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← 170 U.S. 113 - The John G. Stevens

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170 U.S. 113 · 1898

Citation profile

407
cited by 407 later decisions
37
cited 37 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
June 2018
most recently cited

127 federal appellate · 105 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 407 later decisions (37 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2018 · most notably In Re State of New York et al Petition of Walsh et al (1921), Continental Grain Company v. The Fbl-585 (1960)

127 federal appellate · 105 district · 1 state decisions

4901898190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from Second Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance · The Lottawanna · The Belgenland · The J. E. Rumbell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 407 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(A)s long as a plank of the ship remains, the sailor is entitled, against all other persons, to the proceeds as a security for his wages.”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The foundation of the rule that col- . lision gives to the party injured a jus in re in the offending ship is the principle of the maritime law that the ship, by whomsoever owned or navigated, is considered as herself the wrongdoer, liable for the tort * *”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The offending ship is considered as herself the wrongdoer, and as herself bound to make compensation for the wrong done. The owner of the injured vessel is entitled to proceed in rem against the offender, without regard to the question who may be her owners, or to the division, the nature or the extent of their interests in her. With the relations of the owners of those interests, as among themselves, the owner of the injured vessel has no concern. All the interests, existing at the time of the collision, in the offending vessel, whether hy way of part ownership, of mortgage, of bottomry bond or of other maritime lien for repairs or supplies, arising out of contract with the owners or agents of the vessel, are parts of the vessel herself, and as such are bound by and responsible for her wrongful acts. Any one who had furnished necessary supplies to the vessel before the collision, and had thereby acquired, under our law, a maritime lien or privilege in the vessel herself, was, as was said in The Bold Bueeleugh, before cited, of the holder •of an earlier bottomry bond, under the law of England, ‘so to speak, a part owner in interest at the date of the collision, and the ship in which he and others were interested was liable to its value at that date for the injury done, without reference to his daim.’ ””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.