concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">VERNIERO, J.,

concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I concur in that part of the Court’s holding that applies the gap-time calculation to time served on a juvenile sentence. I agree with the rationale expressed in the majority’s opinion. I find additional support in this Court’s recent decision in State in re J.D.H., 171 N.J. 475, 795 A.2d 851 (2002). In that ease, a juvenile argued that the police had intercepted a telephone conversation between himself and the victim of his sexual assault in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-4 (the Wiretap Act). At the time of the interception, the statute authorized the police to so act in cases in which “there existfed] a reasonable suspicion that evidence of criminal conduct [would] be derived from such interception[.]” Ibid.(emphasis added), amended by L. 1999, c. 151 § 3.

Somewhat ironically, the juvenile’s argument in J.D.H. mirrored that which the State is asserting here, namely, that a criminal statute should not apply to juvenile conduct in view of the purported differences between acts of “delinquency” and adult “crimes.” ■The juvenile contended “that the Wiretap Act’s use of the phrase *473‘criminal conduct’ was meant to exclude the police from intercepting communications of juvenile suspects.” J.D.H., supra,171 N.J. at 482, 795 A.2d 851. We disagreed, explaining: “We find nothing in the text or legislative history of the Wiretap Act that demonstrates convincingly that the Legislature intended the Act to apply only to investigations of adult suspects.” Ibid.

I reason similarly in this case. I find no persuasive indication in the text or history of the gap-time statute that the Legislature intended it to apply only to adult sentences. I acknowledge that there are distinct differences between juvenile and adult proceedings. But because they yield the same result, i.e., deprivation of a person’s liberty, juvenile and adult sentences should be treated uniformly for purposes of the gap-time calculation. See State v. Carreker, 172 N.J. 100, 116, 796 A.2d 847 (2002) (favoring uniform application of gap-time statute unless such application “run[s] counter to the statute’s language and underlying policy rationale”).

I part company with my colleagues with respect to their conclusion that defendant is entitled to gap-time credit for that portion of his first sentence that he served after his subsequent criminal behavior resulted in a revocation of parole and re-incarceration. That conclusion is contrary to what I believe lawmakers would have intended in these circumstances. As the majority correctly notes, the gap-time statute at its root is grounded in equitable considerations. Ante at 459, 815 A.2d at 965-66 (characterizing gap-time credit as “equitable remedy”). In my view, however, those considerations require us to deny gap-time credit when a defendant violates parole and is re-incarcerated as a direct result of that conduct. Consistent with the majority’s own equitable paradigm, I conclude that an award of gap-time credit to defendant in the face of his parole revocation constitutes an unwarranted benefit not contemplated by the Legislature.

Although the statute’s legislative history is sketchy, we have surmised that the purpose of gap time “is to mitigate the possible manipulation of sentences by prosecutors who might delay a criminal indictment even when an inmate is available for disposi*474tion on a New Jersey offense.” Carreker, supra,172 N.J. at 113—14, 796 A.2d 847. With that purpose in mind, this Court recently held that the statute does not apply to time served on a defendant’s out-of-state sentence. Id. at 111, 796 A.2d 847. We observed: “In the case of a defendant ... who has fled the jurisdiction and is serving time in a foreign facility, the risk of manipulation is greatly reduced, if not vitiated, by that defendant’s absence.” Id. at 114, 796 A.2d 847.

The same concept is applicable in this case. The time served for which defendant seeks credit resulted from a revocation of parole due to his subsequent acts, not from any manipulation by prosecutors. This is roughly similar to when an inmate commits a crime while in custody, the result being that the inmate’s ultimate term of incarceration is extended to incorporate the additional offense. In that circumstance the statute expressly prohibits an award of gap-time credit. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b (authorizing gap-time calculation when defendant is sentenced for certain offenses “other than an offense committed while in custody”). Although the analogy is imperfect, I find enough similarity between an offense committed while on parole and one committed while in custody to conclude that lawmakers did not intend that gap-time credit apply in either situation.

I do not suggest that courts undertake a fact-sensitive analysis each time they are presented with a gap-time application. In most instances a gap-time award is non-discretionary. We do not want sentencing courts to engage in lengthy hearings to determine whether idiosyncratic factors warrant a particular gap-time calculation. My intended disposition would not require such a hearing for two reasons. First, defendant’s receipt of his juvenile sentence and his subsequent parole furnish the precise dates on which to calculate a gap-time award (ie., 304 days). Second, revocation of that parole was a defined act that indisputably enhanced the time served by defendant for which he now claims credit. That defendant’s conduct resulted in his re-incarceration is self-evident, requiring no subjective determination by the trial court, similar to *475when an inmate serves an out-of-state sentence for which no gap-time credit is available.

Lastly, “[e]riminal statutes, generally speaking, are to be strictly construed, but the rule of strict construction does not mean that the manifestations of the Legislature’s intention should be disregarded.” Carreker, supra,172 N.J. at 115, 796 A.2d 847 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The statute does not address expressly the circumstances presented here. In my view, application of the statute in the face of defendant’s parole revocation would run counter to its underlying policy rationale for the reasons already stated. I thus would afford the trial court the discretion to deny gap-time credit as was done below.

Justice COLEMAN joins in this opinion.

For reversing and remanding — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN — 5.Concurring in part/dissenting in part — Justices COLEMAN and VERNIERO — 2.

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