Volume 175 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

COMMUNITY SCHOOL – JURSIDICTION – STANDING – FAITHLESS SERVANT DOCTRINE – OHIO CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT – STRICT LIABILITY – VOID PUBLIC CONTRACTS: The trial court did not err in concluding that contracts with a community school's superintendent's family violated R.C. 2921.42's prohibition against public officials having a personal interest in a public contract where defendants superintendent and family failed to prove that any exception applied.The trial court did not err in concluding that the attorney general had statutory standing, under R.C. 2117.42, to sue defendants community school superintendent and her family to recover public funds. The trial court did not err in concluding that, under the faithless servant doctrine, the superintendent and her husband should forfeit their employment wages. The trial court erred in concluding that the superintendent and her husband were liable for treble damages under the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act where the illegal contracts did not constitute a pattern within the meaning of the statute. The trial court did not err in concluding that the superintendent is strictly liable for the illegal contracts with her husband and daughter where she received public funds under color of office and was responsible for the school's expenditures. The trial court did not err in concluding that the superintendent's daughter should return all income received under her illegal contracts where, on appeal, defendants provided no argument to the contrary.

In this multi-party, multi-claim breach of contract case, this court lacks jurisdiction to decide appellant/cross-appellee James Tobias's appeal because appellee/cross-appellant Airtron's breach of contract claim was not fully decided below the trial court's decision regarding whether certain claims were subject to a jury trial remains interlocutory. Additionally, the trial court erred by looking outside the plain language of the contract to determine that Airtron breached its contract with James Tobias. James Tobias's appeal is dismissed. The appeal of appellants Daniel Tobias and A-1 Mechanical, which is based on James Tobias's claim, is also dismissed for lack of a final appealable order. The trial court's judgment against Airtron for breach of contract is reversed.

Motion to dismiss nunc pro tunc order Civ.R. 60(A) clerical mistakes errors of oversight or omission substantive changes dismissal with prejudice dismissal without prejudice final, appealable order jurisdiction. Trial court erred in using a nunc pro tunc order to modify its dismissal of complaint "without prejudice" to a dismissal "with prejudice" where there was nothing in the record that showed that the trial court's nunc pro tunc order sought to correct a clerical mistake or an error arising from oversight or omission or that the trial court had actually decided to dismiss complaint with prejudice and then inadvertently indicated that complaint was dismissed without prejudice in its original order. Nunc pro tunc order vacated appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to the extent appellant challenged trial court's dismissal of complaint without prejudice.

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant's complaint did not establish the elements necessary to support his claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Judgment affirmed. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

Appellee, a credit union, reserved the right to change the terms of its membership agreement, which included a provision to arbitrate disputes. By maintaining his account, appellant, a credit union member, manifested his assent to the arbitration provision. Furthermore, the arbitration provision in the membership agreement was not unconscionable. Judgment affirmed.

parental rights, custody, abuse or neglect, guardian ad litem, Juv.R. 4(B)(5), R.C. 3109.04, Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(b)(6), Civ.R. 41(B), notice, due process

Home health aide sought workers' compensation benefits after she fell in the wet grass in the side yard of her client's home and sustained an injury to her back. The employee had completed her shift, had stayed with the client (a long-time friend) for approximately 15 minutes after her shift, and was leaving the home when she went to check on an unknown noise around the side of the house. The trial court did not err in concluding that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of and arising out of her employment. Judgment affirmed.

CIVIL LAW - summary judgment legal malpractice proximate cause damages identifiable loss rebuttal evidence to appellees' affidavits no genuine issue of material fact that appellees' malpractice was the proximate cause of any loss.

SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE – EXCLUSIONARY RULE – STALENESS OF EVIDENCE – GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION – AFFADAVIT: Where the officer's affidavit consisted only of years-old stale information and present evidence of personal drug use, there was no probable cause to search the defendant's residence for evidence of drug trafficking. The trial court erred in applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, because the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable official could have believed in its existence. [But see DISSENT: A reasonable police officer would not find the affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to believe no probable cause existed therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.