¶1dissenting.
¶2The cases cited in the majority opinion correctly state the law on the issues raised in them. My dissent is directed to the fact that they have no application to the present case.
¶3In the instant case the judicial sale produced a bid of $48,000. After the sale and before the hearing on confirmation an additional bid of $1,000, which I shall hereafter refer to as a jump bid, was guaranteed if a resale of the property was permitted. The trial court refused to confirm the sale and ordered a new sale. It is my contention that the granting of a resale under these circumstances is wholly within the discretion of the trial court and not subject to review.
¶4This court has uniformly held that, where a jump bid has been made, a resale is within the discretion of the trial court. The rules announced in the majority opinion have been applied only where the trial court confirmed the sale and an appeal was taken therefrom. We stated the rule in Siekert v. Soester, 144 Neb. 321, 13 N. W. 2d 139, 152 A. L. R. 527, as follows: “According to the third doctrine (See 11 A. L. R. note, pp. 417 to 419, inclusive), where there has been an advanced bid before confirmation, the entire matter of confirmation of judicial sales is left with the trial court, to be confirmed or not according to its judicial discretion. This doctrine is the one heretofore approved and adopted by this court. True, in several cases it has been held by this court that a judicial sale will not be set aside on account of mere inadequacy of price, unless such inadequacy is so gross as to make it appear that it was the result of fraud or mistake, or to shock the conscience of the *37court. But in these cases there was .no evidence that others were willing to pay more.” Other cases to this effect are: State Bank v. Green, 11 Neb. 303, 9 N. W. 36; Prudential Real Estate Co. v. Hall, 79 Neb. 805, 113 N. W. 243; Crews v. Alberts, 124 Neb. 671, 247 N. W. 602; State ex rel. Sorenson v. Denton State Bank, 126 Neb. 486, 253 N. W. 670; First Nat. Bank v. First Trust Co., 145 Neb. 147, 15 N. W. 2d 386; County of Nance v. Thomas, 146 Neb. 640, 20 N. W. 2d 925; County of Gage v. Beatrice Nebraska Water Co., 147 Neb. 236, 22 N. W. 2d 696; Ehlers v. Campbell, 147 Neb. 572, 23 N. W. 2d 727; Knouse v. Knouse, 157 Neb. 748, 61 N. W. 2d 388. The opinion of the majority overrules the holdings of the foregoing cases without doing so in terms. I have not found a single case in this state which reverses an order of the trial court in refusing to confirm a sale and ordering a new sale where a jump bid assures a higher bid on the resale. In Siekert v. Soester, supra, the highest bid was $3,525 and the jump bid $3,800, an increase of $275. This court refused, under the foregoing rule, to interfere with the discretion of the trial court in denying confirmation and granting a resale. In First Nat. Bank v. First Trust Co., supra, this court sustained the action of the trial court in setting aside a confirmation already entered and ordering a new sale on an assured jump bid of $1,000. I submit that the order of the trial court directing a new sale in the present case should be affirmed under the foregoing authorities.
¶5It is the duty of the trial court to secure the highest possible price for property sold at judicial sale. In accomplishing this result the trial court has a broad discretion in determining whether or not a sale should be confirmed. If the trial court confirms the sale, the rules cited by the majority will be applied on appeal. If a resale is granted after a larger bid is assured on resale, the discretion of the trial court has not, previous to this case, been subject to review. I submit that the *38rule heretofore existing is the proper one if trial courts are to follow the injunction imposed on them to obtain the highest price possible for property sold at judicial sale. In many instances, particularly in times of economic stress, judicial sales do not produce adequate bids, or any bids at all. To take from trial courts the discretion to refuse confirmation and grant a resale where an increased bid has. been assured does not appear to be in the public interest.
¶6The duty of an appellate court to protect its own jurisdiction and powers is no greater than its duty to protect the jurisdiction and powers of the courts inferior to it. I disagree with the action of this court in arrogating to itself the right to review the action of the district court in a matter that has been traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the district courts.