Volume 17 — United States Reports

Held: that the collector acquired an inchoate right by the seizure, which, by the subsequent decree of condemnation, gives him an absolute vested title to his share in the forfeiture. Without overturning the doctrine of that case, the present is not susceptible to argument; and we, therefore, unanimously affirm the decision of the circuit court. Judgment affirmed.

Held: that the-District Court of’Maryland had jurisdiction competent to inquire, pnd to decide, whether in such case, restitution ought to be *66 .made to tlie .claimants, or either of them, in whole or in part; that is, whether such restitution could be made consistently with yle jaw 0f nations, and the treaties and laws of the "United States. Glass v. The Betsey, 3 Dali. .6. 16.

Held: in a celebrated case, that the term “ agreement" includes the consideration upon which the promise is founded, and that, therefore, it is necessary the consideration should be expressed upon the face of the written memorandum. Wain v. Warlters, 5 East, 10. S. P. Sears v. Brink, 3 Johns. Rep. 210 .

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of New-York.</p>

Held: that the collector acquired an inchoate right by the seizure, which by the subsequent decree of condemnation gives him an absolute vested title to his share in the forfeiture. b Without overturning the doctrine of that case, the present is •not susceptible of argument; and we, therefore, unanimously affirm the decision of the Circuit Court.

<p>In the case of a naked power, not coupled with an interest, the law requires that every pre-requisite to the exercise of that power should precede it.</p> <p>The party' who sets up a title must furnish the evidence necessary to support it. If the validity of a- deed depends on an act in pais, the party claiming under it is as much bound to prove the performance of the act, as he would be bound to prove any matter of record on which the validity of the deed might depend.</p> <p>In the case of lands sold for the non-payment of taxes, the Marshal’s deed is not even prima facie evidence, that the pre-requisites required by law have been complied with; but the party claiming under it must show positively that they have been complied with.</p>

<p>' Depositions, taken on farther proof, in one prize cause, cannot be in - voked into another.</p>

<p>A vessel and cargo; which is liable to capture as enemy’s property, or for sailing under the pass or license of the enemy, or for trading with the enemy, may be seized after her arrival in a port of the United States, and condemned as prize of war.- The delictum is not purged by the termination of the voyage.</p> <p>Any citizen may seize any property forfeited to the use of the government, either by the -municipal law, or as prize of war, in order to enforce the forfeiture; and it depends upon the government whether it will act upon the seizure; if it proceeds to enforce the forfeiture by legal process, this is a sufficient confirmation of the seizure.</p>

<p>A question of' fact upon a seizure in port, as a droit of admiralty, for trading with the enemy, and using his license. The circumstance of the vessel having been sent into an enemy’s port, for adjudication, and afterwards permitted to resume her voyage, held to raise a vior lent presumption that she had a license, which the Claimant not having repelled by explanatory evidence, condemnation was pronounced.</p>

<p>The property of a house of trade established in the enemy’s country is condemnable, as prize, whatever may be the personal domicil of the partners.</p>

the marshal’s hands unsatisfied; that after the execution of the duty bonds, but before they were payable, to wit, on the 6th of December, 1806, Shoemaker and Travers became insolvent within the true intent and' meaning of the act “ to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage that on the first of February, 1808, goods, .effects, money and credit of Shoemaker & Travers, to the amount of 6,000 dol*lars, had come to the hands of Howland' & Allen, which, the bill…

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), dealt with the constitutionality of New York creating bankruptcy laws and retroactively applying those laws.

Held: if the vendor takes a personal collateral security, binding others as well as the vendee, as, for instance, a bond or note, with a surety or an indorser, or a collateral security by way of pledge or mortgage, that under such circumstances, a lien exists on the land itself.

■ This was a suit brought by M£Neillj the plaintiff , below, against M£M.illan, the defendant below, to recover a sum of money paid for the defendant’s'use j Under the following circumstances: M£MiIlan, residing in Charleston, South Carolina', transacting business there as a partner of the house of trade of Sloane & M£Millan, of Liverpool, on the 8th of" October and 9th of November, 1811, imported foreign merchandise, on which he gave bonds at .the’ custom house, with…

Held: that upon the issuing of the patent to J. C., in November, 1784, the possession then being vacant, he became by operation of law vested with a constructive actual seizin of the whole tract included in his patent; that his whole title passed by his' prior conveyance to' M. G. (the ancestor of the lessor of the plaintiff;) and that when it .became complete at law by the issuing of the patent, the actual constructive…

Held: that this acceptance, communicated at a place different from that indicated by A., imposed no obligation binding upon him. ‘ An offer of a bargain, by one person to another, imposes no obligation upon the former, unless it is accepted by the latter according to the terms on which the offer wasmade.

/ This was an action of covenant brought in the Circuit TJourt of North Carolina, by the executors of John Somerville, the younger, against John Hamil-, ton, on the following covenants in a deed of land, in North Carolina, from Hamilton to John Somerville, the elder, dated April 15th, 1772, The grantor co~ venanted with the grantee, his heirs, and assigns, that the premises “ then were, ánd so forever thereafter should remain, free and clear of and from all former and other…

This was a proceeding in the Court belov7, under the act of Assembly of Maryland, of 1793, c. 30, incorporating the Bank of Columbia* the 14th section of which is in these words: “ And whereas it is absolutely necessary that debts due to the said Bank should be punctually paid, to enable the Directors to calculate with certainty and precision on meeting the demands that, may be made upon them : Be it enacted, that whénever any person or persons are indebted to the said Bank…

<p>By the conquest and military occupation of a portion of the terrritory of the United States by a public enemy, that portion is to be deemed .a foreign country, so far as respects our revenue laws.</p> <p>Goods imported into it, are not imported into the United States; and ; are subject to such duties only as the conqueror may impose..</p> <p>The subsequent evacuation of the conquered territory by the enemy, and resumption of authority by the United Stíftes, cannot change . , the character of past transactions. The jus postliminii does not apply to the case; and' goods previously imported do not .become liable to pay duties-do, the United States, by the resumption of their sovereignty over the conquered territory.</p>

Held: that the state legislature had no authority to compel a person to become a member of a mere private corporation, created for the promotion of a private enterprise, because every man had a right to refuse a grant. Ellis v. Marshall, 2 Mass. 269 .

Held: if the vendor takes-a personal collateral security, binding others as well as the vendee, as, for instance, a bond or note with a surety or an endorser, or a collaterial security by way of pledge or mortgage, that under such circumstances a lien exists on the land itself.

This vessel and her cargo , were libelled in the District Court for the Louisiana district, by the alleged former Spanish owner.

The case agreed in the Court below, stated, that William Nicholls, collector, &.c. being indebted to the United States of America, on the 9th of June, 1798, executed a mortgage to Henry Miller, for the use. of the United States, in the sum of 59,444 dollars, conditioned for the payment of 29,271 dollars, payable, 9,757 dollars on or before the 1st of January, 1799 ; 9,757 dollars on or before the. 9th.of June, 1799 ; and 9,757 dollars on or before the 9th of September, 1799.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that defined the scope of the U.S. Congress's legislative power and how it relates to the powers of American state legislatures. The dispute in McCulloch involved the legality of the Second Bank of the United States and a tax that the state of Maryland imposed on it. In its ruling, the Supreme Court established firstly that the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives the U.S.

Held: that -material men could not maintain a suit in rem in the District Court of Maryland, for’ supplies furnished to a domestic ship, although they might have maintained a suit in personam in.that Court. - - ' Appeal from the Circuit Court of Maryland.

This was an ejectment brought in that Court by the plaintiff in error against the defendants. Upon the first trial of the cause, a judg-. ment was rendered in the Circuit Court in favour of the defendants, and upon thát judgment a writ of error was taken out, and the judgment reversed by this Court, at February Term, 1815; and the causé was sent back to be tried according to certain directions, prescribed by this Court.

<p>Bill for rescinding a contract for the sale of lands, on the ground of ■ defect of title, dismissed with costs.</p> <p>An alien may take an estate in lands by the act of the parties, as by ' purchase ; but he cannot take by the act of the law,, as by descent.</p> <p>Where a person dies, leaving issue, who are aliens, the latter are not deemed his heirs in law; but the estate descends to the next of kin ; who have an inheritable blood, in'the same manner as if no such alien issue were in existence.</p> <p>The 6th articleof the treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain, of 1783, completely protected the titles, of British subjects to lands, in the U. S. which would have been liablé to forfeiture, by escheat, for the defect of alienage. .That article.was not meant to be confined to confiscations jure belli.</p> <p>The 9th article of the treaty between the U. S. and G. B., of 1794, applies to the title of the parties, whatever it is, and gives it the same legal validity as if the parties were citizens. It is not necessary that they should show an actual possession or seizin, but only that the title was in them at the time the treaty was made.</p> <p>The 9th article of the treaty of 1794 did not mean to include any other persons than such as were British subjects or citizens of the U. S..</p>

Held: that this registry was not sufficient ,either to preserve its legal priority, or to give it the equity resulting from constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser. Notice of a prior incumbrance to an agent is notice to the principal.

Held: to be a valid entry. Distinction between amending and withdrawing an entry. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Ohio. . The bill in equity filed in this cause by the appellant, McArthur, states, that George Mathews, on the 19th of September, 1799, made .the following entry with the surveyor of the Virginia army lands. “ No. 3717: 1799, September 19th.

This was an action of ejectment brought- in the Court below by the defendant in error, Sexton, against the plaintiff in error, Wheaton, to -recover the possession of a parcel of ground in the city of. Washington, being lot number 17, in square 254, containing 8254 3-4 square feet, with the. buildings thereon.

<p>Depositions, taken according to the proviso in the 30th sec. of the Iudiciaryact of 1789, c. 20., under a dedimus potestatem,, “ according to common usage, when it may be necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice,” are under no circumstances to be considered as taken.de Sene esse, whether the witnesses reside beyond the process of the Court or within it; the provisions of the act relative to depositions de bene essse.being confined to those taken under the en- , acting part of the section.</p>

Held: and the acts of the parties *518 evidenced by their respective sales of parcels of the land held by each, under his patent, bounding on the agreed line, amount to a full and complete recognition of it; and in the opinion of this Court, precludes the plaintiff, after such a lapse of time, from denying it to be the dividing line between him and the defendants ; and neither ought now to be permitted to disturb the…

Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), often called simply The Dartmouth College Case, was a landmark decision in United States corporate law from the United States Supreme Court dealing with the application of the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution to private corporations. The case arose when the president of Dartmouth College was deposed by its trustees, leading to the New Hampshire legislature attempting to force the college to become a public institution and thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor of New Hampshire. The Supreme Court upheld the sanctity of the original charter of the college, which predated the creation of the State.