State v. Kuczynski’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The State’s second issue questions the trial court’s authority to suspend only a portion of the sentence for the reason that the then existing statute relating to suspended sentences, IC 1971, 35-7-1-1 (Burns Code Ed.), did not expressly allow such a procedure. The State, citing State ex rel. Gash v. Morgan County Superior Court (1972), 258 Ind. 485 , 283 N.E.2d 349 , argues that the suspension of sentences and the revocation thereof is strictly governed by statute. “In defining the parameters of judicial authority in sentencing, we observe that there is no serious objection to the proposition that, under the facts of this case, the trial judge could have properly suspended all or none of the sentence pursuant to IC 1971, 35-7-1-1 (Burns Code Ed.). See: Grzesiowski v. State (1976), Ind.App., 343 N.E.2d 305 . “Furthermore, the then existing IC 1971, 35 — 7-2-1 (Burns Code Ed.) permits the trial court to impose conditions on probation ‘as it may deem best’. Given the general rules stated in Ewing v. State (1974), Ind.App., 310 N.E.2d 571 , that probation, if granted, should serve the best interests of society and the individual and that a trial judge has ‘. . . broad power to impose conditions designed to serve the accused and the community .’, we cannot condemn the trial court’s action in this case. “If the requirement that Kuczynski serve a year in prison is viewed as a condition of probation, any error that may exist is minimized, especially when one considers that no error”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 182 Ind. App. 386 - Russell v. State