Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

17 Wis. 403

Cord v. Hirsch

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Decided June 15, 1863

Wisconsin Supreme Court · decided 1863-06-15

Foreclosure of a mortgage of real estate, executed January 4, 1859, to secure two notes of tbe same date for $110 each, payable in one and two years from date, with interest. On the first of November, 1859, one Elizabeth Moore purchased the mortgaged premises of Hirsch, and took a deed of him, which was recorded the next day. She immediately occupied the premises, and continued to own and occupy them until the commencement of this action, but was not made a party herein.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1863-06-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently June 2001

7 state decisions

20186318701880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1By the Court,

DixoN, C. J.

¶2For the purpose of appeal, the order confirming the sale and that for judgment for deficiency may be considered one. In general practice they are obtained upon a single motion and entered as one order.

¶3View them as we may, the objections now chiefly urged against the confirmation and judgment amount only to tbis : that there is a defect of parties defendant in the action. They are founded upon the one essential fact, that Mrs. Moore, the owner of the equity of redemption, was not joined as defendant. If she had been, and judgment in form taken against her, it is not nor could it well be insisted, that such judgment was not to all intents valid and effectual. But Mrs. Moore was not joined, and the question is, whether the other defendants, or any of them, can now have the benefit of any objection arising from such omission."

¶4We think not. The legislature has fixed the time and manner in which such objections must be taken: by demurrer, if they appear on the face of the complaint; otherwise by answer. R. S., ch. 125, secs. 5, 8. If not so taken, the defendant shall be deemed to have waived the same. Idem, sec. 9. Such waiver is for all the purposes of the action, except, perhaps, those objections which may be raised at the trial by way *409of variance or failure in;proof to establish tbe cause of action set out. It is an abandonment, of every objection or advantage of objection arising solely upon that ground — equivalent to a release of errors in that respect, or a formal admission of record by the defendants that the parties before the court are the proper parties and all the parties necessary to a complete and formal adjudication of the causes of action stated in the complaint. With the exception, therefore, of the cases in which objections may be and áre taken at the trial, and which stand upon a distinct ground, the defendants, failing to demur or answer for that'cause, cannot afterwards make the objection, or insist upon a want of proper parties in the same or any other form. It is as if the legislature had declared that thenceforth it shall be deemed that there is no defect of parties. Moir v. Dodson, 14 Wis., 279. The defendants accept the issues tendered, with all the consequences which might legitimately follow in case every necessary party was before the court. Hence the defendant Hirsch cannot resist a confirmation, or judgment for deficiency, on the ground that the equity of redemption was not extinguished, or that the sale passed nothing but the plaintiff’s assignable interest in the mortgage.

¶5The sale was properly made by the officer to whom the de-cretal order was originally delivered. R S., chap. 13, sec. 106. The other objections, that' the costs were unnecessarily increased by repeated postponements of the sale, and that the last notice of postponement was not signed by the sheriff officially, we think were properly disregarded by the court below. It was not the fault of the plaintiff that the sale did not take' place at once. He was restrained by injunction, and proceeded with the sale the moment the disability was removed. The omission of the sheriff was a clerical mistake, affecting no substantial right. R. S., chap. 125, sec. 40.

¶6Orders affirmed.

/17/wis/403 · .json · Public domain