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← 173 F.3d 782 - Bear v. Boone

Bear v. Boone’s Empirical Analysis

173 F.3d 782 · 1999

Citation profile

20
cited by 20 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
July 2021
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2021

9 federal appellate · 1 district ·

1101999200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Haines v. Kerner · Rose v. Lundy · Brown v. Allen · Granberry v. Greer · Castille v. Peoples

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “satisfied if the federal issue has once been properly presented to the highest court of the state”); see also Bear v. Boone, 173 F.3d 782 , 784 (10th Cir. 1999) (”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The motion before this Court avers that Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and during the course of preparing for his habeas petition, counsel found that trial counsel had failed to investigate relevant mitigating evidence. Accordingly, Petitioner’s habeas counsel requested the federal court excuse Petitioner’s failure to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel issue earlier. The federal judge issued an order holding the habeas petition in abeyance pending exhaustion in state court of the unex-hausted claim. Accordingly, petitioner’s counsel has requested this Court to grant him four months in which to review, investigate and prepare an adequate successor post-conviction application. Petitioner admits that the evidence he seeks to discover was readily available and discoverable by direct appeal counsel. The rules applicable to post-conviction, require filing within sixty days “from the date the previously unavailable legal or factual basis serving as the basis for a new issue is announced or discovered.” Petitioner’s claim that he should be excused from this rule as failure to review the potential claims would result in a miscarriage of justice is not persuasive considering his federal court filings and nearly three-year delay in filing for subsequent post-conviction relief. Petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a successor application for post-conviction relief is here”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]he first opportunity [the defendant] had to raise his due process challenge to the modification of his crime of conviction arose after the Court of Criminal Appeals issued its opinion. Because I believe it would have been inappropriate for [the defendant] to raise his due process claim under the limited rehearing procedures set out in Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 3.14, I believe [the defendant] can now present his due process claim by way of an application for postconviction relief in the Oklahoma courts.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.