¶1The petitioner is the father of W. Mercer Fain, Jr., bom 10 February, 1915, and now in the custody of the respondent, O. M. Wofford, who was the father of the child’s mother, which said mother died on 1 March, 1916.
¶2Upon the hearing before his Honor, Judge Long, the custody of the child was awarded to the two grandmothers, six months to each. The evidence and findings of fact show that the petitioner separated from his wife before her death and that he had a serious disagreement with his father-in-law, the respondent. There is no evidence that the petitioner intended to abandon his child and there is no evidence or finding of fact that he is a man of bad character and unsuitable to have the care of his infant child. On the contrary, it appears to be uncontra-dicted that he lives with his parents, who are people of good character and well-to-do financially; that he is well able financially to care for the child, and that his mother, Mrs. Fain, has agreed to rear the child for her son. His Honor finds as a fact that Mrs. Fain is a woman of most excellent character, and awards the custody of the child to her for six months of the year. It is true, in matters of this character the welfare of the child i$ the chief consideration of the court, but the father has certain natural rights which the courts have always respected. The fact that he had a difficulty with his father-in-law and did not live with his wife at the time of her death does not take away from him the ordinary right of a father to the care and custody of his child.
¶3In Latham v. Ellis, 116 N. C., 30, a case very similar to this, the Court said: “In North Carolina the father has always been entitled to the custody of his children against the claims of any one except those to whom he may have committed their custody and tuition by deed (sec. 1562 of the Code); or unless he is found to be unfit to keep their charge and custody by reason of his brutal treatment of them or his reckless neglect of their welfare and interests, when their custody will be committed to some proper person on application to the courts.”
¶4This question is fully discussed by Mr. Justice Walker in Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15, and by Mr. Justice Hoke in the case of Mary Jane Jones, 153 N. C., 312, and the right of the father to the custody of his child is recognized and sustained. Upon the findings of fact and the evidence in the case, we think his Honor erred in denying the right of the father to the custody of the child. If it can be shown that the father is unsuitable and incapable of taking care of his child, then those who are interested in it may apply to the courts to change its custodian.
¶5In the record before us there is no finding of fact and no evidence which justifies the court in denying the legal rights of the father.
¶6*792The cause is remanded with instructions to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion.
¶7Reversed.
¶8concurring: I do not think it has been held by this Court that the father’s right to the custody of his infant child is absolute or unquestionable. He has the preferred or paramount right, but he may lose it by his conduct or other causes resulting in unfitness. In Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., 15, we said that this preferred right of the father was based upon his duty to protect his child and provide for its maintenance and education, which obligation, in no legal sense, rests upon its grandparents. This fact should have some weight with the court in deciding between the contestants for the child’s custody, apart from the natural claim of the father to the first consideration, as the death of the grandparents, or their inability to care for the child, might leave it without adequate protection and support. “The father, and on his death the mother, is generally entitled to the custody of the infant children, inasmuch as they are their natural protectors for maintenance and education. But the courts of justice may, in their sound discretion and when the morals, safety, or interests of the children strongly requirS it, withdraw the infants from the custody of the father or mother and place it elsewhere.” This was said by Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 205, and we indorsed his statement of the law in Latham v. Ellis, 116 N. C., 30, and In re Turner, 151 N. C., 474.
¶9In this case there is a finding which reflects no credit upon the father if it is viewed in one permissible aspect; but there is no finding of the main, ultimate, and essential fact that the father is an unfit persoh to have the custody, nor is there any finding of facts from which we can, or rather from which we must necessarily infer the material fact, as if it had been found in so many words. It might have been better, in the exercise of our discretion, to have required the essential fact to be found definitely before proceeding to pass upon the rights of the parties; but in the absence of a specific finding of such fact, the preferred right of the father has not been impaired, and the case is brought within the principle as stated in the concluding words of Newsome v. Bunch, 144 N. C., at p. 18: “While the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may order the child into the custody of some person other than the father, when the facts and circumstances justify such a disposition of the child, we do not think that any such case is presented in this record as should induce us to adopt that course and except this case from the general rule. The father has done nothing by which he has incurred a forfeiture of his right to the custody of his *793offspring. There is no room for the exercise even of a sound discretion in favor of the grandparents who now have possession of the child. Speaking for himself, and not committing the Court to his view, the writer of this opinion would hesitate to remove the child from its present custody, if the law were more elastic and we were vested with a larger discretion than is given by the law; but we must follow the precedents and the general principles of justice established by them, though the result may be contrary to what we may consider as the real merits of'the particular case, and though by the facts, even as found by the court, our sympathies may be enlisted in behalf of the grandparents. The insistence upon his strict right under the circumstances may not be very creditable to the petitioner, yet the law is inexorable in such a case, and cannot, be made to yield in deference to a mere sentiment- or to a tender .regard for the feeling of one of the parties; nor are we permitted to exercise an.arbitrary discretion.”