Frenkil v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The breach of duty owed by the defendant to the traveler on the highway was the former’s failure to use the premises of which he was then in the exclusive possession with that degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent man would, under similar conditions, have reasonably exercised, so as to prevent the dangerous state of the premises to become the proximate cause of injury to a traveler in the lawful and careful use of an adjacent municipal highway.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 241 Md. App. 94 - Steamfitters Local Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch. · Cogan Kibler, Inc. v. Vito

2. “In any aspect of the proof, the proximate and efficient cause of the explosion was the presence of free gas. If the particular act or thing which set off the explosion was an act or condition for which either the defendant, through his servants, or a third party, was responsible, it would necessarily be an additional act or omission of the defendant or one of the third party without legal significance so far as the plaintiff's right of recovery is affected, since the injury was inflicted while the defendant's own wrongful act was continuing in force and operation. In the hypothesis made, if the ignition was by the act or nonfeasance of the defendant, the testimony would be unnecessary to establish the plaintiff's right of action; if, on the other hand, it was the act or omission of a third party, it would not affect the plaintiff's right of action against the defendant, whose negligence remained in existence to become concurrent. As observed in Consolidated Gas Company v. Getty , 96 Md. 683 , at page 690, 54 A. 660 , at page 662, 94 Am.St.Rep. 603 : 'But it is equally true that no wrongdoer ought to be allowed to apportion or qualify his own wrong; and that, as a loss has actually happened whilst his own wrongful act was in force and operation, he ought not to be permitted to set up as a defense, that there was a more immediate cause of the loss, if that cause was put into operation by his own wrongful act.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 241 Md. App. 94 - Steamfitters Local Union No. 602 v. Erie Ins. Exch.

3. “It should be noted that the term "exclusive" when used to define the quantity of the possession, control or management by the defendant of the injurious agency is not employed in the sense that the possession, control or management must be several so that for the inference of defendant's negligence to be operative the defendant in possession, control or management must be singlar and never plural. The meaning of the term as here employed is that the possession, control or management must be exclusive as against all who do not have a concurrent joint possession, control or management in fact, either as joint actors, possessors or users in respect of the injurious agency; * * *.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 21 Utah 2d 73 - Talbot v. DR. WH GROVES'LATTER-DAY SAINTS HOSP.