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172 Mass. 453

Boylan v. Everett

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Decided January 7, 1899

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1899-01-07

Tort, for injuries caused by the bite of a dog, which the plaintiff alleged was kept by the defendants. At the trial in the Superior Court, before Sherman, J., there was evidence tending to show that the injury occurred on July 17, 1897, as the plaintiff was walking along a public highway which passed the defendants’ residence in Medfield.

Relies on Whittemore v. Thomas · McLaughlin v. Kemp · O'Donnell v. Pollock

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1899-01-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently September 2003

20 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Lathrop, J.

¶1The bill of exceptions in this case does not state that it contains all of the evidence material to the issue involved, and the question whether the defendants were the keepers of the dog, within the Pub. Sts. c. 102, § 93, was a question of fact for the jury. Barrett v. Malden & Melrose Railroad, 3 Allen, 101. Collingill v. Haverhill, 128 Mass. 218. McLaughlin v. Kemp, 152 Mass. 7. Whittemore v. Thomas, 153 Mass. 347. O'Donnell v. Pollock, 170 Mass. 441. The first instruction requested was, therefore, rightly refused.

¶2The first part of the second instruction requested was given in substance. We do not think that the judge was required to give the last part of this request as matter of law: “ The mere fact that a dog is kept by its owner on the premises of another with the knowledge, or acquiescence, or permission of the owner of such premises, does not of itself make the owner of said premises the keeper of the dog.” Whittemorev. Thomas, ubi supra. Nor can we say that the facts that the defendants fed and caressed the dog, called it in and sent it out, and that it was treated “ the same as anybody would that had a dog at their home,” which is the testimony of the defendants, and which we assume to be the meaning of the last part of the second request, required the .judge to rule, as matter of law, that the defendants were therefore the keepers of the dog, irrespective of the fact *458that the dog belonged to their nephew, who was a boarder with them.

¶3As to the third request we do hot think that if the defendants exercised some control over and had some custody of the dog, it therefore followed that the plaintiff was entitled to a ruling, as matter of" law, that the defendants were responsible for him as keepers.

¶4We are further of opinion that the judge was not bound, as matter of law, to give the fourth ruling requested. While the acts recited may be evidence of keepership, more or less significant according to the other facts appearing in the case, it cannot be said that they are conclusive.

¶5The exception taken to the charge is only so far as it is inconsistent with the requests made. It seems to us that the requests were rightly refused ; and that the case was properly submitted to the jury on the evidence. Exceptions overruled.

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