State v. Locke’s Empirical Analysis
2013
Citation profile
3
cited by 3 later decisions
1
states following
December 2021
most recently cited
3 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Crawford v. Washington · New York Times Co. v. Sullivan · Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego · Watts v. United States · Virginia v. Black
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A true threat is a serious threat, not one said in jest, idle talk, or political argument. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 43 (citing United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1983)). Stated another way, communications that “bear the wording of threats but which are in fact merely jokes, idle talk, or hyperbole” are not true threats. State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274, 283 , 236 P.3d 858 (2010). The nature of a threat “depends on all the facts and circumstances, and it is not proper to limit the inquiry to a literal translation of the words spoken.” State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 611 , 80 P.3d 594 (2003). Statements may “connote something they do not literally say ....” Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 , 1085 (9th Cir. 2002). Consistently with this recognition, our court has held that “[w]hether a statement is a true threat or a joke is determined in light of the entire context” and that a person can indirectly threaten to harm or kill another. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 46, 48 . Further, “[t]he speaker of a ‘true threat’ need not actually intend to carry it out. It is enough that a reasonable speaker would foresee that the threat would be considered serious.” Schaler, 169 Wn.2d at 283 (citation omitted).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[T]he First Amendment demands more than application of our usual standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 48-49 . Instead, we must independently examine the whole record to ensure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion into the field of free expression. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 50 . We are required to independently review only crucial facts, that is, those facts so intermingled with the legal question that it is necessary to analyze them in order to pass on the constitutional question. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 50-51 . In doing so, we may review evidence in the record not considered by the lower court in deciding the constitutional question. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 51 . However, our review does not extend to factual determinations such as witness credibility. State v. Johnston, 156 Wn.2d 355, 365-66 , 127 P.3d 707 (2006).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.