Shepherd v. Fregozo’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Authorities accepting the [narrow coverage theory] point out that vehicular liability insurance is ordinarily written upon and follows particular scheduled vehicles. It is not written upon named individuals, and is not like general health or accident insurance coverage. The liability policy covers a scheduled vehicle, and extends its protection, through omnibus clauses, not only to the named insured but to members of his family and other persons using the vehicle with permission, subject to conditions and exclusions.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mark A. Shempert v. Kim Wright Cox, Personal Representative ad litem for the Estate of Robert Davis · Gillard v. Taylor

2. “[[Image here]] In sister jurisdictions, a body of law has developed under the “regular use” exclusion as it relates to police vehicles available for regular use to policemen.... In O’Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co. of Massachusetts, 141 So.2d 307 , Plaintiff was a police officer employed by Ormond Beach, Florida, and was insured as to his personal automobile by the Defendant insurance company. In his work as a police officer, Plaintiff was expected to and did use whichever one of four city-owned cars was assigned to him. While driving one of such vehicles, he was involved in an accident and sustained various personal injuries. He sued his private insurance company for medical benefits under his policy of insurance. The trial court, applying the “regular use” exclusion, directed a verdict for the defendant, and the District Court of Ap peals of Florida, relying on Moore v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 239 Miss. 130 , 121 So.2d 125 (1960) affirmed the judgment. The holding in the Moore case that an exclusionary clause involved in that case, identical to that in the instant case, is not ambiguous when read in conjunction with the general coverage clause, appears to represent the majority opinion in this country, as pointed out by the Louisiana Court of Appeals in an exhaustive discussion of this area of the law in Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Co., 91 So.2d 123 ( [La.App.] 1956).... O’Brien v. Halifax Ins. Co. of Mass., 141 So.2d 307, 308 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1962). Galvin v. Arnica Mu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gillard v. Taylor

3. “Further expositive of the “regular use” exclusion in its applicability to the case at bar are those cases where an employer provides a fleet of vehicles which may be randomly assigned to a particular employee. In City of Jackson v. Freeman-Howie, Inc., 239 Miss. 84 , 121 So.2d 120 [ (1960) ], the Supreme Court of Mississippi held: The proof clearly shows that insured’s employer furnished for the regular use of insured a truck, either one of about ten, although insured did not regularly use any particular one of the fleet of ten trucks. Two or three trips a week were made by insured as driver of one of the ten trucks of his employer, and he made other trips as helper on one of the trucks. It cannot be said that insured’s use of the employer’s trucks was other than regular use. The question narrows to this: Does the term “regular use” in the exclusionary clause refer to one specific automobile? As stated, the obvious purpose of the exclusionary clause is to limit the extension of medical payments coverage to casual or infrequent use of occupancy of automobiles other than the one defined in the policy, in this case the insured’s Chevrolet. It is regular use of other automobiles that brings the exclusionary clause into operation, and if insured’s employer assigns him one specific automobile for regular use or a number of automobiles, any one of which may be assigned for a particular trip, the result is the same. An automobile is furnished insured “for regular use” in either event”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gillard v. Taylor