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← 171 F.3d 617 - United States v. Smith

United States v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

171 F.3d 617 · 1999

Citation profile

162
cited by 162 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
8
states following
February 2019
most recently cited

102 federal appellate · 14 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 162 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2019 · most notably United States v. Hayes (2009), United States v. Calderon-Pena (2004)

102 federal appellate · 14 district · 14 state decisions

1300199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 921 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 924

Relies on Taylor v. United States · City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center · Bates v. State Bar · McNeil v. Wisconsin · Brewster v. Derwinski

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 162 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “the literal application of the word “restored” as contained in 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii) to Jennings, i.e., requiring him to demonstrate that his civil rights were lost and restored, does not produce an absurd result. First, as recognized by the McGrath, Smith, Hancock, and Banes courts, Congress knew when it enacted the restoration exceptions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 921 (a)(20) and 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) that the several states had drastically different laws governing the restoration of civil rights and that drastically different, perhaps anomalous, results were bound to occur. However, Congress intentionally keyed the restoration of civil rights to state law so it follows that Congress consciously made the decision to accept anomalous results — like- a result that favors incarcerated midemeanants over misde-meanants that were not incarcerated. Second, Jennings has other avenues he can pursue to fall within the restoration exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii); namely, pardon and expungement. Third, to accept Jennings’ position would allow the restoration exception of 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(33)(B)(ii) to swallow the rule. Under Jennings’ formulation, all persons who are convicted of a [misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] and who do not lose their civil rights would be permitted to possess a firearm. Such a construction would allow almost all persons convicted of a [misdemeanor crime of domestic violence] to possess a firearm, thereby substantially undercutting the federal pol”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “look to state law to define the restoration exception.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.