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← 176 F.3d 453 - Lingar v. Bowersox

Lingar v. Bowersox’s Empirical Analysis

176 F.3d 453 · 1999

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
2
states following
October 2021
most recently cited

22 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently October 2021 · most notably Bland v. Sirmons (2006), United States v. Mullins (2006)

22 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

3001999200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Lockett v. Ohio · Eddings v. Oklahoma · Penry v. Lynaugh · Scharffe v. Perkins

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he decision to concede guilt of the lesser charge of second-degree murder was a reasonable tactical retreat rather than a complete surrender. The tactic did not preclude [defendant] from maintaining his innocence on the first-degree murder charge, and if successful, would have permitted Lingar to avoid the death penalty. Further, counsel could retain some credibility and gain an advantage by winning the jury’s trust. Even if the jury convicted [defendant] of first-degree murder, the jury might then be more sympathetic to defense witnesses testifying in the penalty phase that [defendant] deserved mercy. Given the overwhelming evidence, [defendant] could not credibly deny involvement in [the victim’s] killing, and denying all involvement could inflame the jury and incite it to render a death sentence. Defense counsel had no viable option.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “When counsel misstates the law, the misstatement is harmless error if the court properly instructs the jury on that point of law or instructs that the attorneys' statements and arguments are not evidence.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The jury could and should have been given the opportunity [to] consider all mitigating factors, including a history of sexual abuse, substance abuse, and blackouts; a mental evaluation revealing borderline mental retardation, acute paranoid and depressive disorders; expression of remorse; and indications that Lingar was a good candidate for rehabilitation. Lingar was clearly prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to develop and present this evidence. There is no reasonable probability that • a jury advised of these circumstances would have imposed the death sentence on this 20-year-old, mentally retarded and mentally disturbed young man.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.