorable to a defendant than he is entitled to, and cannot be urged by him as reversible error.</p> <p>4. CONTINUANCE — Absent Witnesses — Refusal. Where the facts averred in a motion for a continuance that an absent witness would, if present, testify to, if true, would not be a legal defense to the offense charged, it is not error to overrule such motion.</p> <p>5. RAPE — Assault with Intent — Sufficiency of Evidence. The entire record in this case carefully considered, and the evidence found to fully sustain the verdict rendered, and the trial' of the case free from reversible error.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Discretion of Lower Court — Overruling Challenge for Cause. When the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges of jurors, the overruling of a challenge of a juror for cause is not a reversible error, unless it be made to appear that in so ruling the court abused its discretion.</p> <p>JURY — Number of Peremptory Challenges — Compliance With Statute. The number of peremptory challenges allowed a defendant being fixed by statute, a trial court is without authority to increase the number of such peremptory challenges. 2.</p> <p>3. SEDUCTION — Consent by Promise of Marriage and Fears. Sexual intercourse with an .unmarried female within the age of consent, to which her consent is secured by a xu’omise of marriage, constitutes seduction, although her consent was also secured by arousing her fears.</p> <p>4. SEDUCTION — Voluntary Intercourse not Rape. Where sexual intercourse is voluntarily had by an unmarried female within the age of consent, a prosecution for rape cannot be maintained.</p> <p>5. SEDUCTION — Evidence—Sufficiency. The record in this case carefully examined, and the evidence found sufficient to sustain the conviction, and the trial free from fundamental error.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Okmulgee County; Ernest B. Hughes, Judge. </p> <p>William Crisp was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Insufficiency of Evidence — Maintaining Public Nuisance. In a prosecution for maintaining a public nuisance, evidence held insufficient to sustain a conviction.</p>

J. Campbell, Judge. Frank Mayfield and Leonard Mayfield were convicted of the crime of grand larceny, and they appeal. Frank Mayfield and Leonard Mayfield were convicted in the district court of Rogers county, at the December 1917, term of that court, of the crime of grand larceny, for stealing 16% bushels of wheat from the granary of one B.' S. Clifton, a farmer living in the northwest part of said county.

<p> Appeal from District Court, Washita County; Thomas A. Edwards, Judge. </p> <p>Walter Young was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Carter County; W. F. Freeman, Judge. </p> <p>Jesse Mitchell was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Cherokee County; John H. Pitchford, Judge. </p> <p>Mat Crabtree was convicted of assault with intent to kill, and he appeals.</p>

<p> A-ppeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Cham Jones, Judge. </p> <p>Barney Whitmore was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Unlawful Transportation — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor, evidence examined, and held sufficient to sustain the conviction, and that no reversible error was committed on • the trial.</p>

E„ Dudley, Judge. Earl Everidge was convicted of murder, and he. appeals. Plaintiff in error, Earl Everidge, and Edward Hembree and Floyd Aikens were charged jointly with the murder of P. H. Hearn, alleged to have been committed in Push-mataha county on the 16th day; of September, 1915.

<p> Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; W. B. Williams, Judge. </p> <p>H. C. French and W. R. Sapp were convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor, and they appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from, District Court, -Seminole County; J. W. Bolen, Judge. </p> <p>Tom Thomas was convicted of murder, and he appeals.</p>

Wilson, Jr., Judge. Andrew Johnson was convicted of an assault with a .sharp and dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm .and without justifiable or excusable cause, and he appeals.

G. Watts, Judge. Xenophon Jones was convicted of manslanghter in the first degree, and he appeals. Under an indictment which charged him with the murder of Guy F. McIntyre, in Muskogee county, on or about the 30th day of October, 1917, Xenophon Jones was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentenced to serve a term of 25 years in the penitentiary. The following is in substance the evidence in the case.

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. HABEAS CORPUS — Right to Bail After Commitment for Capital Offense — Burden of Proof. Upon an application for writ of habeas corpus to he let to bail, after commitment for a capital offense by an examining magistrate, the burden is upon the petitioner to show facts sufficient to entitle him to bail, when those facts do not appear from the evidence adduced on the part of the prosecution.</p> <p>2. BAIL — Right to in Capital Case — Evidence. If, upon a consideration of all the evidence introduced on the application for bail, the court is of the opinion that it is insufficient, to create a reasonable doubt of the petitioner's guilt of a capital offense, bail will be refused.</p> <p>3. SAME. Upon this application, the evidence considered, and bail denied.</p>

<p>Petition by Wilson Smith for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. GAMING — Conducting Game — Defensive Evidence — Admissibility. In a trial for conducting a roulette wheel for money, it is not reversible error to exclude offered evidence of rules governing the operation of such gambling games and that the witnesses offered were at times in the place where said wheel was being conducted, and that they had not seen anything tending to show that the defendant was in any wise connected with the operation of said game or interested therein, as such of-ferred evidence did not tend to show any defense to the crime with which the defendant was charged.</p> <p>2. SAME — Persons Liable. Any person, whether he be owner, employe, or bystander acting as a matter of accommodation, who conducts a roulette wheel played at for money, or assists in conducting the same, is subject to information and conviction for so doing, whether he acts for compensation or not. (Following Johnson v. State, 10 Olda. Or. 597, 140 Pac. 622.)</p> <p>3. APPEAJj AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Instructions. Instructions given and instructions refused do not constitute reversible_ error, unless upon examination of the entire record it appears that the giving or the refusal to give such instructions has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice or constitutes a violation of a. constitutional or statutory right of a defendant.</p> <p>4. TRIAL — Refusal of Instructions on Jury’s Deliberation. It is not reversible error for a trial court to refuse to instruct a jury that they are not required to surrender their honest convictions for the mere purpose of agreeing upon a verdict.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Pawnee County; Conn Linn, Judge. </p> <p>Mary F. Rioe was convicted of the crime of murder, and she appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. RAPE — Elements of “Rape in the First Degree.” Rape in the first degree may be committed upon a female of any age, when accomplished by force and violence overcoming' her resistance, or by means of threats of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution.</p> <p>2. SAME — Insufficiency of Information. An information for rape alleged that the defendant, did make an assault upon and rawish and have sexual intercourse with a certain female under the age of 18 years, of previous chaste character, and not. the wife of the defendant, and against, the will and without the consent of said female. Held, that the information is insufficient to charge rape in the first degree as defined by the fourth subdivision of section 2414, Rev. Laws 1910.</p> <p>3. RAPE — Elements of “Rape in the Second Degree.” Carnal knowledge of it female over the ago of 10 years and under the age of 18, of previous chaste and virtuous character, other than the wife of defendant, whether accomplished with or without the consent of such female, is rape in the second degree.</p> <p>4. SAME — Sufficiency of Information. An information alleging that the defendant did make an assault upon, and ravish and have sexual intercourse with, a certain female under the age of 18 years, of previous chaste character, and not the wife of defendant, without the consent and against the will of said female, was not fatally defective for failure to allege that the female was “over the age of 16 years.”</p> <p>5. SAME — Allegations and Proof — Previous Chaste Character. Under the statute, (second subdivision of section 2414, Rev. Laws) the previous chaste and virtuous character of the prose-cutrix is a material element of the offense, and must be alleged, and the state must prove in tlie first instance that she was of previous chaste and virtuous character.</p> <p>6. SAME — Burden of Proof. In a prosecution for statutory rape, where the previous chastity of the female is an essential element of the offense as defined by the statute, it cannot be said that the law presumes that the female,, was not of chaste character when the act was committed, although such chaste character must be alleged, and the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was of previous chaste and virtuous character.</p> <p>7. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Instructions on Rape. lii a prosecution for rape as defined by second subdivision of section 2414, Iiev. Laws, an instruction that every female is presumed to be of previous chaste character until the contrary is shown, was harmless error, where the proof of the prosecutrix’s previous chaste character was not contested.</p> <p>8. EVIDENCE — Burden of Proof — Alibi. The burden of proof is not shifted by the defense of an alibi, and the defendant is entitled to an acquittal if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt of his presence at the time and place where the crime was committed.</p> <p>9. TRIAL — Instructions on Alibi. An instruction to iind the defendant not guilty if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was not present when the crime was committed, if it was committed, is erroneous.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Beckham County; Thomas, A. Edioards, Assigned Judge. </p> <p>Bud Armstrong was convicted of grand larceny, and' appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. HABEAS CORPUS — Scope of Inquiry — Void Proceedings. Tbe writ of habeas corpus does not deal with errors or irregularities which render proceedings voidable merely, but such only as 'render -them 'absolutely void.</p> <p>3. SAME — Conviction—Jurisdiction. The review of a judgment of conviction and imprisonment by writ of habeas corpus is limited to the questions: -Had the court which rendered the judgment jurisdiction of the offense and of the person convicted? Or did the court in the course of the proceedings which resulted in the judgment lose judisdiction to render a valid judgment and sentence V</p> <p>3. SAME — Prima Facie Showing — Record. Where it is shown by the return that petitioner is detained by virtue of a commitment issued upon a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, such showing is prima facie only of the fact, and may he impeached by the record of the case for the purpose of showing that the court or judge was without jurisdiction to render the judgment.</p> <p>4. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE — Presence of Accused — Necessity in Felony Cases. In felony cases the defendant’s presence in open court when judgment, is rendered is an essential prerequisite, and indispensable to the jurisdiction of the court to render a valid judgment. He cannot waive this right and his counsel cannot do so for him.</p> <p>5. SAME — Validity of Judgment Pronounced in Jail. Where, 'after rendering judgment in open court, in the absence of the defendant, the judge left the courtroom and proceeded to the county jail, where the defendant was confined, and there, in the absence of the court clerk and the defendant’s counsel, again pronounced judgment and sentence, held, that the court was not in session at the county jail, and the judgment and sentence there pronounced is a nullity. Held, further, that all the proceedings of rendering judgment and passing sentence were corara non judice and void.</p> <p>8. SAME — Void Judgment — Validity of Verdict — Procedure. The holding in this case that 1ho proceedings in rendering judgment and passing sentence were void only affects the judgment and sentence, and leaves the verdict and all precedent proceedings in full force and effect. The petitioner is therefore remanded to the custody of respondent pending- the rendition of judgment in conformity with law and in accordance with the verdict of conviction.</p>

Champion, Judge. Dave Childers was charged by information with the crime of perjury. From a judgment setting aside the information, the State takes a pretended appeal. T. B. Wilkins, Co. Atty., for the .State. Graham & Logsdon, for defendant in error. •

<p> Appeal from District Court, Ottawa County; Geo. C. Crump, Assigned Judge. </p> <p>J. J. Shepherd was convicted of maintaining a gambling house, and he appeals.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Payne County, John P. Hicham, Judge. </p> <p>Harry Williams was convicted of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.')</p> <p>1. TRIAL — Refusal of Requested Instructions Not Sustained by Evidence. Instructions requested must be based upon the evidence: and, where the evidence does not sustain the request, rhere is no error in refusing to give the instruction.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Province of Jury — Question Whether Witness Was Accomplice — Instruction. Where the evidence is conflicting as to whether a certain 'witness is an accomplice, it is proper for the court to instruct the jury on the law of accomplices, and leave the question of whether or not the witness is an accomplice for the decision of the jury as a matter of fact.</p> <p>3. EVIDENCE: — Accomplices—Refusal of Requested Instruction. A requested instruction, in substance to the effect that if the jury believes any witness lias been promised immunity, or entertains the hope of immunity, from any prosecution poudiDg against him for some other offense than that upon which the defendant is being tried, he stands in the relation of an accomplice to the defendant, and that the testimony of such a witness should he corroborated in the manner required of accomplices, is properly refused.</p> <p>4. EVIDENCE — Relevancy—Evidence Affecting Credibility of Witness. As the jury is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence and of the credibility of each and every witness, anything that properly tends to cast light upon the credit to be given to a witness is a matter that should be permitted to go before the jury for its consideration.</p> <p>5. APPEAL AND ERROR — Harmless Error — Exclusion of Evidence. By express statutory enactment, this court is precluded from reversing a judgment of conviction because of the exclusion of evidence properly tendered, unless after an examination of the entire record it is apparent to this court that the exclusion of such evidence probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice', or deprived the defendant of some constitutional or statutory right to liis prejudice.</p> <p>6. APPEAL AND ERROR — Modification of Judgment — Conducting Liquor Nuisance. The Legislature has seen fit to vest in this court power and authority to modify a judgment of conviction where the ends of justice seem to require it. Eor reasons why the judgment of conviction should be modified in this case, see body of opinion.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Carter County; W. F. Freeman, Judge. </p> <p>Ed Reed, J. M. Barron, and Tom Ford were convicted of conducting prohibited gambling games, and they appeal.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>ASSAULT AND BATTERY — Assault With Weapon to Do Bodily Harm — Insufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm, the evidence considered, and held as a matter of law insufficient to support the verdict and judgment of conviction.</p>

<p> Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County’, N. E. McNeill, Judge. </p> <p>E. L. Long was convicted of a second violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>On supplemental petition for rehearing on behalf of defendant Tom Ford.</p>

<p> Appeal from County Court, Ottaiva County; Vern E. Thompson, Judge. </p> <p>James N. Stovall was convicted of a misdemeanor, and he appeals.</p>

<p>(Syllabus..)</p> <p>INTOXICATING LIQUORS — Unlawful Possession — Sufficiency of Evi--. dence. In a prosecution for the. unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor,’the evidence considered, and held sufficient to sustain the conviction. ,. ■ •••</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>APPEAL AND ERROR — Abatement of Prosecution — Death of Defendant. In a criminal action, the purpose of the proceeding being to punish the defendant in person, the action must necessarily abate upon his death.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>LARCENY — Sufficiency of Evidence. In a prosecution for the theft of an- automobile, the evidence considered, and held sufficient to sustain conviction, and that no reversible error was committed on the trial.</p>

<p>(Syllabus.)</p> <p>1. APPEAL AND ERROR — Prejudicial Error — Evidence and Argument. Where incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence is admitted over proper objection and exception of defendant’s counsel, and improper remarks are made by the county attorney clearly outside the record, and are properly excepted to, and it is apparent to this court upon an examination of .(he entire record that such errors probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and were prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant, the judgment of conviction will be reversed.</p> <p>2. TRIAL — Record of Argument. When timely request is made, the trial court should order the court reporter to take down in shorthand the argument of counsel.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; H. B. Standeven, Judge.</p> <p>Oscar Morris, convicted for a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, appeals.</p>

Appeal 1'rom Conjity Conrt, Pittsburg County; tí. P. Brown, Judge. Cliarley Hamilton was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and to serve a term of 30 days in the county jail, and appeals.

<p>Appeal from District Court, Garter County; W. F. Freeman, Judge.</p> <p>Lon Peevy, convicted of manslaughter in the. first degree, appeals.</p>

<p>Application for writ of habeas corpus by J. E. Anderson to be - admitted to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Cotton County; J. 'O. Norman, Judge.</p> <p>Lester Keeter was convicted of - violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, ('reek County; G. R. AVileox, Judge.</p> <p>John Henry AA’nnl was convicted of violation of the prohibitory liquor law. and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Alfalfa County; J. C. Robberts, Judge</p> <p>J. W. Jennings was convicted of bigamy, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of Floyd Heytz, an 'insane person, for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Caddo County; Will Linn, Judge.</p> <p>AAA H. Martin was convicted of the crime of unlawful!/ selling mortg.- ged property, and airpeals.</p>

<p>Petition by Frank .Sawyers for writ of habeas corpus to lie admitted to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court. Tulsa County; IT. L. Standeven, Judge.</p> <p>Lafe Lewellen was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law. and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; H. D. Standeven, Judge.</p> <p>Dan Ward was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and lie appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Counl.v Court, Garvin County; J. I). Mitchell, Judge.</p> <p>Bill Hacks was con-victed of a violation of tlie prohibitory liquor Jaw, and -lie appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; S. F. Brown. Judge.</p> <p>Joe Dorset was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

Apixeal from County Court, Payne County; Wilberforce Jones, Judge. R. A. Tropp and Will Andrews were convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor laws, and they appeal.

<p>Appeal from County Court. Love County; J. H. Hays, Judge.</p> <p>Bud Campbell was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Okmulgee County; Ernest B. Hughes, Judge.</p> <p>B. H. Mann was convicted of the crime of unlawfully receiving stolen property, and -he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Ottawa County; N. C. Barry, Judge.</p> <p>Geo. Whitehead was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Okmulgee County; Dudley C. Monk, Judge.</p> <p>Arthur Cobbs was convicted of a violation of tlie. prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; H. L. Standeven, Judge.</p> <p>Billy Wagner was convicted of a violation of the, prohibitory liquor law. and lie appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court. Okmulgee County; Dudley C. Monk, J udge.</p> <p>A. Ford, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court. Washington County ; Robert D. Wad-dill, Judge.</p> <p>Francisco Lucino, convicted of ti violation of the prohibitory liquor law, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; William H. Zwick. Judge.</p> <p>Tate Jones was convicted of unlawfully transporting liquor, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; William H. Zwick. Judge.</p>

J. Ray, Judge. Bob Morris was convicted of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquors with intent to sell them, and he appeals.

Stex>hens County; J. W. Marshall, Judge. Tom Richards and Rose Rogers were convicted of .u violation of the prohibitory liquor law. and they appeal.

Woodward County; James B. Oulliison, Judge. G. W. Server was convicted of keeping a gambling nuisance and sentenced to serve a term of two years in the state, penitentiary, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from Superior Court. Okmulgee County; R. E. Simpson, Judge.</p> <p>Frances Fuller was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor laws, and appeals.</p>

<p>Petition by George Fox for writ of babeas corpus lo lie admitted to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; W. B. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>C.' S. Denegre was convicted of possessing whisky with intent to sell it, and: he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Muskogee County; Guy F. Nelson, .Judge.</p> <p>Buzz Wright was convicted of a violation of the prohibition liquor ¡aws, and lie appeals.</p>

’A. Carlton, Judge. Ira Spencer and lioy Spencer were jointly tried and convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor laws, and they appeal.

<p>Appeal from County Court, Pontotoc County; Orel Busby, Judge.</p> <p>Will Ward was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Okmulgee County; Mark L. Bozarth, Judge.</p> <p>Bud McLaughlin was convicted of the crime of unlawful destruction of public property, and appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court. Okmulgee County; R. E. Simpson, Judge</p> <p>Eli Reed was convicted of keeping a place with the intent to sell intoxicating liquors, and from his sentence to a fine and imprisonment he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court. Cuslcv County; E.'J. Lindley. Judge.</p> <p>IX O. Nichols was convicted of abandoning 'his family, and lie appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Count, Okmulgee County; R. E. Simpson, J udge.</p> <p>Plaintiffs in error were convicted of the crime of keeping a house of ill fame, and appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; N. E. McNeill, Judge.</p> <p>Lindsey Coleman was convicted under the enhanced penalty act of the prohibitory liquor law, and lie appeals.</p>

Edwards, Judge. Oliver Robinson was convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property, and sentenced to serve a term of 18 months’ imprisonment in the State Reformatory at Granite, Okla., and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; N. E. McNeill, Judge.</p> <p>Henry AArade was convicted under tlie enhanced penalty act of the prohibitory liquor law (Laws 1913, e. 20), and sentenced to serve a term of five years' imprisonment in the state .penitentiary and to pay a fine of $50, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Ax>peal from Superior Court, Okmulgee County; R. E. Simpson, Judge.</p> <p>Joe Jackson and Joe Thomas were convicted of the crime of maintaining a place with intent to sell intoxicating liquor, and they appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court, Tulsa County; W. B. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>Fred Down, convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law*, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Tulsa County; W. B. Williams, Judge.</p> <p>Harry Northrup was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Count, Rogers Comity; Edward Jordan, Judge.</p> <p>E. L. Smart was convicted of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquors, and he axipeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County court, Lore County; W. I!. Jones, Judge.</p> <p>A. L. Jones, convicted- of a misdemeanor, appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Cleveland County; F. B. Swank, Judge.</p> <p>Charles Holden was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Grady County; Will Lynn, Judge.</p> <p>Charley Crisp was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals.</p>

John Martin was convicted, of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree and sentenced to serve a term of 35 years in the state penitentiary, and he appeals.

<p>Appeal from County Court, Payne County; Wilburforee Jones, Judge.</p> <p>John Sherwood was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory liquor laws, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County. Court, Oklahoma County; William H. Zwick, Judge.</p> <p>W. M. Thompson was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors, and lie appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Ottawa County: N. O. Harry. Judge.</p> <p>W. W. Hutchins was convicted of the crime of unlawful posses-t-ion of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Proceeding by the State, on relation of G. C. Suman, County Attorney, of Payne County, for a writ of prohibition against Inicien B. Wright, Judge of the Twenty-Second Judicial District.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Oreelc County: Ernest 15. Hughes, Judge.</p> <p>Ike Pollykoff was convicted of grand larceny, and he 'appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from Superior Court, Creek County; G. R. Wilcox, Judge.</p> <p>Jesse Ripley was convicted of the crime of conveying intoxicating liquors, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Cotton County: J. R. Norman. Judge.</p> <p>S. R. kittle was convicted of violating the prohibitory law. and lie appeals.</p>

<p>Petition by Charley Roach. F. H. Anthony. ':md James J. Kelly for writ habeas corpus to have bail reduced.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Edward Dewes Oldfield, Judge.</p> <p>\V. E. (Dutch) Weber, convicted of grand larceny, api>eals.</p>

<p>Petition by IV. 1-1. Parrick for writ of habeas corpus to be let to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Coin!, Oklahoma County; W. R. Taylor, ■i udge.</p> <p>Pressy James was convicted of selling unlawfully intoxicating liquors, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Eddie Wilkins petitioned for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>In the matter of petition of Lee Meaghers for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Application of J M. Conley and Bess Conley for writ of habeas corpus to -be let to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garfield Counity, E. L. Swigert. Judge.</p> <p>Sam Miller was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Enid, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; Wm. H. Zwick, Judge.</p> <p>Jack King- was convicted of a "violation of the prohibitory law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Petition of Dick Johnson and others for whit of habeas corpus.</p>

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Andrew Lawler against A. K. Gossont, Superintendent of the State Training School at Pauls Valley, to which petitioner had been committed by order of the judge of the juvenile court.

<p>Appeal from County Coun, Oiclahoma County; W. It. Taylor, Judge.</p> <p>A. L. Ivey was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Petition for writ of habeas corpus by J. J. Shepherd.</p>

<p>Application by Mary Dorris for writ of habeas corpus to be let to bail.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Tulsa County; N. E. McNeill, Judge.</p> <p>E. L. Long was convicted' of a second violation of the prohibitory liquor law, and he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Garvin County; F. B. Swank, Judge, ■. C. A. Belvin was convicted of shooting at another with intent to kill, and1 he appeals.</p>

<p>Appeal from County Court, Garvin County; J. D. Mitchell, Judge.</p> <p>J. J. McAdams was convicted of violation of the prohibitory liquor law. and he appeals.</p>