Marsh v. Illinois Cent. R.’s Empirical Analysis
175 F.2d 498 · 1949
Citation profile
172 federal appellate · 10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 221 later decisions — most recently September 2017 · most notably Dyer v. MacDougall (1952), Mendoza v. Borden, Inc. (1999)
172 federal appellate · 10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan · William Parsons v. Bedford Breedlove · Felton v. Spiro · Mt. Adams & E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery · Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Randolph
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 221 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““A motion for a new trial is addressed to the trial judge’s discretion. He may grant a new trial * * * (and he alone can) because he thinks the verdict is wrong, though supported by some evidence. The exercise of his discretion is not ordinarily reviewable on appeal, though a failure to exercise discretion, or an abuse of it, may be corrected.””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“A motion for a directed verdict, or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule of Civil Procedure 50, 28 U.S.C.A., raises a question of law only: Whether there is any evidence which, if believed, would authorize a verdict against movant. The trial judge in considering those motions does not exercise discretion, but makes a ruling of law . . . .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““While it is not our function to weigh the evidence, we do agree with the trial judge’s first expressed opinion that the weight of the evidence is ‘overwhelmingly against the plaintiff’. But we do not agree that the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was therefore justified. There was evidence of the appellant, not very explicit or positive, which if believed might authorize a jury to conclude he was hurt in the manner he claims. Because the trial judge does not believe it, because of appellant’s own contradictions and conduct and of opposing evidence which seem to overwhelm it, is not ground for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and we must reverse that judgment. Howard v. Louisiana & A. R. Co., 5 Cir., 49 F.2d 571 . “3. But it is ground for the trial judge to grant a new trial, though the trial was free of other error. He has in strong terms disapproved the verdict as contrary to the evidence, so much as to warrant setting the verdict aside and entering judgment for the defendant. We have reversed the entering of a final judgment, but it is evident that the new trial ought to be granted and would have been except for the misconception that absence of other error prevented it. The full discretion vested in the trial judge not having been exercised, we will remand the case with direction to the judge to grant a new trial instead of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if he continues to think the veridct to be against the overwhelming weight of the eviden”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.