174 Conn. App. 536 - State v. Reddick’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As we previously have recognized, prosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments.... When making closing arguments to the jury, [however] [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument.... Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.... Nevertheless, the prosecutor has a heightened duty to avoid argument that strays from the evidence or diverts the jury's attention from the facts of the case. [The prosecutor] is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent.... While the privilege of counsel in addressing the jury should not be too closely narrowed or unduly hampered, it must never be used as a license to state, or to comment upon, or to suggest an inference from, facts not in evidence, or to present matters which the jury [has] no right to consider.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 188 Conn. App. 813 - State v. Simmons · 187 Conn. App. 350 - State v. Santiago

2. “[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments.... When making closing arguments to the jury, [however] [c]ounsel must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument.... Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 187 Conn. App. 537 - State v. Jerrell R. · 188 Conn. App. 813 - State v. Simmons

3. “Under our Penal Code, self-defense, as defined in [General Statutes] § 53a-19 (a)... is a defense, rather than an affirmative defense. See General Statutes § 53a-16. Whereas an affirmative defense requires the defendant to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, a properly raised defense places the burden on the state to disprove the defendant's claim beyond a reasonable doubt. See General Statutes § 53a-12. Consequently, a defendant has no burden of persuasion for a claim of self-defense; he has only a burden of production. That is, he merely is required to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant presenting his claim of self-defense to the jury.... Once the defendant has done so, it becomes the state's burden to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. General Statutes § 53a-12 (a)....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 189 Conn. App. 186 - State v. Grasso