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176 Misc. 911

In re Babushkin

New York Supreme Court

Decided July 18, 1941

New York Supreme Court · decided 1941-07-18

Relies on Birdzell v. Birdzell ex rel. Tucker · Worthy v. Worthy · Bradford v. Abend

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1941-07-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1993

3 state decisions

10194119501960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Eder, J.

¶1This is an ex parte application by the substituted committee of an incompetent veteran for an order to appoint a special guardian ad litem to commence an action for an absolute divorce on behalf of the incompetent against his wife and to retain an attorney to prosecute said action and to advance all necessary and reasonable disbursements and costs that said action may entail.

¶2The incompetent has been an inmate of a United States veterans’ hospital since February 7,1929. It is alleged that the incompetent’s wife has been living in adultery for upwards of five years.

¶3*912This is an unusual application and concerns, primarily, the status of a non compos as plaintiff and the authority of the guardian, of an incompetent to maintain an action for divorce against the erring spouse.

¶4Marriage is a personal status brought into being with the free and voluntary consent of the parties assuming that relation and it continues for the lifetime of the parties save and except when the sacred relation is dissolved by virtue of statutory authorization for wrong committed against such relation by the other party. Even in such a case it requires the active and affirmative volition of the injured and innocent spouse.

¶5Since, then, the right to sue for an absolute divorce is a purely personal one, of necessity it requires the intelligent action of the injured party. Being incompetent or insane the requisite intelligent action is wanting. Can this, personal right be the subject of transfer to and be exercised by another on behalf of the incompetent to the same extent and with the same effect as if it had been exercised by the incompetent himself as if he were of sound mind? I do not think so.

¶6Condonation or forgiveness by the wronged husband or wife, as the case may be, is not an impossibility, and, indeed, is recognized in law as a bar to an action for either a limited or absolute divorce. The aggrieved husband or wife may, for divers reasons, choose to continue the connubial ties, notwithstanding the wrong. An incompetent or insane person is not regarded as being capable or in a condition to exercise a proper or intelligent discretion in the matter; that another may exercise it for him is denied in other jurisdictions where it is held that a guardian or next friend cannot maintain.a suit for absolute divorce for his ward. (Worthy v. Worthy, 36 Ga. 45; Iago v. Iago, 168 Ill. 339; 48 N. E. 30; Bradford v. Abent, 89 Ill. 78; Birdzell v. Birdzell, 33 Kan. 433; 6 P. 561; Ellis v. White, 61 Iowa, 644; 17 N. W. 28. See, also, Smoot, Law of Insanity [1929 ed.[, § 426.)

¶7In Kaplan v. Kaplan (256 N. Y. 366) the following question was certified to the Court of Appeals: “ May a person legally declared incompetent maintain an action for a separation through a duly authorized representative?” This question was answered in the affirmative. As to whether an action for-an absolute divorce may be maintained through such a representative is a matter the court said it would determine when the question is directly presented.

¶8My research has not unearthed any case in this State involving this specific question. In the Kaplancase the Court of Appeals referred to the fact that the action was brought for a separation and that the suit was based upon the continued existence of the *913marriage tie but seems to intimate that a different rule obtains in the case of a suit for absolute divorce. The court said, “ there may be ground for an inference that the Legislature did not intend that the statutory right to bring an action for the dissolution of a marriage, valid in its inception and resting upon free consent, should be brought in behalf of an incompetent who, if capable of exercising choice, might prefer to hold even an unfaithful spouse, or who might, indeed, in good conscience, regard the marriage bonds as indissoluble.”

¶9In the light of the views expressed by the courts in other jurisdictions, and the intimation in Kaplan v. Kaplan (supra)and after due reflection, I have come to the conclusion that the guardian or other representative of an incompetent or insane person cannot maintain an action for absolute divorce against the offending spouse; that it is a right strictly personal to the party aggrieved and is solely under the control of the person injured by the infidelity of the other and that it is wholly at the volition of that party whether a suit shall be begun and prosecuted or not.

¶10The application is accordingly denied.

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