Collins v. M’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 5 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The power of bankruptcy courts to discharge debt is fundamental to our bankruptcy system. If a state could assert Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid the effect of a discharge order, the bankruptcy system would be seriously undermined ... This purpose can be fulfilled today only if the bankruptcy courts retain the power to discharge debts, including debts owed to states, consistent with federal supremacy power with respect to bankruptcy.””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Robertson v. University of Virginia (In Re Robertson) · Pritzl v. Citibank (N.Y. State), N.A. (In Re Pritzl)

2. “Here, a copy of the Collinses’ motion was served by mail on the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, however, was not named as a defendant, was not served with process, and was not compelled to appear in bankruptcy court. The Commonwealth was free to respond to the motion or ignore it. In these circumstances, the motion to reopen was not a suit “against one of the United States” within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. See [Maryland v.] Antonelli [Creditors’ Liquidating Trust], 123 F.3d [777] at 787 [(4th Cir.)]. The Commonwealth chose to appear in bankruptcy court and oppose the Col-linses’ motion to reopen on the ground that the bail bond debt was nondis-chargeable.... A federal court’s jurisdiction over the dischargeability of debt, just like its jurisdiction to confirm a plan of reorganization, “derives not from jurisdiction over the state or other creditors, but rather from jurisdiction over debtors and their estates.” Antonelli, 123 F.3d at 787; see also Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 574 , 67 S.Ct. 467 , 91 L.Ed. 504 (1947); Spartan Mills v. Bank of Amer ica Illinois, 112 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -•, 118 S.Ct. 417 , 139 L.Ed.2d 319 (1997). Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over the case with authority to resolve all claims against the estate and discharge the debtor, regardless of whether a state is a creditor. See Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. at 572 , 67 S.Ct. 467 ; International Shoe Co. v. Pin”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Phelps v. Sallie Mae Loan Service Center (In Re Phelps) · In Re Sun Healthcare Group, Inc.

3. “When the bondsman incurs liability for the full amount of bail upon his principal’s failure to appear in criminal court, we refer to this colloquially as “forfeiting” the bond. It does not matter, however, that § 528(a)(7) includes the term “forfeiture” in its list of nondischargeable debts; this section, as we have said, excludes from bankruptcy discharge only debts that are essentially penal in nature. From the standpoint of the bondsman, the “forfeiture” of a bail bond is more akin to triggering liquidated damages for breach of his contract with the state than it is to triggering a penal sanction against him. Indeed, losses on bail bonds when criminal defendants abscond are an inevitable cost of doing business for the professional bondsman.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. City of Philadelphia v. Nam (In Re Nam) · Dobrek v. Phelan