Holler v. Lowery’s Empirical Analysis
1938
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 2 district · 71 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 81 later decisions — most recently November 2007 · most notably Barbre v. Pope (2007), Aravanis v. Eisenberg (1965)
8 federal appellate · 2 district · 71 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Merrifield v. C. Hoffberger Co. · State Ex Rel. Schiller v. Hecht Co. · Taxicab Co. of Balto. v. Emanuel · Dickey v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co. · Lashley v. Dawson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 81 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““There is no mystery in the doctrine of proximate cause. It rests upon common sense rather than legal formula. Expressed in the simplest terms it means that negligence is not actionable unless it, without the intervention of any independent factor causes the harm complained of. It involves of course the idea of continuity, that the negligent act continuously extends through every event, fact, act and occurrence related to the tortious conduct of the defendant and is itself the logical and natural cause of the injury complained of. In the statement of the doctrine an intervening cause means not a concurrent and contributing cause, but a superseding cause, which is itself the natural and logical cause of the harm.” Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149 , 200 A. 353 , 358; Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, 1941 Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 33, p. 92.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““If the negligent acts of two or more persons, all being culpable and responsible in law for their acts, do not concur in point of time, and the negligence of one only exposes the injured person to risk of injury in case the other should also be negligent, the liability of the person first in fault will depend upon the question whether the negligent act of the other was one which a man of ordinary experience and sagacity, acquainted with all the circumstances, could reasonably anticipate or not. If such a person could have anticipated that the intervening act of negligence might, in a natural and ordinary sequence, follow the original act of negligence, the person first in fault is not released from liability by reason of the intervening negligence of another, [citing cases].””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Segerman v. Jones
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.