dissent">McGRAW, Justice,

dissenting:

The rendition warrant and requisition from California stated that the appellant was charged with “the crime of violation of a child custody order.” Although violation of a child custody order could perhaps be prosecuted as criminal contempt, it is not the crime proscribed by Cal.Penal Code § 278 (West Supp.1984). The heading of the chapter under which this section of the California Code is found is clearly denominated “child abduction.” The appellant was not charged with “child abduction” under the rendition warrant and requisition, nor was she charged with “criminal contempt.” Instead, she was charged with “violation of a child custody order.” Unless California Superior Court child custody orders are considered criminal statutes, their violation cannot be considered crimes. The authorities cited by the majority for the proposition that the phrase “violation of a child custody order” substantially recites the facts necessary to the validity of the issuance of the rendition warrant in this case are inapposite. Although not models of clarity, each of the rendition warrants involved in the cases cited charged violations of criminal statutes, and *98not violations of judicial orders. For example, in State ex rel. Keehn v. Capelle, 17 Wisc.2d 116, 115 N.W.2d 487 (1962), the rendition warrant charged the petitioner with “child stealing” in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 278. In 1962, the heading of the chapter under which section 278 of the California Penal Code was found was denominated “child stealing.” See Cal.Penal Code § 278 (West 1970). Therefore, the rendition warrant charging the petitioner with “child stealing” provided clear notice of the crime with which the petitioner was charged. In the instant action, however, it was at best ambiguous as to what crime the appellant was charged with perpetrating. Even in light of the availability of supporting documents, it was uncertain whether she was charged with criminal contempt or child abduction. I believe such uncertainty violated the appellant’s right to procedural due process under the federal and state constitutions. Therefore, under law, justice dictates that the relief requested be granted.

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