Malony v. Adsit’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

85 federal appellate · 14 district · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 145 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A bill o£ exceptions allowed in any cause shall be deemed sufficiently authenticated if signed by the judge of the court in which the cause was tried, or by the presiding judge thereof, if more than one judge sat at the trial o£ the cause, without any seal of court or judge annexed thereto.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Penn Mut. Life Ins. v. Ashe · Sanborn v. Bay

2. ““It certainly cannot be contended that, if the trial judge is able officially to sign the bill of exceptions, it would be competent for the counsel to dispense with his action, and rely upon an agreed statement of the facts and law of the case as tried. Nor can they agree that another than the trial judge may perform his functions in that regard. In Lynch v. Craney, 95 Mich. 199 , 54 N. W. 879 , it was said that the practice of stipulating a bill of exceptions without the sanction of the judge cannot be commended; and, if such fact be brought to the attention of the court before the argument of the case, the appeal will be dismissed. In Coburn v. Murray, 2 Me. 336 , it was held that a bill unauthenticated by the trial judge cannot be given validity by consent of counsel. We are referred to no decision of this court on the x>recise question whether counsel can stipulate the correctness of a bill of exceptions not signed by the trial judge. But we think that on principle this cannot be done, and we regard the cases just cited as sound statements of tlie law. Accordingly, our conclusion is that the errors of the trial court alleged in the bill of exceptions, unauthenticated by the signature of the judge who sat at the trial cannot be considered by us.” .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Oxford & Coast Line R. v. Union Bank of Richmond · Fellman v. Royal Ins. Co.

3. ““Where the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of certain described property, which is unlawfully detained by the defendant, and the possession of which the plaintiff prays to recover, a general verdict for the plaintiff is a finding that he is entitled to the possession of all the property described in the complaint. Again, in this action, brought under a special statute of the United States, in support of an adverse claim, but one estate is involved in the controversy. No title in fee is or can be established. That remains in the United States, and the only question presented is the priority of right to purchase the fee. Hence the inapplicability of a statute regulating generally actions for the recovery of real estate, in which actions different kinds of title may be sufficient to sustain the right of recovery. It would be purely surplusage to find in terms a priority of the right to purchase, when that is the only question that can be litigated in such statutory actions.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Price v. Brockway · Tyee Consol. Min. Co. v. Langstedt