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← 170 F.1d 529 - Shulthis v. McDougal

Shulthis v. McDougal’s Empirical Analysis

170 F. 529 · 1909

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
May 1983
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 1983 · most notably Albert Shulthis v. D a McDougal (1912), Sizemore v. Brady (1914)

8 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

170190919101920193019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co. · Stanley v. Schwalby · Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians v. United States · Pickering v. Lomax · Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The word ‘descend' is. of course, inapplicable to the actual contingency provided for by ihe statute, because that contingency contemplates the death of the child before he had actually become seised of any interest: in the land. The word ‘descend’ is a word of art, and indicates the transference of property by inheritance. If any significance is to be given to it, as used in this section, it must be held that the intent of the parties to the agreement was that the land should pass to the same persons and in the same proportions as it would have passed if the child had died seised of it. Any other construction simply obliterates this word, and makes the land pass to the parj ties who are heirs directly by. allotment from the tribe. The statute itself not only declares that it shall ‘descend,' but also declares that it shall be ‘allotted and distributed’ to the heirs. It is manifest, therefore, that both ideas were in the minds of the parties to the agreement. This construction receives further support by the general scheme which the federal government and tlie Creek Nation formed for the disposition of the tribal property. The first requisite for the partition of the tribal estate in severalty among its members was to ascertain and legally establish who were members of the tribe. By reason of the many intermarriages between members of the tribe and members of the white and negro races, and by reason ol' the fraudulent claims to membership, the ascertainment of the particular”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The provisions of the act of Congress approved March 1, 1901, * * * in’ so far as they provide for descent and distribution according to the laws of the Creek Nation, are hereby repealed, and the descent and distribution of land and money provided for by said act, shall be in accordance with Chapter 49 of Mansfield's Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, now in force in the Indian Territory.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.