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170 F.3d 1246

Docket No. 97-35481.

McNab v. Kok

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Submitted March 15, 1999.1

Decided March 25, 1999.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1999-03-25

2 counsel of record

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Foss v. Foss · Morales v. Calderon · Henry v. Lungren

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1999-03-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions — most recently February 2023 · most notably Dows v. Wood (2000), Samson Dubria v. Ga Smith (2000)

12 federal appellate · 3 district ·

3001999200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Wendy Rae Willis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Portland, Oregon, for the petitioner-appellant.

¶2*1247David B. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, Oregon, for the respondents-appellees.

¶3Before: SNEED, KOZINSKI, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM.

¶6Loren Edward McNab, a former Oregon prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, see Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1389 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996), and we affirm.

¶7McNab filed a habeas corpus petition challenging Oregon’s sex offender registration requirements. On appeal, McNab contends that the district court erred by dismissing his petition for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that McNab was not “in custody” within the meaning of section 2254(a). This contention lacks merit.

¶8We have held that Washington’s and California’s sex offender registration statutes do not place a petitioner in custody because these statutes do not place “a significant restraint on ... physical liberty” by restricting the registrant’s freedom to move about. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183-84 (9th Cir.1998) (Washington), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 824, 142 L.Ed.2d 682 (1999); see Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241-12 (9th Cir.1999) (California). Like their counterparts in California and Washington, sex offenders subject to registration in Oregon are free to move to a new place of residence so long as they notify law enforcement officials of their new address. Compare Cal.Penal Code § 290 (West 1998) and Wash. Rev.Code § 9A,44.130 (West 1998) with Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 181.595 & 181.596 (West 1997). Accordingly, because Oregon’s sex offender registration requirements place no greater restraint on personal liberty than those of California and Washington, the Oregon law does not place McNab in custody within the meaning of section 2254(a). See Henry, 164 F.3d at 1241-42; Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.

¶9AFFIRMED.

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