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← 173 U.S. 17 - Towson v. Moore

Towson v. Moore’s Empirical Analysis

173 U.S. 17 · 1899

Citation profile

109
cited by 109 later decisions
20
cited 20 times by the Supreme Court
17
states following
June 2008
most recently cited

21 federal appellate · 7 district · 43 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 109 later decisions (20 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2008 · most notably Neil v. Biggers (1972), International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States (1977)

21 federal appellate · 7 district · 43 state decisions — followed in 17 states

270189919001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Mackall v. Mackall · Stuart v. Hayden · Baker v. Cummings · Conley v. Nailor

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 109 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““It is undoubtedly the duty of courts carefully to watch and examine the circumstances attending transactions of this kind when brought under review before them to discover if any undue influence has been exercised in obtaining the conveyance. But to consider a parent disqualified to take a voluntary deed from his child without consideration, on account of their relationship, is assuming a principle at war with all-filial as well as parental duty and affection, and acting on the presumption that a parent, instead of wishing to promote the interest and welfare, would be seeking to overreach and defraud his child; whereas, the presumption ought to be, in the absence of all proof tending to a contrary conclusion, that the advancement of the interest of the child was the object in view, and to presume the existence of circumstances conducing to that result. Such a presumption harmonizes with the moral obligation of a parent -to provide for his child, and is founded upon the same benign principle that governs cases of purchases made by parents in the name of a child. The prima facie presumption is that it was intended as an advance- ' ment to the child, and so not falling within the principle of a resulting trust. The natural and reasonable presumption' in all transactions of this kind is that a benefit was intended the child, because in the discharge of a moral and parental duty. And the interest of the child is abundantly guarded and protected by keeping a watchful eye over the ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““In this respect, reference was made to the long intimacy between father and son, the alleged usurpation by the latter of absolute control over the life, habits, and property of the former, efforts to prevent others during the last sickness of the father from seeing him, and the subjection of the will of the father to that of the son, manifest in times of health, naturally stronger in hours of sickness. A confidential relation between father and son is thus deduced, which, resembling that between client and attorney, principal and agent, parishioner and priest, compels proof of valuable consideration and bona fides in order to sustain a deed from one to the other. But while the relationships between the two suggest influence, do they prove undue influence? * * * That the relations between this father and his several children during the score of years preceding his death naturally inclined him towards the one and against the others is evident, and to have been expected. It would have been strange if such a result had not followed; but such partiality towards the one, and influence resulting therefrom, are not only natural, but just and reasonable, and come far short of presenting the undue Influence which the law denounces. Eight or wrong, it is to be expected that a parent will favor the child who stands by him, and give to him, rather than the others, his property. To defeat a conveyance under those circumstances, something more than the natural influence springing from such”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “‘Tn the case of a child’s gift of its property to a parent, the circumstances attending the transaction should be vigilantly and carefully scrutinized by the court, in order to ascertain whether there has been undue influence in procuring it; but it cannot be deemed prima facie void. The presumption is in favor of its validity, and, in order to set it aside, the court must be satisfied that it was not the voluntary act of the donor. The same rule as to the burden of proof applies- with equal, if not greater, force to the case of a gift from a parent to a child, even if the effect of the gift is to confer upon a child, with, whom the parent makes his home and is in peculiarly close relations, a larger share of the parent’s estate than will be received by other children or grandchildren.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.