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← 174 F.3d 1207 - Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Insurance

Butero v. Royal Maccabees Life Insurance’s Empirical Analysis

174 F.3d 1207 · 1999

Citation profile

129
cited by 129 later decisions
4
states following
March 2019
most recently cited

26 federal appellate · 3 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 129 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. (2003), Cotton v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance (2005)

26 federal appellate · 3 district · 5 state decisions

1040199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeaux · Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Taylor · Donovan v. Dillingham · Lordmann Enterprises, Inc. v. Equicor, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 129 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Here's the rule: ERISA super-preemption exists only when the `plaintiff is seeking relief that is available under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a).' Whitt v. Sherman Intern. Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1330 . Regardless of the merits of the plaintiffs actual claims (recast as ERISA claims), relief is available, and there is complete preemption, when four elements are satisfied. First, there must be a relevant ERISA plan. See id.; Kemp v. International Business Machs. Corp., 109 F.3d 708 , 713 (11th Cir.1997). Second, the plaintiff must have standing to sue under that plan. See Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346 , 1350 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1998). Third, the defendant must be an ERISA entity. See id.; Franklin v. QHG of Gadsden, Inc., 127 F.3d 1024, 1029 (11th Cir.1997); see also Morstein v. National Ins. Servs., Inc., 93 F.3d 715, 722 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) (no preemption at all—not even defensive preemption—when the defendant is `a non-ERISA entity' and the claims do not `affect relations among principal ERISA entities as such'). Finally, the complaint must seek compensatory relief akin to that available under § 1132(a); often this will be a claim for benefits due under a plan. See Engelhardt, 139 F.3d at 1354 ; Franklin, 127 F.3d at 1029 ."”
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(1) No contributions are made by an employer or employee organization; (2) Participation [in] the program is completely voluntary for employees or members; (3) The sole functions of the employer or employee organization with respect to the program are, without endorsing the program, to permit the insurer to publicize the program to employees or members, to collect premiums through'payroll deductions or dues checkoffs and to remit them to the insurer; and (4) The employer or employee organization receives no consideration in the form of cash or otherwise in connection with the program, other than reasonable compensation, excluding any profit, for administrative services actually rendered in connection with payroll deductions or dues checkoffs.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “) preemption does not furnish federal subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, defensive preemption provides an affirmative defense to certain state law claims and calls for their dismissal where the state claim”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.