¶1 The statute (Eev., sec. 3287) defines an accessory before the fact as one who “shall counsel, procure, or command any other person to commit any felony,” and the testimony of Council clearly comes within the statute, as it shows that the defendant counseled and procured the commission of the crime.
¶2 The credibility of the witness was for the jury, as it is established by a long line of authorities in .this State that while the evidence of an accomplice ought to be received with caution, and that the court in its discretion may so instruct the jury, it is sufficient, uncorroborated, to support a verdict of guilty. S. v. Honey, 19 N. C., 390; S. v. Holland, 83 N. C., 624; S. v. Barber, 113 N. C., 713; S. v. Shaft, 166 N. C., 409.
¶3 The motion for judgment of nonsuit was therefore properly overruled.
¶4 .The objection that Council was disqualified because, being under sentence of death, a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum could not issue to compel his attendance, under Eevisal, sec. 1855, is met by the decisions in S. v. Adair, 68 N. C., 68, and Ex parte Harris, 73 N. C., 65, holding that this statute does not apply to the State, and the objection that the-witness was dead, by the fact that' he was present in the flesh.
¶5 No error.