Busbee v. Quarrier’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““This jurisdiction is committed to the rule that in the limited field of rear-end collisions, and where the leading vehicle is located within its proper place on the highway, proof of an accident such as is here involved raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the overtaking vehicle. Rianhard v. Rice, 119 So.2d 730 (Fla.App.1960); Shedden v. Yellow Cab Company of Miami, 105 So.2d 388 (Fla.App.1958); McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So.2d 785 (Fla.App.1958). Appellant insists that this rule is only applicable to a situation where the leading vehicle has lawfully come to a stop on the public highway and is struck from the rear by an overtaking vehicle. We do not think it is restricted to such a narrow construction. We hold that it is available to raise a naked presumption of negligence in any case where there is no direct testimony available and the facts are such as to raise a reasonable inference that the operator of the leading vehicle was exercising due care. Under such circumstances the operator of the overtaking vehicle is in the most favorable position to introduce evidence reflecting due care on his part, the effect of which is to dissipate the presumption. Attending this concept is the general rule that in the absence of evidence as to the circumstances attending an acci dent, one injured in his person or property through the negligence of another in the operation of a motor vehicle upon the highway will be presumed to have ttsed due care for his safety. Town of Palm B”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ritter v. Brengle

2. “"Circumstantial evidence certainly may be relied upon as a basis for recovery in civil actions. Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 908 . The rule is clear, however, that the inference of the existence of an essential fact to be drawn from circumstantial evidence cannot be made the basis of a further inference of an essential, unless it can be said that the initial inference was established to the exclusion of any other reasonable inference. "* * * "In civil cases if the proved circumstances justify an inference pointing to an essential fact which inference outweighs all reasonable inferences to the contrary, it can then be said that a conclusion as to the existence of the ultimate fact is justified by the circumstantial evidence. Tucker Brothers, Inc. v. Menard, supra. However, the established rule of evidence is that we cannot construct a conclusion upon an inference which has been superimposed upon an initial inference supported by circumstantial evidence unless the initial inference can be elevated to the dignity of an established fact because of the presence of no reasonable inference to the contrary. Voelker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, Fla. 1954, 73 So.2d 403 . See also Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec. 41." (Emphasis added.) [1]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 234 So. 2d 132 - Little v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.

3. “It is well established in this jurisdiction that when circumstantial evidence is relied on in a civil case, the particular inference relied on to establish the fact must outweigh all contrary inferences to such an extent as to amount to a preponderance of all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from the same circumstances.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 606 So. 2d 669 - Keys v. State