Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

31 federal appellate · 2 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “* * * payments made to the United States for violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, * * * are deductible as business expenses, under section 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code, if the taxpayer proves that the violation was neither willful, intentional, nor the result of the failure to take practical precautions. Rev. Puling 54r-204, Int. Rev. Cum. Bull., vol. 31, pp. 49, 50-51.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Weisman · Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. United States

2. ““We think the factual situation in the instant case meets all the necessary requirements for deduction as an accrued item in 1943 rather than in the year 1944. The events which fixed the amount of the claim and determined the fact of the taxpayer’s liability were the charging of overceiling prices in the year 1943. The moment that plaintiff exacted an overcharge a statutory liability arose under section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 [50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 925(e)] to refund at least the amount thereof to the consumer or to the United States. Further, as the overcharges were not exacted in bad faith, the amount of liability was not undetermined, because the practice of the Office of Price Administration had become definitely established to require only the repayment of the overcharge as single damages in such cases. National Brass Works, Inc., v. Commissioner, supra; Office of Price Administration Manual, Section 9.1601. Contrary to the Government’s contention we feel that the settlement agreement entered into on May 31, 1944, did not in itself establish the existence of a liability which was previously contingent, but was merely an acceptance by the Government of the amount of the overcharge as fixed by and ascertained from plaintiff’s books and records for 1943. There is nothing in the record to indicate that plaintiff at any time denied or contested its liability for the overcharges. Plaintiff did not file an answer to the suit by the Office of Price Adm”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Marantz v. Yoke

3. “The Revenue Act does not declare that penalties may not be deducted; the doctrine is a judicial gloss — and, for that matter, a gloss of the lower courts only, save as the Supreme Court recognized it by implication in Commissioner v. Heininger. We agree that it is a proper gloss (indeed we have ourselves enforced it several times) ; and its justification is that, when acts are condemned by law and their commission is madé punishable by fines or forfeitures, to allow these to be deducted from the wrongdoer’s gross income, reduces, and so in part defeats, the prescribed punishment. Obviously, to relieve the wrongdoer of a part of the tax due upon his income, in effect is to remit that much of the sanction imposed; as would at once be apparent, if we were to compare the case of a wrongdoer who has an income with that of one who has none. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Richey v. Commissioner