¶1dissenting.
¶2After reviewing the evidence I am unable to agree with the ma¡ority’s conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial ;ourt in its determination that plaintiff was guilty of laches in failing to exercise due diligence in perfecting service on defendant. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶3Plaintiff’s attorney testified that after the filing of the case (on October 28, 1982) he received a copy of the summons from the office of the clerk of the trial court upon which whomever had attempted service had written in that the defendant was in the Army in California. Subsequently, plaintiff’s attorney called the telephone number which defendant had given plaintiff at the time of the collision and was told by an unidentified male that defendant was in the Army in *42California. Thereafter, on November 10, 1982, plaintiff’s attorne wrote the office of a particular United States Senator to request hi assistance in locating defendant’s address in the Army. By a lette dated November 19, 1982, plaintiff’s counsel received an acknowledj ment of his letter to the Senator. In January of 1983, a member of th Senator’s office telephoned to inform plaintiff’s counsel that they ha located a James E. Hudgins but further inquiry revealed that this ii dividual was a person other than the defendant.
¶4Plaintiff’s attorney then telephoned repeatedly the number d< fendant had given to plaintiff at the time of the collision and agai was told by the same male (who in one telephone call identified him self as defendant’s stepfather) that defendant was in the Army. 0 May 5, 1983, plaintiff’s attorney drove to Fayetteville (the county sea of Fayette County, defendant had given plaintiff a Fayette Count address at the time of the collision) to check voter registration lists but determined that defendant never registered there.
¶5Plaintiff’s attorney continued to call the telephone number de fendant had given plaintiff at the time of the collision and on June £ 1983, reached a woman at that number (apparently defendant’ mother) who stated that defendant was in the Marines (rather thai the Army) in California. On the following day, June 3,1983, plaintiff5 attorney telephoned the office of the United States Senator (and als on the same day sent a formal letter) to provide this new informatioi and request assistance. By a letter dated June 30, 1983, plaintiff’s at torney received an acknowledgment of his letter of June 3, 1983, an< by a letter dated July 26, 1983, plaintiff’s attorney received informa tion from the Senator as to defendant’s address with the Marines n California.
¶6However, prior to the receipt by, plaintiff’s attorney of defen dant’s correct address, defendant appeared specially through his at torney on June 20, 1983, to submit a motion to dismiss based on ai insufficiency of service of process. Defendant’s motion to dismiss wai granted on July 21, 1983, and on September 19, 1983, plaintiff’s mo tion to reconsider and set aside the dismissal (which noted his receip of defendant’s address) was denied.
¶7When cross-examined, plaintiff’s attorney expressed his confi dence in the method he had chosen to locate defendant. This confi dence seems reasonable in the light of the brief period of time withii which defendant’s correct address was supplied after the correction o the misinformation supplied by defendant’s family (as to the brand of the service in which he was enlisted).
¶8The delay in service appears to be more correctly attributed t( the misinformation provided by defendant’s stepfather than to anj lack of reasonable diligence attributable to plaintiff. As I find ar abuse of discretion by the trial court in its determination that plain *43tiff’s efforts to locate defendant were not conducted in a reasonable and diligent manner, I would reverse.