State v. Pratt’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[C]ourts have no authority to suspend a sentence or impose a sentence contrary to that authorized by the Legislature. In looking at the legislative authorization, we must use familiar rules of statutory construction. Our principal goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. If the legislative intent is clear from the plain meaning of the language chosen, we enforce the statute according to its terms. If different sections of statutes were drafted as part of an overall statutory scheme, we must read and construe them together. In State v. Therrien, 140 Vt. 625, 627-28 , 442 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1982), we described the options available under § 304 as “to revoke probation and require the original sentence to be served, continue probation, or alter the conditions of probation.” This list of options comports with the plain meaning of the language used by the Legislature. The options do not include the one attempted to be exercised here, revocation of probation and imposition of a different sentence from that imposed originally. We do not reach a different conclusion when we read § 304 together with 28 V.S.A. § 205(a). Section 205(a) provides that “[a]fter passing sentence, a court may suspend all or part of the sentence” and place the defendant on probation. We held in Therrien that the sentence is “passed” when it is originally imposed and suspended, not when the court requires that it be served upon revocation of probation. Except where there is a specific legislative auth”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Mark Jankowski