173 Md. App. 94 - Massey v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In reviewing the court’s disposition of a motion to suppress, “we look only to the record of the suppression hearing and do not consider the evidence admitted at trial.” In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 488 , 701 A.2d 691 (1997). In this limited review, we consider the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this instance the State. Id. We review the factual findings of the motions court for clear error. Byndloss v. State, 391 Md. 462, 477 , 893 A.2d 1119 (2006). Although we defer to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we must make a de novo constitutional evaluation by “reviewing] independently the application of the law to those facts to determine if the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law[.]” See Whiting v. State, 389 Md. 334, 345 , 885 A.2d 785 (2005).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Darryl P. · 192 Md. App. 469 - Adams v. State

2. “Although Marzec did not explain that Griffith had provided information in the past, and thus had no “known” track record, Griffith clearly was not an “unknown” informant. “ ‘[I]t is improper to discount [out of hand] an informant’s information simply because he has no proven record of truthfulness or accuracy. ’ ” United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir.2000).... On the contrary, we believe the motions court could readily infer from the totality of the circumstances that Griffith, a target of a search and seizure warrant who had his own troubles with the police, was “known” because he had been identified and provided the information face-to-face. For example, in United States v. Couch, 367 F.3d 557, 560 (6th Cir.2004), the court, in rejecting the argument that police failed to show that the provider of information was a “reliable informant,” observed that the informant’s identity was known to police, had been named in the affidavit, and could be held accountable for lying to the police. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 , 120 S.Ct. 1375 , 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (known informant can be held responsible). Again, Griffith was neither a confidential informant, nor an anonymous tipster____ He was caught red-handed after police executed a search and seizure warrant for his room, and, after being “interviewed” by the police, arranged to set up a drug buy from Massey. The fact that Griffith was interviewed “face to face” by Marzec strengthens the reliability of his ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 178 Md. App. 156 - State v. Jenkins

3. “When confronted with the actual testimony of a critical witness and the knowledge that the witness has given a prior statement bearing on a material issue in the case, counsel is not engaged in a mere “fishing expedition” in seeking access to the prior statement. At that point, it becomes more than a matter of casting a seine over the State’s files to see what turns up, but of directly confronting the witness; and the statement thus assumes a specific importance and relevance beyond its general value for trial preparation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 183 Md. App. 188 - Adams v. State