¶1dissenting:
¶2The record in this case indicates that shortly after his arrest the appellant made a written confession concerning the theft of the automobile. After conducting an in camera hearing, the trial court found that the confession was not a product of “any threat, fear or inducement.” The trial court held that the statement was admissible at the appellant's trial.
¶3In its examination of the record, the majority emphasizes the testimony of the appellant that, at the time of the arrest, an officer threatened the appellant with violence in order to induce the appellant to confess to the offense. Noting that such testimony was uncontradicted, the majority concludes that the officer’s threats ultimately resulted in, and tainted, the appellant’s written confession.
¶4I dissent from the implication of the majority that, because the appellant’s testimony concerning the threats was uncontra-dicted, the trial court in this case necessarily had to find that threats were made.
¶5In Collett v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 267, 176 S.W.2d 893 (1943), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed the defendant's conviction of manslaughter. In that case, the court held that the trial court acted properly in submitting to the jury the issue of whether the defendant had been empowered with arrest authority during the period in question. The defendant asserted that the testimony concerning that authority was undisputed. The Court of Appeals stated as follows:
While we recognize the rule that the Court should not submit to the jury an issue about which there is no contradiction in the evidence, we are not willing to extend it to include instances where the only proof of the uncontradicted fact is the testimony of persons for whose benefit the testimony is given.
¶6296 Ky. at 274, 176 S.W.2d at 897.
¶7See also Roberts v. State, 36 Ala.App. 491, 494, 59 So.2d 821, 824 (1952), “in criminal cases, the jury are the judges of fact, and the credibility of the witnesses is for the jury even if the evidence is without dispute,” and Commonwealth v. McNeese, 156 Mass. 231, 232, 30 N.E. 1021, 1022 (1892), “in this Commonwealth there is now no rule that a witness must be believed simply because he is not impeached and tells a plausible story.” Annot., 62 A.L. R.2d 1191 § 7 (1958); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 660 (1976).
¶8The officer who allegedly threatened the appellant did not appear at the in camera hearing concerning the admissibility of the appellant’s written confession. Of course, the testimony of such officer would have been helpful with respect to the question of whether threats were made. The testimony of the appellant concerning the threats obviously supported the appellant’s theory that his written confession was the product of coercion.
¶9I do not believe that under the circumstances of this case the trial court was bound by the appellant’s testimony. I would not extend State v. Easter, cited by the majority, to a point which would, in cases of this nature, preclude a trial court’s discretion concerning the admissibility of confessions.
¶10This Court has held, as recognized in the opinion of the majority, that “[i]t is a well-established rule of appellate review in this state that a trial court has wide discretion in regard to the admissibility of confessions and ordinarily this discretion will not be disturbed on review.” Syl. pt. 2, State v. Vance, 162 W.Va. 467, 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978). See also syl. pt. 3, State v. Sparks, 171 W.Va. 320, 298 S.E.2d 857 (1982); syl. *461pt. 2, State v. Goodmon, 170 W.Va. 123, 290 S.E.2d 260 (1981); State v. Adkins, 170 W.Va. 46, 289 S.E.2d 720, 728 (1982); syl. pt. 2, State v. Woods, 169 W.Va. 767, 289 S.E.2d 500 (1982); syl. pt. 1, State v. Wimer, 168 W.Va. 417, 284 S.E.2d 890 (1981)syl. pt. 1, State v. Lamp, 163 W.Va. 93, 254 S.E.2d 697 (1979). Justice Neely joins in ttos dissent.