Salahuddin v. Mead’s Empirical Analysis
174 F.3d 271 · 1999
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 3 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently June 2012
4 federal appellate · 3 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (§ 20409 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 28 U.S.C. § 1915 · 28 U.S.C. § 1961 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1997E
Relies on Landgraf v. USI Film Products · Lindh v. Murphy · Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno · Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States · Wright v. Morris
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[The court] will not strain to detect or create an ambiguity in the otherwise plain terms of the provision before us. It is of course possible for Congress to state in even clearer terms that a particular statutory provision is to apply only prospectively, particularly by crafting a subsection to that provision which speaks solely and specifically to the question of timing. The Supreme Court has demonstrated however, that a statute can offer express guidance even without such a targeted subsection. Moreover, in its post-Landgraf decisions, the Court has hinted that such a heightened level of clarity, if it is ever required, is required only to justify the retroactive application of a newly enacted provision. By implication, and as demonstrated by [subsequent caselaw], Congress can reveal its intent to apply a provision prospectively in fewer words and without a discrete statutory subsection addressed specifically to that issue. [The court is] therefore satisfied that by limiting the [provision] to [data that “shall be immune,”] Congress has expressly precluded application of that requirement to actions that have already been filed.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[B]y limiting the exhaustion requirement to actions that ‘shall be brought,' Congress has expressly precluded application of that requirement to actions that have already been filed.”); Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 494 (10th Cir.1998) (”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.