Peterson v. Armstrong’s Empirical Analysis
1965
Citation profile
22 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently December 1995
22 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ballard v. National Indemnity Company of Omaha, Neb. · Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co. · Cosmopolitan Mutual Insurance v. Continental Casualty Co. · Oregon Auto. Ins. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · Rogillio v. Cazedessus
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"If the insured (including omnibus insured) has other insurance against a loss covered by * * * this policy, the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability of this policy bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance."”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““In Coco v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., La.App. 3 Cir., 136 So.2d 288 , this court had occasion to make an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence concerning the question before us. As there stated, ‘ * * * the jurisprudence of this State has been established to the effect that where the original permittee has been granted more or less general discretion and continuous control over the insured vehicle by the named insured, such general permission carries with it the implied consent of the named insured for the original permittee to allow third persons to use the insured vehicle.’ 136 So.2d 293 . Citations omitted. “The opinion further states, 136 So.2d 293 : ‘In a case, however, where the original permittee has been granted the more or less general use of and continuous control over the insured vehicle by the named insured, but with the specific restriction or prohibition that he is not to permit anyone else to drive it, then we think the general permission granted to the original permittee does not carry with it the implied consent of the named insured that others may be permitted to drive the insured car.’ Nevertheless, as the opinion continued, 136 So.2d 295 : ‘We can readily conceive of circumstances where the permission of the named insured for a second permittee to use the automobile may be implied, even though the named insured has specifically prohibited the initial permittee from letting someone else drive. Such permission may be implied, for instance, if the na”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“* * * only the named insured may constitute one a permittee and thus afford him coverage; if an original borrower turns over the possession of the vehicle to a second permittee, this second permittee is not considered as using the car with the permission of the named insured, unless, either expressly or by implication, the initial permission included the named insured's consent for the first permittee to allow third persons to use the insured vehicle.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.